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Abstract 
Despite decades of improvement workplace safety still has a long way to go 
(Dekker, 2019). Many thousands of workers continue to be injured across the globe (ILO, 
2019). Even in developed countries like Australia, injury rates are stalling, and even 
increasing in some industries (Safe Work Australia, 2019), and workers’ compensation 
claims are on the rise (Work Cover Qld, 2019). Consequently, research on ways to 
improve workplace safety is still very much in demand. Since the late 1970s, 
organisational culture’s role in contributing, firstly, to large-scale disasters (Turner, 1979), 
and later, to positive capabilities for successful and safe performance (Weick & Roberts, 
1993), prompted the coining of the term ‘safety culture’ (INSAG, 1991).  
A safety culture is widely considered to be a subset of the broader organisational 
culture of relevance to safety (Griffin & Curcuruto, 2016), or alternatively, an analytical lens 
from which to examine and evaluate the broader organisational culture for its effects on 
safety properties (Guldenmund, 2018). Yet, empirical intervention research on safety 
culture is still in its infancy (Aburumman et al., 2019). My programme of research aims to 
contribute to this gap in academic and practical understanding.  
In this research, I develop an integrative and situationally-based model of safety 
leadership that contributes to a positive safety climate and culture through the 
implementation of various ‘control strategies’ (Leverage, Energise, Adapt, and Defend; 
LEAD). The research programme consists of theoretical development, followed by a series 
of studies designed to develop and validate a new measure of safety leadership. The final 
study tests an intervention toolkit designed around the new model, drawing on a multi-
organisational setting. 
The theoretical paper describes how the LEAD model can be used to exert an 
influence over workers’ safety performance by creating a shared social context regarding 
the applicability and utility of various ‘bundles’ of safety practices (i.e., control strategies). 
This model is linked to a number of theories in safety science, including high reliability 
organising, Rasmussen’s (1997) control model, as well as the extant literatures around 
safety culture, climate, and leadership. 
In the second section of the research programme, four studies are undertaken to 
create, test, and evaluate the psychometric performance of a LEAD scale. Qualitative 
interviews were undertaken with 25 subject matter experts and an item pool built from 
coded and thematically-analysed comments. Next, an item pool was subjected to testing 
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and refinement. The LEAD factor structure was established through exploratory factor 
analysis. Finally, two separate applied studies confirmed the LEAD model’s factor 
structure and provided evidence of its predictive validity insofar as accounting for variance 
in safety performance and motivation.  
The final study involved the development and evaluation of a LEAD toolkit that was 
designed for industry. The toolkit consisted of separate worker and leader training 
programs, a senior manager workshop, and a survey tool with results debrief. Six 
organisational units within a much larger academic institution participated in the 
intervention research. Training feedback was positive overall, and increased in positivity as 
the sessions progressed. Comparisons before and after the training, and between training 
participants and non-participants, showed that the toolkit did influence self-reported safety 
performance and perceptions of two LEAD dimensions: Adapt and Defend.  
The thesis concludes with a general discussion, including an extended treatment of 
directions for future research, and a personal reflection.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Despite marked progress in health and safety management (Hofmann, Burke & 
Zohar, 2017), injuries and fatalities still occur in Australian workplaces. According to Safe 
Work Australia (2017), 182 fatalities occurred in 2016. Examining workers’ compensation 
claims data, 104,770 serious injuries and illnesses occurred between 2015-16. When 
reclassified in terms of severity rather than lost time, serious injury rates may actually be 
increasing in Australian workplaces (O’Neill & Wolfe, 2017).  
Safety-related incidents carry many costs, both moral and economic. In 2012-13, 
workplace injuries and illnesses cost the Australian economy $61.8 billion (Safe Work 
Australia, 2015). Further, the median compensated cost of workplace safety incidents 
increased by 30% from $5,200 to $6,800 between 2015-16 (Safe Work Australia, 2017). 
Taken together, further work is clearly needed to prevent workplace injuries and illnesses 
across Australia. 
Today, many organisations share their frustration about the safety plateau. First 
coined by James Reason (1997), the safety plateau is a region of organisational 
performance whereby incidents and injuries reduce to a certain amount, but fail to reach 
zero. Typically, organisations’ strength of safety management waxes and wanes in 
response to the recency of safety incidents. Scholars and practitioners alike have taken to 
this problem with vastly different strategies and methods. Some argue that an even greater 
resolve and Zero Accident Vision is required to make further advancements (Zwetsloot et 
al., 2017). Others believe that the very nature of safety requires redefinition, moving away 
from a focus on negatives and towards a positive focus such as the creation of resilience, 
capacity, and potentials for success (Hollnagel, 2014; Dekker, et al., 2016). Safety culture 
and climate researchers present another avenue for safety improvement, which arguably 
encapsulate and transcend these other movements in safety science as they seek to 
understand the shared patterns of thinking that underpin safe organisations (e.g., 
Antonsen, 2017; Naevestad, 2009; Naevestad, 2008; Reiman & Rollenhagen, 2014). 
Indeed, safety culture and safety climate are “critically important” (Hofmann et al., 
2017; p.382) to making improvements in health and safety performance. Defined loosely 
as group level and shared perceptions, values, norms, and beliefs around health and 
safety, safety culture and safety climate extend safety science and practice to include the 
social phenomena that influence workers’ safety behaviour. Safety culture, largely through 
retrospective case studies, has been shown to enhance understanding of why catastrophic 
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organisational incidents occur, particularly with reference to high profile events such as 
Deep Water Horizon (Reader & O’Connor, 2013), Challenger (Vaughan, 1997), and Pike 
River (Black, 2014). Safety climate has a much firmer empirical base and a more 
consistently-demonstrated relationship with group- and individual-level safety 
performance. Numerous meta-analyses have demonstrated strong predictive relationships 
with safety compliance and proactive safety behaviours (Christian, Bradley, Wallace & 
Burke, 2009; Clarke, 2006; Clarke, 2010).  
Safety culture and climate are important to advance the future of safety science and 
performance because they are ‘soft controls’ over worker behaviour. In contrast to ‘hard 
controls’ like engineering-based solutions; physical machine guarding, ventilation systems, 
and pedestrian barriers, social phenomena like safety culture and safety climate offer 
additional ways to safeguard the welfare of workers, prevent process disruptions, and 
even generate additional productivity and profitability (Fabius et al., 2013; Lamm et al., 
2006). Hence, finding evidence-based and effective ways of improving safety culture and 
safety climate is high on the research agenda. 
Yet, despite the utility of these constructs, there remains significant theoretical and 
practical issues to be resolved. Safety culture and safety climate exhibit considerable 
conceptual murkiness and overlap, to the extent that the terms are often used 
interchangeably (Glendon & Stanton, 2000; Gadd & Collins, 2002; Hofmann et al., 2017). 
Safety culture is theoretically underspecified and detached from the more established 
organisational culture literature (Guldenmund, 2010), to the extent that it has been labelled 
a ‘concept in chaos’ (Hopkins, 2006; Antonsen, 2009). On this point, safety culture has 
become conceptually ‘bloated’ with it being labelled as a catchall term that has lost intrinsic 
meaning (Borys, 2014; Guldenmund, 2010). Some scholars have even referred to safety 
culture as the ‘new human error’ (Dekker, 2019). Both safety culture and safety climate 
suffer from heterogeneity in dimensionality, with no clearly agreed set of higher order 
factors or aspects around which consistent measures can be developed and tested (Flin, 
Mearns, O’Connor & Bryden, 2000). Finally, although there have been many theories put 
forward as to how safety culture’s and safety climate’s effects translate through into 
behaviour (Griffin & Curcuruto, 2016), empirical research testing these ideas is in its 
infancy (e.g., Zohar, Huang, Lee & Robertson, 2015).  
An alternative to safety culture and climate is safety leadership. Safety leadership is 
an established antecedent of workplace safety behaviour, both directly, and indirectly via 
constructs like safety climate (Clarke, 2013). It is based on tangible practices and 
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behaviours that can be trained (Barling et al., 2002; Mullen & Kelloway, 2009). Safety 
leadership also benefits general work and employee outcomes including organisational 
commitment, innovation, knowledge management, and job satisfaction (Donovan et al., 
2017). Not only can safety leadership be demonstrated by those in official or formal roles 
such as supervisors. Co-workers can also demonstrate safety leadership by teaching 
others about safety topics, stopping the job if risk is unacceptable, and generally being 
proactive, self-starting and showing initiative toward safety (Hofmann et al., 2003). These 
properties make safety leadership an attractive alternative for industry looking for ways to 
improve safety performance using readily-implemented initiatives. In the next section I 
present a brief overview of the safety leadership literature, and explain how this research 
programme aligns with and extends this literature in new directions. 
 
A brief overview of safety leadership research 
The phrase ‘safety leadership’ first appeared in the scholarly literature in the mid-
1980s and early 1990s, through conference publications by safety engineers and other 
industry professionals (e.g., Cosad et al., 1998; Pater, 1984; Rosenfield, 1980). Definitions 
of safety leadership at that time were largely informal and atheoretical, reflecting the 
practitioner-centric audiences and industry-driven research context. For example, Carrillo 
and Simon (1999) described safety leadership as a ‘grass roots’ style of leadership that 
focusses on consultation, participation, and establishing safety as a core value and cultural 
assumption, as per Edgar Schein’s writings on organisational culture.  
 Also in the 1980s, Dov Zohar coined the phrase ‘safety climate’, which emphasised 
the role of management actions in driving safety performance, through creating shared 
behaviour-outcome expectancies among workers. These expectancies concerned the 
value and priority of safety relative to other demands like production and efficiency (Zohar, 
1980; Zohar, 2000). Management commitment to safety, a common dimension of safety 
climate (Flin et al., 2000), was thereafter established as a safety leadership-esque 
construct. To this day, it remains unclear how safety climate is distinguished from safety 
leadership (Molnar et al., 2019; Oah et al., 2018).  
 In 1994, a type of ‘proto-safety leadership’ concept was explored by Simard and 
Marchand. Building on the original propositions of Heinrich (1931) and industry consultants 
regarding the importance of supervision in leading safety outcomes, the authors 
investigated the effects of supervisory practices on safety. Although the term ‘safety 
leadership’ and even ‘leadership’ weren’t mentioned, Simard and Marchand (1994) 
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showed that a participatory style of supervision (involvement in safety activities) predicted 
positive safety performance among workers.  
In 1999, Hofmann and Morgeson explored the effects of a general leadership 
theory, leader-member exchange, on safety communication and accidents. They argued 
that higher levels of organisational support and better-quality leader-member relationships 
would activate norms of reciprocity, leading to greater willingness among workers to speak 
up about safety. The findings suggested that investing in genuine and high-quality 
relationships at work could improve safety performance.  
It wasn’t until 2001 that O’Dea and Flin published on safety leadership in the 
mainstream safety science literature. Safety leadership was loosely defined as a form of 
‘participative management’ whereby leaders became actively and visibly involved in safety 
activities, and conducted frequent, informal communications between workers and 
management about safety. Open-ended survey comments revealed four themes or 
dimensions of safety leadership among offshore oil and gas managers: visibility, 
relationships, workforce involvement, and proactive management (O’Dea & Flin, 2001). 
The seminal study done by Barling and colleagues (2002) was the first peer-
reviewed article to coin the term ‘safety-specific leadership’. In this study, the construct 
was safety-specific transformational leadership, which reflected a domain-specific 
application of Bass and Avolio’s full range leadership model (1989). A definition of safety-
specific transformational safety leadership is: “leaders who inspire, intellectually stimulate, 
and consider workers as individuals in the context of safety” (Vignoli et al., 2018). Barling’s 
study was the first to advocate for a split between general leadership and safety-specific 
leadership. 
At the same time, Zohar had branched out to explore leadership in safety. He 
approached the issue from both a general leadership perspective and a safety-specific 
leadership perspective. In Zohar (2002a), the effects of general transformational and 
transactional leadership on safety climate and injuries were found to be moderated by the 
leader’s perceived safety priority. In Zohar (2002b), this evidence was used as the basis 
for a facet-specific measure of transactional safety leadership. Workers were asked to 
recall the nature of interactions with their superior, and the responses classified into either 
safety-oriented or production-oriented, or both. An intervention was designed to increase 
the frequency of safety-related transactions between supervisors and leaders, which 
improved safety performance. Thus, this study added weight to the safety-specific 
leadership debate. 
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Thereafter, research on both general leadership for safety and safety-specific 
leadership exploded. Of note, safety-specific leadership has expanded to include not only 
the full-range leadership model, but also more nuanced and bespoke models derived from 
qualitative research. In the next sections we explore general leadership and safety, as well 
as safety-specific leadership research, by drawing on recent studies. 
 
General leadership and safety 
The argument for using general leadership concepts to explain safety outcomes is 
as follows. The lived reality of leaders is that multiple goals and demands compete for their 
attention simultaneously (Inness et al., 2010). Leadership is something leaders do 
constantly, not in separate silos of “safety”, “productivity”, “quality”, “staff wellbeing” 
etcetera. To the extent that safety leadership is a specific concern, this should be 
represented by considering whether leaders place priority on safety, rather than 
constructing a fully separate leadership construct just for safety. As well as being 
unnecessary, creating a separate construct for safety leadership is likely to create overlap 
between the way we measure “safety leadership”, “safety climate”, and “safety”. This 
overlap will make it hard to measure the effects of safety leadership on safety by conflating 
separate constructs and positively inflating associations between predictor and criterion 
variables (Inness et al., 2010).  
A recent review by Donovan and colleagues (2016) mapped the landscape of 
general leadership and safety performance. The review identified five core general 
leadership theories that have been applied to the safety context: transformational, 
transactional, leader-member exchange, empowering leadership, and authentic 
leadership. The authors identified associations between leadership styles and 
organisationally-relevant outcomes, ranging from safety climate, to safety behaviours 
(typically compliance and participation), and non-safety outcomes such as job satisfaction 
and organisational commitment. Donovan et al (2016) emphasised the fact that most 
research in this space is cross-sectional, which makes causal inferences inappropriate. 
Nevertheless, their review provides evidence that general leadership plays a role in 
supporting safety outcomes.  
More recently, Donovan and colleagues (2018) further explored the role of general 
leadership in safety by categorising specific instances of leadership behaviours into the 
major theories. It was found that in emergency situations, leaders draw on a wide 
repertoire of behaviours that improve safety, such as coaching, inspiring, and role-
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modelling. General leadership behaviours that concentrated on relationship-building were 
particularly important for safety, with increased flow of communication a direct result. This 
study showed that general leadership models, when applied to safety decision-making, are 
a useful tool to identify specific practices that constitute ‘safety leadership’. 
 
Safety-specific leadership 
 The most popular approach to operationalizing safety leadership has been to apply 
Bass and Avolio’s (1989) ‘full range leadership’ model, which includes both transactional 
and transformational safety-specific leadership (Clarke, 2013). Transformational safety-
specific leadership was borne out of work by organisational psychologists, who adapted 
existing and established measures such as the multifactor leadership questionnaire (MLQ) 
by adding the word ‘safety’ to existing items (Barling et al., 2002; Kelloway et al., 2006). 
Others applied components of the full range leadership model such as passive or laissez-
fair leadership (Kelloway et al., 2006) and transactional leadership (Zohar, 2002) to safety-
specific contexts. The seminal work of Barling and colleagues (2002) remains the most 
influential, with over 1,000 citations (Google Scholar, 2019). Barling and associates (2002) 
were the first to coin the term ‘transformational safety leadership’ and explored its 
relationship with safety climate, and a new variable they termed safety consciousness 
(general awareness of safety issues at work) using a cross-sectional design. 
Transformational safety leadership was associated with safety climate and safety 
consciousness, which in turn was correlated with safety injuries and incidents.  
 Despite the methodological shortcomings of Barling’s et al. (2002) work, such as 
cross-sectional data, small sample sizes, the model providing “reasonable but not 
outstanding fit to the data” (p.493, Barling et al., 2002), and lack of stringent construct 
validity testing such as confirmatory factor analysis, transformational safety-specific 
leadership became entrenched as the dominant perspective. Subsequent and more recent 
studies (albeit, without adequately addressing the original methodological shortcomings) 
have reinforced this approach through gathering evidence of correlations with safety 
behaviours (e.g., Fernandez-Muniz et al., 2014; 2017; Mullen et al., 2017; Smith et al., 
2016). Indeed, a meta-analysis by Clarke (2013) showed that transformational safety 
leadership was strongly related to proactive and citizenship-oriented safety behaviours, 
whereas transactional safety leadership was related to safety compliance behaviours. This 
result painted a simple yet compelling picture regarding the differential impact supervisors 
could have over worker behaviour through the employment of different leadership styles. 
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Yet importantly, no published study to date has explicitly tested the construct validity of 
transformational safety leadership in the context of general transformational leadership, 
despite repeated calls to do so (Conchie et al., 2012). 
Workers will take cues regarding the priority of safety through observations of 
leadership practices in specific contexts, such as safety, and infer what is emphasised or 
valued by the organisation as a result (in the form of reciprocated safety behaviours). This 
line of argument is largely supported by a program of work undertaken by Zohar and 
colleagues (2002; 2008; 2014) whereby leaders adopted a largely transactional approach 
by communicating the priority of safety relative to other work demands, with the results of 
a communication-focussed intervention demonstrating meaningful impacts on both 
subjective (i.e., safety climate) and objective (i.e., microaccidents, behavioural 
observations) outcomes. Nevertheless, reliance on these studies as evidence that 
transformational safety leadership and general leadership are separate constructs, is 
arguably problematic. It is difficult to imagine a scenario where a leader regarded as 
‘transformational’ in the general sense (which includes a dimension regarding 
‘individualised consideration’ or care and concern for the welfare of team members; 
Seltzer & Bass, 1990) would explicitly compromise safety while still retaining an overall 
favourable leadership evaluation. In other words, the correlation between safety-specific 
transformational leadership and general transformational leadership is likely to approach 
1.0, which questions its discriminant construct validity. 
Other safety-specific leadership researchers have adopted a purely qualitative or 
mixed-methods approach. Under this perspective, safety leadership is operationalised as a 
distinct construct that is separate to general leadership and doesn’t explicitly reference the 
full range leadership model (Daniel, 2015; Donovan et al., 2016; Grill & Nielsen, 2019; 
Molnar et al., in press; O’Dea & Flin, 2001). 
 Daniel’s (2015) qualitative investigation of safety leadership in the Australian 
construction industry showcases this approach. Following in-depth interviews with 20 
leaders at different organisational levels, a model of safety leadership was presented. 
Interestingly, despite “the viewpoint that safety leadership is a separate category from 
leadership reaching a minority consensus” (p.7; Daniel, 2015), the author argued for a set 
of safety-specific practices including use of discipline, articulating a safety vision, showing 
honesty, and role-modelling safety. These dimensions overlap considerably with existing 
general leadership theories such as transactional, transformational, and authentic 
leadership.  
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Summary of previous safety leadership research and ways forward 
 General leadership and safety have received some attention, but are underutilised 
by practitioners and industry given the intuitive appeal of a ‘safety-specific’ leadership 
construct. Nevertheless, the work by Donovan and colleagues (2016; 2018) highlights the 
array of general leadership theories and their positive associations with safety 
performance.  
The concept of transformational safety-specific leadership has dominated the 
literature to date. According to this work, an effective safety leader shows both 
transactional and transformational safety-specific behaviours. Yet, this approach runs the 
risk of muddying the waters when it comes to distinguishing leadership from similar 
constructs such as safety climate. Other research in this area seeks to identify the ‘secret 
sauce’ of safety-specific leadership; behaviours that are unique to the safety leadership 
construct. However, these attempts to identify a safety-specific leadership construct are 
still in their infancy, with some models showing considerable overlap with general 
leadership, or being couched within specific samples and organisational contexts that 
limits generalisability. 
A novel area in which safety leadership could continue to be explored concerns the 
‘what and when to apply’ aspect of leadership; namely, situational leadership (Hersey & 
Blanchard, 1969). Based on contingency concepts, situational leadership proposes that 
successful leaders adapt their approach based on the requirements of the work situation. 
Recently, these ideas were applied by Casey and colleagues (2017; 2019) to a model of 
leadership that proposes to improve safety performance by contributing to a strong 
situation or shared social context around safety. Specifically, leadership was 
conceptualised as a 2x2 contingency matrix consisting of four bundles of safety-relevant 
practices shown by supervisors and co-workers collectively: Leverage, Energise, Adapt, 
and Defend. Each ‘control strategy’ is thought to align with a specific work situation to 
achieve the best safety performance, and over time, contribute to an improve safety 
climate and culture via motivational and social learning mechanisms (Casey et al., 2017). 
From this perspective, safety leadership is considered from the angle of its effects on the 
team rather than the behaviours and qualities of the leaders themselves. The model also 
provides a theoretical scaffold that links specific leadership practices through to individual 
performance via self-regulation and motivational states in subordinates. 
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Research program overview 
Workplace safety performance globally requires ongoing improvement, particularly 
as we experience the technological and social challenges of the 21st century (Hu et al., in 
press). Also, there is a dearth of published studies on safety culture and climate 
improvement interventions (Aburumann et al., 2019), not to mention safety leadership 
interventions (e.g., Mullen & Kelloway, 2009). Therefore, this programme of research 
involved the development and evaluation of an industry safety culture improvement ‘toolkit’ 
that targets safety leadership as the mechanism for improving the social context for safety. 
This research is desperately needed because many organisations in Australia are 
struggling to improve safety to levels required by legislation, let alone to levels that would 
reduce or eliminate injuries. For instance, proactive visits from safety inspectors rose 6% 
and reactive visits rose 12% between 2016-2017 across Australia, yet injury rates have 
remained stable or even worsened in some industries (Safe Work Australia, 2018). 
The timing of this research was fortuitous as the regional work, health and safety 
regulator (Workplace Health & Safety Queensland) had recently implemented a state-wide 
safety leadership program, instated a Board of industry stakeholders with a strategic 
priority to build a culture of health and safety across high-risk industries, and approved a 
project to develop an evidence-based industry toolkit. Furthermore, there was a recent 
move towards ‘hard compliance’ from the regulator in response to several high-profile 
safety-related tragedies, which put additional pressure on Queensland businesses to look 
for ways to improve safety performance (OIR, 2019). This ‘perfect storm’ was leveraged to 
maximise the relevance and practical impact of this research. 
In total, this research generated three academic publications. The research consists 
of one theoretical examination (outlining our general propositions and theoretical 
framework), four separate studies that developed and validated a measurement tool, and a 
final applied intervention study that evaluated the effect of an industry toolkit developed by 
the author as part of his role at OIR. These scholarly works are described in the chapters 
that follow. 
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Chapter 2: Safety climate and culture: Integrating Psychological and Systems 
Perspectives 
 
Abstract 
Safety climate research has reached a mature stage of development, with several 
meta-analyses demonstrating the link between safety climate and safety outcomes. More 
recently, there has been interest from systems theorists in integrating the concept of safety 
culture and to a lesser extent, safety climate into systems-based models of organizational 
safety. Such models represent a theoretical and practical development of the safety 
climate concept by positioning climate as part of a dynamic work system in which 
perceptions of safety act to constrain and shape employee behaviour. We propose safety 
climate and safety culture constitute part of the enabling capitals through which 
organizations build safety capability. We discuss how organizations can deploy different 
configurations of enabling capital to exert control over work systems and maintain safe and 
productive performance. We outline four key strategies through which organizations to 
reconcile the system control problems of promotion versus prevention, and stability versus 
flexibility.   
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Introduction 
It has been almost 40 years since the concept of safety climate was originally 
introduced by Zohar (1980). Broadly, safety climate refers to shared perceptions held by 
members of a team or organization about the way safety is managed within the 
organization (Griffin & Neal, 2000; Zohar, 1980). After a slow start, interest in the concept 
increased during the mid-1990’s, and has grown rapidly since. According to Web of 
Science, only 11 articles included ‘safety climate’ in the title between 1980 and 1996. 
Since 1996, 429 articles included ‘safety climate’ in their title; of these, 70 were published 
between 1997 and 2006, and 359 were published between 2007 and 2016.  
Research in safety climate has reached a mature stage of development within the 
psychological and management literature (Zohar, 2010). For example, several meta-
analyses provide good evidence of the link between safety climate and safety outcomes   
(Christian, Bradley, Wallace, & Burke, 2009; Clarke, 2006, 2010; Nahrgang, Morgeson, & 
Hofmann, 2011). These studies consistently demonstrate that people work more safely 
when there is a shared social context where safety is prioritized and valued. Consequently, 
safety climate is firmly established as an organizational antecedent of safety performance.  
Despite the progress in understanding safety climate and its impact, there remain 
limitations that might be addressed in future research. Specifically, the construct domains 
of safety climate and the broader concept of safety culture are often blurred and 
overlapping (Cox & Flin, 1998; Guldenmund, 2000), with both researchers and 
practitioners conflating the meaning of culture and climate (Griffin & Curcuruto, 2016). 
Safety climate and culture also tend to be treated as static variables, which does not 
reflect the more dynamic orientation of contemporary systems-based models of 
organizational safety. Recently, Griffin et al. (2014) introduced the concepts of safety 
capability and enabling capitals, which although are more compatible with systems 
thinking, add further conceptual complexity to discussions of safety climate and culture. 
The net result is poor understanding of how climate, culture, and capability interrelate and 
evolve over time, as well as how these concepts contribute to the overall safety of an 
organizational system.  
We propose that a systems-based approach is needed to address current 
limitations in safety climate and culture literatures. Systems approaches provide a dynamic 
representation of the way safety develops and breaks down in complex operations 
(Hollnagel, Paries, Woods, & Wreathall, 2011; Leveson, 2011). Although these 
approaches incorporate concepts of safety culture at a broad level, there are few specific 
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links between concepts of safety culture and safety systems (Reiman & Rollenhagen, 
2014). While safety culture has received some attention from systems theorists (Goh, 
Love, Stagbouer, & Annesley, 2012; Marais, Saleh, & Leveson, 2006; Pidgeon & O'Leary, 
2000), safety climate has largely been ignored. This lack of attention is unfortunate 
because safety climate lends itself more readily to integration within systems-based 
models given its transient, multi-level, and multidimensional properties (Zohar, 2010).   
Adopting a systems approach enables the dynamic nature of safety to be integrated 
with concepts of safety culture, climate, and capability. From a systems perspective, safety 
can be conceptualized as a control dilemma, meaning that threats and disturbances that 
may destabilize the system are identified, monitored, and controlled (Griffin, Cordery, & 
Soo, 2015). We propose that this control dilemma is best resolved by developing safety 
capabilities across two key domains: stability/flexibility and promotion/prevention. We 
position safety climate and culture within a framework of enabling capitals such that 
climate and culture represent the mechanisms through which this safety capability can be 
operationalized allows disturbances can be managed.   
In the following sections, we first review the development of safety climate concepts 
and provide some practical distinctions between safety climate and culture. In the second 
part of the paper, we review key systems perspectives of safety and accident causation. In 
the final part of the paper we present an integrative systems model incorporating safety 
culture and climate concepts.   
 
Safety Climate, Culture, and Capability  
Safety climate: State of current knowledge  
There is now a large body of research examining the relationships among safety 
climate, safety behaviour, and accidents. Accidents are workplace events that result in 
physical harm to people, property, or the environment, while safety behaviour is any form 
of workplace behaviour that affects the likelihood of physical harm to people, property or 
environment (Beus, Dhanani, & McCord, 2015). The two forms of safe work behaviour that 
have most commonly been examined are safety compliance and safety participation. 
Safety compliance refers to the core activities that individuals need to carry out to meet 
mandated safety requirements, which are typically specified in the form of rules and 
procedures (Griffin & Neal, 2000; Neal, Griffin, & Hart, 2000). Safety participation involves 
behaviours that do not directly contribute to an individual’s personal safety, but which help 
to develop an environment that supports safety. These include helping co-workers and 
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demonstrating initiative (Griffin & Neal, 2000; Neal et al., 2000). A closely related construct 
is safety citizenship, which is defined as the degree to which employees are willing to 
enlarge their role beyond normal job requirements by engaging in behaviours such as 
whistleblowing (Hofmann, Morgeson, & Gerras, 2003). Both safety participation and safety 
citizenship are important concepts as they represent the extent to which individuals 
engage in positive safety behaviours over and above what is simply expected of them.   
There have been several meta-analyses (Christian, Bradley, Wallace, & Burke,  
2009; Clarke, 2006, 2010; Nahrgang et al., 2011) and systematic reviews (Beus, McCord, 
& Zohar, 2016) of this literature in the past decade. Meta-analyses have confirmed that 
safety climate is positively associated with both safety compliance (Nahrgang et al., 2011) 
and safety participation (Clarke, 2006), and suggest that the relationship between safety 
climate and safety participation may be stronger than that between safety climate and 
safety compliance (Christian, Bradley, Wallace, & Burke, 2009; Clarke, 2006). This is 
consistent with the theory that a positive safety climate is more likely to encourage safety 
behaviours over and above basic procedural adherence due to the norm of reciprocity 
established when individuals and teams perceive management as placing an adequate 
emphasis on workplace safety (Clarke, 2006).   
Meta-analyses have also confirmed that safety behaviour is associated with 
accidents. Clarke (2006) and Christian, Bradley, Wallace, and Burke (2009) found that 
both compliance and participation were negatively associated with accidents. Furthermore, 
Christian, Bradley, Wallace, and Burke (2009) found that a broad composite of safety 
behaviour was more strongly associated with accidents than specific safety behaviours, 
and that safety behaviour mediated the relationships between safety climate and 
accidents. Nahrgang et al. (2011), in contrast, found that compliance was negatively 
associated with accidents, but participation was not, although participation was associated 
with adverse events, such as near misses. Nahrgang et al. (2011) argued that the 
differences between the results of these two meta-analyses might be due to the inclusion 
of driving-related studies in their meta-analysis, as the factors that predict accidents in the 
transport industry appear to be different to those in other industries. Furthermore, we 
would not necessarily expect participation to be strongly related to accidents at the 
individual level, because the effects of participation are indirect, reducing the risk of harm 
to other people, rather than to the self (Griffin, Neal, & Parker, 2007).   
Further research has investigated variables mediating the relationship between 
safety climate and safety behaviours. Most of this work has examined the role of safety 
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knowledge and motivation. Safety knowledge refers to an individual’s understanding of 
safety practices and procedures and safety motivation refers to an individual’s willingness 
to work safely (Griffin & Neal, 2000). Two types of safety motivation have been identified: 
valence, which is the perceived value, or importance, of safety to the individual (Neal & 
Griffin, 2006); and instrumentality, which is the extent to which the person believes that 
working safely will be recognized and rewarded (Scott, Fleming, & Kelloway, 2014; Zohar, 
2011). From the perspective of self-determination theory (SDT), valence is a type of 
autonomous motivation in which individuals are motivated by the intrinsic value of safety, 
while instrumentality can be seen a type of controlled motivation in which individuals are 
motivated by external contingencies (Gagné & Deci, 2005). Meta-analyses have confirmed 
that safety knowledge and safety motivation mediate the relationship between safety 
climate and safety behaviour (Christian, Bradley, Wallace, & Burke, 2009), although there 
is not yet enough research to draw conclusions regarding the relative contribution of 
different forms of safety motivation.  
A separate body of research informed by the job demands resource (JDR) model 
(Bakker & Demerouti, 2007) has examined how job demands and resources influence 
safety behaviour (Nahrgang et al., 2011). Job demands are physical, psychological, social, 
or organizational aspects of the job that require sustained physical and/or psychological 
effort (Schaufeli & Bakker, 2004). Job resources, on the other hand, are physical, 
psychological, social or organizational aspects of the job which reduce job demands, or in 
some other way aid in the achievement of work goals or stimulate personal development 
(Demerouti, Bakker, Nachreiner, & Schaufeli, 2001). Safety climate is seen as a job 
resource from the perspective of the JDR model.   
The JDR model suggests that job demands exhaust an individual’s mental and 
physical resources, leading to burnout, which is a state of exhaustion, cynicism and lack of 
efficacy (Maslach & Leiter, 2008). Job resources, such as safety climate, on the other 
hand, are thought to protect against burnout by replenishing resources. People are thought 
to be more likely to work unsafely, and have accidents, when their energy levels are 
depleted due to burnout (Nahrgang et al., 2011). Meta-analytic results confirm that job 
demands are positively, and job resources are negatively, associated with indicators of 
burnout (anxiety, stress and depression) in the predicted direction (Nahrgang et al., 2011). 
Indicators of burnout, in turn are positively associated with accidents, but not unsafe 
behaviour, although relatively few studies have examined these relationships.    
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Meta-analyses have also examined the relative strength of effects at the individual 
and group levels of analysis, and the direction of the relationship between safety climate 
and accidents. Christian, Bradley, Wallace, Burke, and Spears (2009) found that the 
relationships between safety climate on the one hand, and safety behaviour and accidents 
on the other, were stronger at the group level than at the individual level, which is 
consistent with the argument that climate is an emergent group-level construct. Beus, 
Payne, Bergman, and Arthur (2010) found that safety climate was both a leading and 
lagging indicator of safety, although the correlation between prior accidents and safety 
climate was marginally stronger than the correlation between safety climate and future 
accidents. Focusing on the subdimensions of safety climate, Beus, Payne, Bergman, and 
Arthur (2010) found that management commitment to safety, which is the core element of 
safety climate, is more predictive of future accidents than prior accidents. More recently, 
Bergman, Payne, Taylor, and Beus (2014) examined the relationship between safety 
climate and accident rates across 42 worksites at multinational chemical manufacturing 
company over a four year period. They found that safety climate was both a leading and 
lagging indicator of accidents, but that the effect differed, depending on the type of incident 
and the time lag. The relationship between safety climate and reportable accidents 
diminished after three months, while the relationship between safety climate and low level 
(not reportable) accidents sustained for two years.  
 
Limits of current understanding  
Substantial progress has been made in understanding the relationship between 
safety climate and safety behaviour. However, our understanding of the underlying 
process is limited in a number of important ways including the methodological challenges 
associated with the assessment of safety climate and safety behaviour. The field is still 
dominated by cross-sectional studies examining relationships at the individual level of 
analysis, although more studies are examining relationships at the group or organizational 
levels (e.g., Brondino, Silva, & Pasini, 2012; Lee & Dalal, 2016).  
From a theoretical perspective one issue is the need to develop a better 
understanding of safe and unsafe work behaviour at different levels within an organization, 
and the mechanisms through which they have an impact on safety outcomes. There is a 
need to incorporate a broader range of factors into models of safety behaviour, so that we 
can account for the different ways in which people act to reduce, or increase, the risk of 
harm to themselves or others. For example, key behaviours that are now being included in 
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models of safety include adaptivity, proactivity and teamwork (Griffin et al., 2007). These 
types of behaviour are important when the risks and hazards associated with a particular 
work system are unpredictable, and the system is highly interdependent, meaning that the 
actions of one person have an impact on others.   
A second general issue is the need to better understand the mechanisms by which 
safety climate influences safe and unsafe work behaviour. In part, this can be achieved by 
more systematically considering factors that shape behaviour such as competence, 
motivation, energy, and opportunity. Competence includes factors that determine what a 
person can do, such as knowledge, skill and expertise. To date, the safety climate 
literature has focused on explicit knowledge of rules and procedures, and has ignored the 
tacit knowledge and skill that people develop as they acquire expertise in a domain. The 
skill and expertise of staff is arguably more important than their knowledge of rules and 
procedures (Hollnagel, 2009). For example, the human factors literature focuses on 
situation awareness as a key factor that influences safety in a dynamic and uncertain 
environment (Durso & Sethumadhavan, 2008), yet situation awareness is largely ignored 
within the safety climate literature, possibly because it is a dynamic variable and difficult to 
measure using employee surveys.  
Motivation determines what a person is prepared to do, and the reasons why they 
are prepared to do it. The safety climate literature has not yet considered the 
consequences of different forms of safety motivation, such as extrinsic and intrinsic safety 
motivation. Zohar, Huang, Lee, and Robertson (2015) recently argued that safety climate 
induces extrinsic safety motivation, and undermines intrinsic safety motivation. They found 
that the relationship between safety climate and compliance was stronger for people who 
reported lower levels of work engagement, suggesting that extrinsic safety motivation may 
compensate for a lack of intrinsic safety motivation. However, to the best of our 
knowledge, studies have not yet measured extrinsic and intrinsic safety motivation directly, 
or examined whether extrinsic safety motivation can undermine intrinsic safety motivation. 
Furthermore, we would expect that the effects of extrinsic and intrinsic safety motivation 
would depend on the type of safety behaviour being examined. Specifically, intrinsic safety 
motivation is likely to be particularly important for discretionary behaviours, such as 
participation, citizenship, adaptivity and proactivity, which are important for the safety of 
the system as a whole.    
Energy provides the drive for behaviour, while situational factors provide the 
opportunities and constraints that limit the behaviours that are possible. While Nahrgang et 
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al. (2011) identified engagement and burnout as energetic states that have the potential to 
influence safety behaviour. However, these constructs were not directly assessed in their 
meta-analysis. Variables such as anxiety and depression were used as indicators of 
burnout, while participation, communication and information sharing were used as 
indicators of engagement.  The most direct way to assess the effects of low levels of 
energy is to measure fatigue, yet fatigue is largely overlooked within the safety climate 
literature, which is surprising given that it is known to be one of the major causes of 
industrial accidents (e.g., Hockey, 2013). On the positive end of the scale, activated 
positive affect,  such as feelings of energy and enthusiasm, is an important determinant of 
proactive and prosocial behaviours (Parker, Bindl, & Strauss, 2010). Again, these factors 
are largely overlooked within the safety literature. In addition, the choices that people 
make are limited by the opportunities that are available to them, and the constraints that 
they are acting under. Relatively little attention has been given to the role that 
opportunities and constraints play in shaping safety behaviour. One exception is a recent 
study by Lee and Dalal (2016), who found that a strong safety climate, indexed by high 
levels of within-group agreement, constrained the expression of individual differences.    
Finally, to better understand the mechanisms through which safety climate 
influences safety behaviour, we need to take a more dynamic approach. Theories of self-
regulation can be used to understand the process by which people adapt to task demands, 
and explain the choices that they make in relation to the goals that they are pursuing 
(Neal, Ballard, & Vancouver, in press). This is a dynamic process, and as such, needs to 
be studied at the within person level, using repeated measures designs, together with 
sophisticated statistical models, such as latent change models (Liu, Mo, Song, & Wang, 
2016) that are capable of directly testing a theory of change. The safety climate literature 
currently paints a picture of safety that is fairly static, rather than dynamic.   
 
Culture and Capability  
The concept of safety climate overlaps with the concepts of safety culture and 
safety capability. In this section, we examine how these concepts can be better 
understood in relation to each other.  
 
Safety culture  
Safety culture represents an organization’s core values about the importance of 
safety and the underlying beliefs and assumptions that guide behaviour and decision 
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making (Reason, 1998). Safety culture not only shapes the externally visible elements of 
an organization, but also the things that are “not said” or reflected only in symbolic actions. 
For these reasons, safety culture is often described in terms of “deep” meaning whereas 
safety climate is described as the “surface features” (Denison, 1996). Guldenmund (2000) 
identified three layers of safety culture. The core layer of culture is described as the basic 
and fundamental assumptions about safety and the middle layer consists of espoused 
values and attitudes. The outer-most layer is described as artefacts, which represent 
behavioural manifestations of the underlying safety culture and physical symbols such as 
safety posters and signage.   
Safety climate can be understood as perceptions of the middle and outer layers of 
safety culture at a given point in time. From this perspective, safety climate is an indicator 
of the underlying shared assumptions that comprise an organization’s safety culture. 
Safety climate then provides an assessment of how effectively various safety practices at 
different levels of an organization have been implemented, resulting in a shared sense of 
the overall value, priority, and importance placed on safety (Zohar, 1980, 2010).   
When it is systematically invoked for practice or research, this layered metaphor of 
culture highlights useful distinctions between culture and climate. For example, culture is 
likely to be harder to change than climate, because it reflects deeper and more pervasive 
assumptions. Climate, on the other hand, is more amenable to change through deliberate 
organizational actions such as safety training, strategic planning, and participative decision 
making (Beus, Payne, Bergman, & Arthur Jr, 2010).   
Despite its advantages, the layer metaphor is limited in the degree it captures 
interactions within and between layers, obscuring important links among implicit beliefs, 
organizational practices, human decision-making, and actions. In particular, it provides a 
limited view of the types of capabilities that an organization needs to operate safely. This 
limitation is particularly important when trying to understand safety from a systems 
perspective, as safety culture is only one component within a broader socio-technical 
system (Reiman & Rollenhagen, 2014).  
  
Safety capabilities  
Safety capability can be defined as the capacity of an organization to maintain safe 
operations in dynamic and uncertain operating environments, and is generated via human, 
social, and organizational processes termed “enabling capitals” (Griffin et al., 2014). 
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Enabling capitals are foundational building blocks that include technologies, structures, 
processes, and importantly, social aspects including safety culture and climate.  
Organizational capital is thought to include both human resource management, such as 
high-performance work systems, and safety management practices such as risk 
management procedures. Social capital refers to capacities embedded in social 
relationships, such as culture and teamwork. Human capital refers to individual 
competences such as the knowledge, skills, abilities, experiences of employees within the 
organization.   
Unlike safety capability, enabling capitals are hypothesized to be directly 
observable and hence, measurable and amenable to change (Griffin et al., 2014). 
Enabling capitals can be considered as the system components that shape safety 
processes at different levels within an organization. Figure 1 provides an overview of these 
three capitals and how they might relate to both the underlying safety culture and to the 
more observable safety climate. Each enabling capital can be mapped across the layers of 
Schein’s culture model (Schein, 2004). Moving from the centre of the figure, core inner 
layers are considered less tangible and distal in terms of their influence over behaviour 
than successive outer layers. The middle layer represents the core assumptions regarding 
safety and effectiveness that are held by members of the organization. These assumptions 
underpin all three types of capital.   
The middle layer represents the foundations upon which each capital is built. For 
human capital, this includes the abilities, dispositions, beliefs, attitudes, values and 
motives of people. For social capital, these foundations include the pattern of network ties 
and configurations, the shared understanding across members of the network, and the 
norms and trust that enable exchange relationships to work effectively. For organizational 
capital, the foundations include structure, technology and resources.   
The outer layer in Figure 2.1 represents the factors that directly influence safety. 
For human capital, this includes the expertise, motivation and energy of people; for social 
capital, factors such as leadership and teamwork; for organizational capital, factors such 
as safety information systems, policies, procedures and practices.  
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Figure 2.1. Organizational, social, and human enabling capitals.  
 
  
 
  
To elaborate an example, consider a maintenance engineer who is injured by a 
release of high-pressure steam after failing to isolate a critical process because s/he 
believed the process had no impact on task safety. This erroneous belief can be viewed 
from a number of perspectives within the framework of enabling capitals. In terms of 
human capital, the erroneous belief might reflect a limitation in the knowledge of 
maintainers about safety procedures and the connection between work processes. 
Regarding organizational capital, the belief might be influenced by practices which affect 
the task, or the knowledge maintainers have about the task. For example, the training 
system might not have conveyed adequate information, or the design might reflect a failure 
to isolate processes effectively. In relation to social capital, and at the most tangible level, 
a failure by supervisors to communicate risk or promote the value of training might limit the 
opportunity of maintainers to acquire a more accurate belief. At the deepest level, a shared 
cultural belief about the nature of the process hazard risk and its controllability may have 
been implicated as a distal influence over cognitions and/or behaviour.  
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The individual, social, and organizational aspects of the failure described above can 
be assessed using a range of different measurement methods ranging from personal 
assessments through to safety climate and culture surveys, and system audit tools. These 
tools provide a window into the nature of the constraints that control and shape individual 
and team safety behaviour when faced with system disruptions. For example, individuals 
might hold beliefs about the role of safety in successful performance, norms around 
leadership style might shape the way supervisors communicate safety goals, and 
embedded industry practices might constrain the role of training. At the deepest level, 
implicit assumptions form the essence of the organizational safety culture and hence the 
most basic mechanisms for system control.     
Our capability framework clarifies some distinction between the observable features 
of safety climate and the more implicit elements of safety culture. The framework places 
safety climate within the domain of social enabling capital, differentiating it from the 
organizational and human capitals. Safety climate is therefore conceptualized as 
perceptions of behavioural norms and espoused values around safety, aggregated at 
different levels of the organization (e.g., team, department, company). In the following 
section, we integrate safety capability and these enabling capitals with systems theory to 
explore how safety culture and climate can act as forms of control.   
 
Integrating Systems Approaches with Climate and Culture  
Socio-technical systems approaches treat safety as an emergent property of the 
organizational system and adopt a control orientation to disturbances in the system 
(Leveson, 2011). Decision makers at each level of the organization pursue goals, which 
may be set or influenced by other actors at different levels (Rasmussen, 1997). 
Performance and the achievement (or not) of goals can be affected by disturbances that 
affect the availability or quality of inputs, or disrupt the process by which inputs are 
transformed into outputs, which in turn reduces system control. For example, external 
market forces can influence a firm’s investment in safety measures, operational schedules 
can be disrupted by congestion or weather, and front-line operations can be disrupted by 
problems with equipment or supplies. An accident can only occur if there the level of 
control over a work system reduces to the point of failure. There are three ways that loss 
of control can occur: external disturbances might not be handled effectively; components 
within the system may fail; or components of the system may interact in unexpected ways 
(Leveson, 2011).   
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The control problem  
One of the critical challenges that organizations face is maintaining effective control 
in a dynamic and uncertain environment (Griffin et al., 2015). Control is particularly difficult 
to achieve when the system is subject to unexpected disturbances, there are complex 
interdependences among the components of the system, and there are lags or delays in 
the response of the system, or in the provision of feedback to the people making the 
decisions. To maintain effective control, an organization needs the capability to: a) monitor 
the output of the system and act to correct any discrepancy between the output and the 
goal (feedback control); and b) learn from experience, and anticipate or predict the future 
state of the system to prevent discrepancies from occurring (feed-forward control). A 
control system that is unable to learn from, adapt to, and anticipate, change, is unable to 
operate effectively (Hollnagel, Woods, & Leveson, 2007).  
Controls act to constrain the system so that it remains within the limits of acceptable 
performance. According to Rasmussen (1997), the boundaries for safety and economic 
viability define the feasible operating space for an organization. The operating point 
location is determined by forces that push the system towards or away from each of these 
boundaries. In most situations there is uncertainty regarding the exact location of the 
boundary for unacceptable safety, and an organization will only know that it has crossed 
the boundary when an accident occurs. For this reason, the organization struggles to keep 
away from the safety boundary. Rasmussen (1997) argues that, over time, this produces a 
marginal safety boundary that marks the limit of acceptable safety.   
One of the key insights of socio-technical systems theory is that organizations in 
high risk industries tend to operate close to the marginal safety boundary (Mitropoulos & 
Cupido, 2009). Management pressure to improve efficiency, and worker pressure to 
manage the effort necessary for goal achievement push operations closer to the unsafe 
zone (Hollnagel, 2009; Rasmussen, 1997). The organization’s safety management system 
exerts a counter-pressure, resisting movement towards the boundary. When an 
organization operates close to the marginal safety boundary, temporary control failures will 
cause it to cross into the buffer zone. Over time, deviations into the buffer zone become 
normalized, and the marginal boundary is shifted, reducing the safety margin.   
 
Culture and climate as system controls  
We propose that safety culture and climate enable organizations to solve the safety 
control problem through constraints that shape performance in ways that optimize both 
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productivity and safety goals. Safety culture is a distal control mechanism because it is 
deeply embedded in the organizational functions, it is implicit rather than explicit in actions, 
and is slow to change (Antonsen, 2009). Core assumptions at the heart of safety culture 
facilitate control by supporting a shared way of interpreting situations and identifying 
appropriate responses or ways of acting (Choudhry, Fang, & Mohamed, 2007). For 
example, assumptions regarding the nature of human activity determine the extent to 
which people should take initiative or await instruction (Guldenmund, 2000). A belief that 
people should take initiative is likely to foster more effective responses to emergency 
scenarios when system control is lost. Conversely, a belief that people should always 
await instructions before acting may result in catastrophe. This distinction in belief content 
is apparent in the concept of safety culture maturity (Parker, Lawrie, & Hudson, 2006) 
whereby organizations are seen to possess varying types of beliefs that are more or less 
conducive to safety. At one extreme, the shared beliefs held by an organization may be 
described as ‘pathological’ insofar as they detract from the goal of system safety, and at 
the other extreme, ‘generative’ in the sense that safety beliefs generalize to all aspects of 
system operation. From this perspective, implicit safety beliefs (the essence of safety 
culture) therefore influence system safety through establishing a shared understanding of 
how to act and think in an organization (Antonsen, 2009; Guldenmund, 2010).  
Conversely, safety climate is a proximal control mechanism because the shared 
perceptions of safety priority and practices at a given point in time can be modified through 
specific organizational, supervisor, and co-worker practices, and is more closely related to 
safety behaviour (Neal et al., 2000). Organizations can invest resources to build a more 
positive and coherent safety climate, thus reducing the risk of future accidents. 
Dimensions of safety climate represent control strategies that elicit specific operating 
behaviours by enhancing the competence of employees, motivating them effectively, 
energizing them, and removing constraints. For example, management safety commitment 
is commonly identified as a key dimension of safety climate (Flin, Mearns, O'Connor, & 
Bryden, 2000). By establishing managerial practices (e.g., genuine safety walkarounds) 
and safety interactions, social exchanges activate the norm of reciprocity, obligating 
employees to behave in ways that are aligned with formal safety procedures and policies.   
 
Control dilemmas  
Turner and Pidgeon (1997) explored the complex role of safety culture in disasters 
and elaborated ways that culture could simultaneously direct attention toward some 
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hazards yet deflect from others. We explore this duality for both culture and climate in 
relation to two core control dilemmas for organizational systems. The first dimension 
represents the relative emphasis that the organization places on reliability as opposed to 
flexibility. The second dimension represents the way that the organization frames the goals 
that people are expected to pursue.  
  
Reliability vs flexibility  
One of the key dilemmas that any organization faces is balancing the need for 
reliability with flexibility (Quinn & Rohrbaugh, 1983). On the one hand, an organization 
needs to be able to operate reliably under routine operational conditions. When uncertainty 
is low, as is often the case under routine conditions, it is possible to specify what needs to 
be done, and how it should be done, using instructions and procedures (Griffin et al., 
2007). This is a top-down style of control that is directive and prescriptive. Many 
organizations try to achieve control over safety using this approach (Rasmussen, 1997) 
and in fact is the approach taken by most safety management systems (McDonald, 
Corrigan, Daly, & Cromie, 2000). On the other hand, organizations need flexibility to 
respond to unanticipated in adaptive ways. This type of response often requires 
decentralized decision making using local expertise and knowledge (Pidgeon, 1998).  
The goal of the top-down approach is to ensure that known risks and hazards are 
eliminated or controlled. It assumes that work can be decomposed into a set of 
independent steps, the risks identified for each step, and appropriate controls put in place, 
typically in the form of procedures. Compliance with safe work procedures is monitored 
and enforced. This style of control can be effective when the task, corresponding hazards, 
risk control mechanisms, and the external environment are well-known and isolated from 
unplanned disruption (Hale & Borys, 2013; Hollnagel, 2011). A top-down control approach 
is reflected in many safety climate and culture measures, for example, assessing whether 
people are adequately trained in the use of and comply with safety procedures (Zohar, 
1980; Zohar & Luria, 2005).  
However, top-down control is problematic in a dynamic and uncertain work 
environment because it is not possible to write a set of rules to cover every potential 
circumstance. As a result, the top-down approach is largely reactive, requires large 
investments of resources to maintain, limits learning, and is more likely to fail under 
nonroutine conditions (Mitropoulos, Abdelhamid, & Howell, 2005). Top-down control also 
emphasizes uncertainty reduction, whereby prescriptive rules and standardization aim to 
45 
 
minimize uncertainty and achieve reliable performance (Grote, 2007). It is particularly 
problematic when the top-down control mechanisms interact in unforeseen ways, creating 
conflicting goals and increasing uncertainty (Grote, 2007, 2015). The locations of safety 
performance boundaries may become obfuscated or shift, especially when efficiency 
pressures regularly drive performance closer to the boundary of acceptable performance 
and these deviations become accepted ways of doing work (Dekker & Pruchnicki, 2014). 
Top-down control strategies may also impair the quality of feedback loops about control 
implementation and effectiveness from lower to higher levels (Leveson, 2015).   
An alternative approach is to emphasize flexibility, using bottom-up control, in which 
people are given autonomy to make decisions within their area of competence. When 
uncertainty is high, people need the autonomy to decide what needs to be done, and how 
to do it (Griffin et al., 2007). Within socio-technical systems theory, this bottom up process 
is captured by the principle that variance should be controlled as near to the point of origin 
as possible (Cherns, 1976). Autonomy has been shown to enhance performance when 
uncertainty is high, because it: a) allows problems to be detected and solved more quickly 
and effectively; b) enables decision makers to learn from experience and acquire higher 
levels of expertise; c) enhances intrinsic work motivation; and d) makes people more 
proactive and innovative (Parker et al., 2010). In addition to formal changes in how work is 
done and organized, organizations may also invest in informal and “soft” (Grote, 2007) 
control mechanisms such as leadership and culture that not only motivate proactive work 
behaviours, but also elicit normative pressures and constraints on behaviour during 
uncertain system states that require flexibility. Such constraints also aim to manage risk 
through increasing uncertainty – cultural standards for behaviour such as speaking up is 
an example of how uncertainty can be increased yet risk managed effectively through 
flexibility(Grote,  
2015).  
High reliability organizations are a type of work system that can balance the 
competing demands for reliability and flexibility. These organizations are thought to 
operate at consistently safe levels close to the acceptable performance boundary using a 
combination of top-down and bottom-up control (Cook & Rasmussen, 2005). Top-down 
control is achieved by setting goals or objectives for people to achieve, rather than 
directing people what to do and how to do it. Procedures are used to standardize 
operations under routine conditions to ensure consistency and facilitate coordination 
amongst different actors in the system. However, local operators are given the autonomy 
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to manage disturbances. For example, they are allowed to improvise where necessary, 
and do what is needed to stabilize the system and respond to threats/disruptions 
effectively (Weick, 1987; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). Achieving optimal levels of both 
flexibility- and reliability-inducing control strategies should be a goal of high-risk 
organizations (Grote, 2015).   
 
Promotion versus prevention  
A second control dilemma that organizations-as-systems must successfully 
reconcile is between promoting gains and preventing losses. Other ways of 
conceptualizing this control dilemma include the efficiency-thoroughness trade-off (Marais 
& Saleh, 2008) and the protection-production goals conflict (Wang, Ding, Love, & 
Edwards, 2016). Given that production--focused promotion goals exert a continual 
pressure on system operations, pushing closer to the boundary of acceptable performance 
(Rasmussen, 1997), reframing promotion goals in terms of safety and/or exerting a 
counter-pressure through prevention goals is critical to achieve safety goals/targets and 
avoid accidents. Recent research has shown that individual differences in regulatory focus 
influence risk-taking behaviour, with alignment between control strategy and regulatory 
focus resulting in higher safety performance and misalignment (e.g., negatively-framed 
safety campaigns for promotion-focused individuals) resulting in lower safety performance 
(Hamstra, Bolderdijk, & Veldstra, 2011).  
As noted above, goals are a key mechanism through which control is achieved in 
an organization. From a psychological perspective, the framing of a goal as something 
positive that a person strives to achieve, as opposed to something negative to avoid or 
prevent, has a profound impact on behaviour (Arnold & Reynolds, 2009). According to 
Regulatory Focus Theory (Higgins, 1997), a promotion focus fulfils fundamental needs of 
nurturance and growth, is underpinned by strong ideals, aspirations, and desirable end 
states, and motivates approach behaviours that may include risk-taking and exploration. 
On the other hand, a prevention focus satisfies needs of security and safety, is 
underpinned by a sense of obligations, and motivates avoidance or risk-averse behaviours 
such as rule-following and risk minimization.  
From an organizational perspective, it is important to achieve a balance of 
promotion and prevention. Prevention is essential for organizational survival. The 
organization needs to respond to economic, social and environmental threats in ways that 
reduce risk and withdraw from adverse situations to avoid system failures (Weick, Sutcliffe, 
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& Obstfeld, 1999). A focus on duties and obligations keeps people alert to risk, and 
ensures compliance with minimum standards. On the other hand, an excessive focus on 
prevention may limit personal initiative, and emphasize compliance behaviours such as 
rule-following (Aryee & Hsiung, 2016). Promotion, on the other hand, is essential for 
prosperity. An organization needs to pursue opportunities for growth and development 
(Scott & Davis, 2015) and a focus on ideals and aspirations keeps people striving for 
continuous improvement (Wu, McMullen, Neubert, & Yi, 2008).  
For example, Wallace and colleagues (Wallace & Chen, 2006; Wallace, Johnson, & 
Frazier, 2009) found that a prevention focus is negatively associated with injuries because 
workers are more likely to show vigilance and care, following rules and adopting safety 
responsibilities. Conversely, a promotion focus was positively associated with injuries as 
speed and efficiency strategies tended to be used over safe and cautious work 
behaviours.  
Others have found that employees’ promotion focus was positively related to safety 
performance through safety initiative – proactive safety behaviours that are self-starting 
and focused on changing the organization’s safety practices to improve them (Aryee & 
Hsiung, 2016; Kark, Katz-Navon, & Delegach, 2015). In the latter case, it appears that 
safety can be framed in terms of aspirations and ideals, meaning that promotion-focused 
safety goals complement prevention-focused goals through elicitation of proactive 
behaviours that tap into personal and shared values (Kark et al., 2015).  
Framing safety as a promotion goal entails describing a future state where work 
tasks are completed efficiently and without hazard release. Thus, a promotion-focused 
safety goal means the work system is operating as close as possible to the boundary of 
safe operations, and is able to do so without unacceptable risk through proper coordination 
and management of performance variability (Cook & Rasmussen, 2005). A promotion-
oriented safety goal also emphasizes ongoing adjustments to performance, resulting in 
successful variability, continuous improvement, and flexibility to anticipated threats 
(Curcuruto, Mearns, & Mariani, 2016). Importantly, simultaneous optimization of both 
prevention- and promotion-focused orientations at work appears to be not only possible, 
but desirable in terms of performance outcomes, including safety (Kark et al., 2015; 
Wallace & Chen, 2006).  
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Practical Control Strategies   
From a control systems perspective, differences in safety culture and climate 
configurations represent differences in the types and effectiveness of various control 
strategies that organizations can employ. The arguments above highlight different ways 
that organizations strive to solve the safety control problem. These strategies and their 
associated policies, procedures, and practices are amenable to influence through safety 
culture and climate. As explained below, the combination of these two control dimensions 
produce four different types of control strategy.   
We expect that the need for these strategies may vary depending on the state of 
the system, but that over time, organizations are best served by using a balance of all 
strategies, and dynamically shifting their emphasis on each strategy in anticipation of or in 
response to changes in system state. Through modifying leadership and safety 
management practices, which in turn make aspects of the underlying safety culture salient 
and establish a particular safety climate, organizations are able to deploy appropriate 
control strategies that return the system to a safe and stable state.   
 
Defend  
The first strategy is termed ‘defend’. The defend strategy emphasizes reliability and 
has a prevention orientation, so is primarily reactive. Defend is employed during system 
states where a safety incident or near-miss has occurred, and the organization is reacting 
in ways to bolster its barriers to future reoccurrences. Defend may also be used when the 
system’s risk levels are deemed high such as when routine violations like workarounds or 
other unsafe acts are occurring. In these system states, high management production 
pressure and workers’ desire to invest the least effort to complete tasks result in 
tendencies to sidestep rules to get the job done.   
Accordingly, the defend strategy uses control measures that seek to protect against 
harm or economic loss in a stable environment. These control measures exert a 
counterpressure that resists the operating state moving into the unsafe zone, and tightly 
constrains operating variability. This control is achieved by establishing and enforcing 
safety standards, monitoring compliance, and acting to correct deviations. The emphasis is 
on top-down supervisory control. It is a reactive strategy that is most effective when 
dealing with well-known risks and hazards that are encountered during routine operations. 
Defend is best described as an uncertainty reduction control strategy, whereby prescriptive 
action rules and automation are used to centralize control over work systems and achieve 
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reliable and stable operations (Grote, 2015). These practices serve to constrain the 
variability of performance through prescriptive rules and exerting a counter-pressure in the 
form of traditional safety campaigns that emphasize rule-following behaviour.   
Safety climate, as the shared perceptions of safety procedures, creates a ‘strong 
situation’ that restricts behaviour. At a deeper level, shared beliefs and assumptions about 
the nature of rules exert constraints by providing a referent for how rules should be thought 
about and acted on. Beliefs regarding the process of justice and power are additional 
cultural constraints that shape the performance of system operators.   
In some organizations, a defend control strategy may become excessively 
bureaucratic, with increased formalization of safety procedures resulting in apathy and 
poor quality upwards feedback about system operations from lower levels (Marais et al., 
2006). Another disadvantage of the defend strategy is that is sets up a tension with 
production/efficiency goals, meaning that operators may be inclined to implement 
workarounds or fail to provide accurate feedback data to higher levels of the organization. 
Another disadvantage of the defend strategy is the attempted elimination of uncertainty, 
which may impair safety-related innovation (Grote, 2015). These points suggest that 
reliance on defend as the primary safety control mechanism is likely to be inadequate.  
 
Adapt  
The second strategy is termed ‘adapt’. The adapt strategy emphasizes flexibility 
and has a prevention orientation, so is also primarily reactive in nature. Adapt is most 
useful when the system has crossed the boundary of acceptable performance and a 
hazard has been released. In this situation, the variability of system operations becomes 
erratic and tightly-coupled, whereby small perturbations in the work system can result in 
marked changes that could result in disaster (Cook & Rasmussen, 2005). The system 
objective is to return to a controlled and safe state as quickly as possible.  
The adapt control strategy implements constraints that seek to protect against harm 
or economic loss during non-routine operations, such as when new hazards are 
encountered for the first time. Adapt exerts control through providing local operators with 
the flexibility they need to respond quickly and effectively to unexpected disturbances, and 
to do what is needed to move the system out of the unsafe or unproductive zone. They 
also enable local operators to learn from mistakes and errors, and to prevent the same 
problems from occurring again by engaging in proactive safety behaviours such as raising 
improvement suggestions. At higher levels within the organization, they enable 
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procedures, practices, technology or strategy to be adjusted to suit changing 
circumstances, thereby obtaining better control over the location of the operating point and 
performance boundaries, and pulling the operating point to move back into a safe state.   
Perceptions of emergency readiness and continuous improvement practices, such 
as error management, represent the types of constraints exerted by safety climate. 
Relatedly, climate perceptions around psychological safety, the perception that it is safe to 
take interpersonal risks, (Edmondson, 1999) are also likely to be important for successful 
implementation of the adapt strategy. A positive psychological safety climate is related to 
higher levels of speaking up behaviour, such as when a safety incident is first noticed 
(Grote, 2015). Beliefs about the consequences for speaking up about an error or mistake, 
and assumptions about the causes of accidents are additional deeper constraints over 
thinking and behaviour within the work system.  
 
Leverage  
The third strategy is termed ‘leverage’. The leverage strategy emphasizes the 
achievement of an optimum balance between production and safety, and so is most 
effective during normal operational states. Leverage is most useful when the system is 
operating in stable conditions, and by virtue of production pressures that seek to push the 
operating state closer to the boundary of acceptable performance, at risk of crossing into 
the unsafe zone. The location of the acceptable performance boundary may become 
obfuscated or shift, especially when efficiency pressures routinely drive performance 
closer to the boundary and these deviations become accepted or ‘normalized’ through 
implementation of practices and shared understandings across the organization (Dekker & 
Pruchnicki, 2014). In this situation, operators become complacent to hazards (Marais et 
al., 2006) and have ‘forgotten to be afraid’ (Reason, 1997).  
Leverage uses control measures that seek to simultaneously promote both safety 
and productivity in a stable environment. These control measures exert a force that 
pushes the system toward the boundary of acceptable performance, and maintains a 
dynamic equilibrium over production and safety goals. Leverage achieves optimal balance 
through promotion-focused goals. These goals appeal to employees’ sense of nurturance 
and achievement, being challenging in nature and rewarded once attained. Importantly, 
safety is framed according to a promotion-focused orientation, such as positive targets to 
be achieved. Recognition of successful task behaviours that achieve promotion goals 
without compromising safety is a key practice underpinning the leverage control strategy. 
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In this way, the system implements reinforcing loops to encourage future repetition of 
successful behaviours that optimize both production and safety goals (Goh, Brown, & 
Spickett, 2010). Leverage requires the removal of barriers or constraints that impede 
progress, typically by ensuring that activities and operations are appropriately planned and 
coordinated. Effective coordination of activities between levels of an organizational system 
is critical for safe performance (Leveson, 2011). Without effective coordination, 
inappropriate control actions may be issued, resulting in disaster. There must also be clear 
allocation of accountability for safety performance, and operators need to have the 
appropriate for the means for achieving accountability (Grote, 2015).  
From a safety climate perspective, shared perceptions of reward/recognition, safety 
communication, and planning practices establish strong behaviour-outcome expectancies 
that shape performance ‘at the pointy end’ of system operations. Culturally, shared 
assumptions and beliefs about the nature of human relationships and agreement around 
accountabilities and responsibilities are relevant constraints afforded by the leverage 
strategy. Culture has long been associated with methods to achieve coordination of 
independent organizational actors using an approach that deemphasizes effortful 
surveillance and verification (e.g., Weick, 1987). Using a socio-technical model of safety 
culture, Grote (2007) described shared practices, norms, and attitudes that achieve 
coordinated action in ways that are compatible with the leverage control strategy. 
Examples include measurement of safety indicators, resource planning focused on safety 
promotion, and collective safety awareness.   
 
Energize  
The final strategy is ‘energize’. The energize strategy emphasizes flexibility and has 
a promotion orientation, so is proactive in nature. This strategy uses control measures that 
seek to promote safety and/or productivity in a changing environment. These changes can 
arise from factors such as new technology, the availability of supplies or resources, 
customer demand, competitors, organizational strategy, structure, or operating conditions. 
Changes in production technology may put organizations at risk (Marais et al., 2006). 
Advances in technology may result in hidden sources of risk due to a lack of 
understanding around how the technology will interface with existing system structures, 
constraints, and operators. The risk carried by organizational change may be further 
exacerbated if these produce short-term production benefits, with safety decreasing in 
importance as a result.  
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The energize control measures exert a force, pushing the system towards the 
boundary of acceptable performance. Control is maintained in this situation through 
constraints such as a shared vision for safety or productivity, inspiring a collective sense of 
purpose or commitment to these goals, and providing autonomy for people to be able to 
make it happen. Internalization of company values means that operators look for ways to 
simultaneously enhance both productivity and safety. Given this emphasis on autonomy 
and internalization of company goals, energize exerts control over system operators 
primarily through its effects on internalized forms of motivation. Energize is characterized 
by proactive work behaviours, such as initiating change in a future-focused manner (e.g., 
making suggestions to improve efficiency and/or safety of the system). Energize control 
strategies build employees’ level of autonomous and intrinsic motivation, resulting in 
increased role breadth self-efficacy and role flexibility, appraisals of being in control of 
work tasks, and openness to change (Curcuruto et al., 2016; Parker, Williams, & Turner, 
2006).  
Safety climate exerts control through shared perceptions of practices such as 
employee consultation and involvement in organizational decision-making. Consulting with 
employees on safety-related changes not only increases their sense of ownership and 
engagement (Geller, Roberts, & Gilmore, 1996), but also provides upwards feedback 
information to equip controllers with additional information about how such changes may 
impact on boundaries and performance. Safety culture exerts control through shared 
assumptions about the nature of human activity, specifically, the expectation that safety-
related proactivity and initiative are desirable behaviours. Also, shared organizational 
values related to participation and involvement mean that employees are likely to 
internalize company goals and strive to achieve them. These values can be embedded in 
systems such as safety rules, with decisional latitude built-in to how rules should be 
implemented (Grote, 2007).  
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 Table 2.1. Summary of LEAD control strategies. 
Energize  
Control measures that seek to promote safe 
production in a changing environment (e.g., 
changes in technology, the availability of supplies 
or resources, customer demand, competitors, 
organizational strategy, structure, or operating 
conditions).  
These control measures change the system 
boundaries to enhance efficiency and safety 
performance. This is done by developing a 
shared vision for safe production as an 
aspirational goal, inspiring a collective sense of 
purpose or commitment to these goals, providing 
autonomy, and involving operators in decision-
making.   
 Safety climate: Perceptions of employee 
consultation and involvement practices.  
Safety culture: Beliefs around the nature of 
human activity, and specifically safety initiative.   
The system is proactive and forward-looking with 
a view to exploring new opportunities and 
capitalizing on them to improve efficiency and/or 
safety.  
Adapt  
Control measures that seek to protect against 
harm or economic loss in novel accident 
scenarios (e.g., loss of process control, hazard 
release).  
These control measures exert a counter-
pressure that pulls the system operating point 
back into the safe zone. This is achieved by 
implementing well-practiced emergency 
routines, and adjusting procedures, practices, 
technology or strategy to prevent future 
reoccurrences.   
Safety climate: Perceptions of emergency 
readiness and error management practices.  
Safety culture: Beliefs about the consequences 
of speaking up about errors/mistakes, and the 
causes of accidents.  
The system is reactive and reflective with a view 
to improving future performance through 
exploiting current capabilities to restore safety, 
and ensuring the system adapts and learns from 
its failures.  
  
  
  
  
Leverage  
Control measures that seek to promote safe 
production in a stable and routine environment.   
These control measures push the system 
towards an optimal production/safety balance. 
Constraints are established through setting 
aspirational standards, monitoring progress, and 
rewarding success and accomplishment. It 
requires the removal of barriers or constraints 
that impede progress. Effective planning and 
coordination are hallmarks of this control 
strategy.  
Safety climate: Perceptions of safety recognition, 
communication, and planning practices.  
Safety culture: Beliefs about the nature of human 
relationships, particularly cooperation to achieve 
shared safety goals.  
The system is proactive and forward-looking with 
a view maintaining a dynamic equilibrium 
between safety and efficiency.   
Defend  
Control measures that seek to protect against 
harm or economic loss in a stable and routine 
environment.   
These control measures exert a force that pulls 
the operating state back into the safe zone and 
constraints variability to reduce risk as low as 
possible.  
Defend exerts control by setting and enforcing 
safety standards, monitoring compliance, and 
acting to correct deviations. The emphasis is on 
top-down control. Disciplinary practices aim to 
eliminate violations and performance variability.  
Safety climate: Perceptions of safety procedures 
and practices.  
Safety culture: Beliefs about the nature of rules, 
organizational justice, and distribution/use of 
power.  
The system is reactive and reflective with a view 
to eliminating sources of performance variability 
and resisting the pressures exerted by 
production and efficiency goals.   
 
Conclusion  
Recent advances in fields such as cognitive systems engineering and resilience 
engineering have started to integrate safety culture into models of organizational systems. 
54 
 
Safety culture tends to be referenced more frequently than safety climate in these systems 
models. However, safety culture is best considered as an embedded, intangible, and distal 
influence over system performance, whereas safety climate is more dynamic and 
malleable, and applicable across multiple levels of analysis. These properties mean that 
safety climate is readily applied to systems-based models of safety and acts as a proximal 
mechanism for managing system safety.  
Scholars within the resilience engineering discipline have developed novel 
assessment techniques that are being used to measure the nature and effectiveness of 
control efforts such as those using signal detection theory, (Abdelhamid, Patel, Howell, & 
Mitropoulos, 2003) and the resilience analysis grid (Hollnagel, 2009). However, the 
concept safety climate has largely been absent from these investigations. In light of this 
work, we recommend that future research should examine the safety climate and culture 
components that underpin each of the described control strategies, and relate assessment 
data across these to performance outcomes. Such data will provide organizations with the 
direction needed to develop the control capabilities required to achieve resilient and safe 
operations under a range of operating conditions. An additional avenue for research is 
examining more dynamic models of safety climate that elucidate how climate perceptions 
can be ‘deployed’ or strategically implemented by decision-makers at different levels of an 
organizational system to shape and constrain behaviour. Such longitudinal research 
designs will help to establish the control functions afforded by different dimensions of 
safety climate, and help to inform practical recommendations for industry in terms of 
implementing safety climate as a form of social control over safety performance.  
Perhaps the most compelling rationale for including safety climate and culture within 
systems models is the notion of bottom-up control. Bottom-up control is likely to be more 
effective and sustainable under the types of conditions faced by high hazard organizations 
in the modern age, where uncertainty, interdependence, and dynamic environments are 
encountered routinely. 
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Chapter 3: LEAD operational safety: Development and validation of a tool to 
measure safety control strategies 
 
Abstract 
This paper describes four studies, which together develop and validate a new 
measurement tool for team-level safety leadership. Leadership has long been associated 
with exemplary safety performance, but is difficult to characterise and measure. Further, 
safety practices shown by co-workers have been studied in isolation. The new measure 
that we develop in this research operationalises work by Casey and colleagues (2017) that 
suggests self-regulation states provide the mechanism by which leadership practices 
influence safety behaviours. This theory predicts that there are four main ‘control 
strategies’ used to maintain safety performance. Each strategy makes use of a distinct set 
of safety practices, and gives rise to a specific self-regulation state in workers. These 
states in turn predict both compliant and proactive safety behaviours. In Study 1, we 
interviewed 25 subject matter experts to extract safety leadership practices and develop a 
draft measurement tool. In Study 2 we evaluate the measurement tool and inform its 
refinement through empirical means. In Study 3 we evaluate a shortened version of the 
tool. In Study 4 we provide further validation evidence for the shortened tool and examine 
associations with self-regulation mediators and safety performance. We found support for 
all of our hypotheses, which supports the idea that safety leadership practices are related 
to self-regulation states within workers, which in turn are associated with different safety 
behaviours. This study is among the first to empirically evaluate an integrative model that 
seeks to link safety leadership practices through to safety behaviour via self-regulation 
theories. 
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Introduction 
As organisations become more complex, competitive, and dynamic, traditional 
accident models are failing to accurately predict or prevent workplace accidents (Reason 
et al., 2006). Consequently, there is an ongoing search for positive capacities that both 
prevent incidents and promote the achievement of successful work outcomes (Hollnagel et 
al., 2015). Safety-specific practices that influence individuals’ motivations to work safely, 
such as those shown by supervisors and co-workers, represent one such positive capacity 
that could simultaneously promote proactive behaviours and prevent non-compliant or at-
risk behaviours. Supervisors and co-workers, being most proximal to workers at the front 
line, have the potential to exert the most influence over safety behaviours and subsequent 
performance (e.g., Brondino et al., 2012; Fugas et al., 2012; Fugas et al., 2011; Lingard et 
al., 2010). 
Although much work has been done on examining primarily the influencing 
practices of supervisors (under the umbrella of safety leadership), this literature has been 
criticized for its reliance on transformational and transactional leadership theory, which has 
problems because 1) it conflates safety leadership and safety climate, 2) relies on static 
styles or almost personality-like conceptualizations of leadership (e.g., charisma), and 3) 
may not accurately represent the reality of safety leadership practices in the field 
(Donovan et al., 2016; Nayani et al., 2018; Pilbeam et al., 2016). Further, there have been 
calls to examine safety leadership from a more dynamic perspective given there has been 
little prior consideration of how work context influences the selection and demonstration of 
leadership style, with one systematic review concluding that specific aspects of leadership 
practice encourage different safety behaviours among employees, given the activation of 
different motivational pathways (Pilbeam et al., 2016).  
A promising avenue through which safety practices may exert effects over safety 
behaviour is via motivational pathways such as self-regulation (a motivational state that 
enable a person to guide goal-directed activities through the use of strategies; Karoly, 
1993). Through applying the science of self-regulation, it should be possible to identify 
specific bundles or combinations of practices that teams can implement to induce 
combinations of self-regulatory states, in turn, driving specific behaviours. This idea stands 
to benefit health and safety performance due to the dynamic deployability of a wider 
repertoire of safety behaviours (e.g., proactivity) in response to environmental 
circumstances.  
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Self-regulation has been studied in the safety domain. For instance, Wallace and 
Chen (2006) found that safety climate induced a prevention-focus, which in turn flowed 
through to safety compliance. In the leadership space, Kark and colleagues (2015) found 
support for transformational leadership predicting promotion focus, and in turn, being 
related to safety initiative. Ayree and Hsiung (2016) found that there is a differentia 
relationship with safety outcomes via promotion and prevention-focus. The contribution of 
our paper is the integration of these multiple and separate lines of inquiry into one 
overarching framework, linking safety leadership practices with safety outcomes via 
different combinations of regulatory focus. We also introduce a new self-regulatory 
construct called ‘uncertainty management’, which makes further inroads into 
understanding how safety leadership shapes and moulds operators’ safety behaviours in 
response to various team practices. Further, we contribute to safety science by elucidating 
a dynamic model of self-regulation, whereby different combinations of regulatory focus 
states are seen to influence different configurations of safety behaviour. The measure we 
develop in this paper will help to stimulate and drive additional research to explore the 
dynamic associations between self-regulation and safety behaviour, via leadership. Thus, 
overall this paper contributes to safety science by both integrating work that has come 
before, as well as striking new ground to understand more about what drives safety 
performance in the context of safety leadership. 
Recently, Casey, Griffin, Harrison and Neal (2017) argued that organizations can 
use a range of different control strategies for achieving their safety objectives, and that 
these strategies should be reflected in workers’ perceptions of safety climate. Casey et al. 
(2017) argued that these different aspects of safety climate have an impact on safety 
behaviour via different motivational pathways. As safety climate operates at the strategic 
or organizational level, we extend the ideas explained in the Casey et al (2017) paper by 
applying them at the operational level (see Figure 3.1). Operational influences such as 
those extended by supervisors and co-workers are most proximal to the ‘sharp-end’ where 
work is done, and so stand the most chance of exerting effects over individuals’ safety 
behaviours (Lingard et al., 2010).   
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Figure 3.1. Overview of theoretical model used in this research. 
 
In this paper, we use the Casey et al. (2017) framework to develop a new measure 
that combines various supervisor and co-worker practices into ‘bundles’ that are predicted 
to influence safety performance in purposeful ways. We also conduct a preliminary 
examination of the role of self-regulation as an important mediator through which the 
operations-level control strategies influence safety behaviour. We targeted teams given 
prior research has shown that proximal practices shown by supervisors and co-workers 
exert a strong influence over safety behaviour (Brondino, Silva & Pasini, 2012; Lingard et 
al., 2010).  
Although a plethora of safety leadership scale exist, most are derived from 
straightforward adaptation of existing measures such as the multifactor leadership 
questionnaire (e.g., Barling et al., 2002). Few have been derived inductively from 
qualitative research (e.g., Wu, 2005), and none to our knowledge have been 
operationalized with respect to self-regulation theories or systems-based concepts. Such a 
reoperationalization of supervisor and co-worker safety practices would be advantageous 
to practitioners because it would draw together many different studies and concepts, 
provide a unified instrument and consistent set of dimensions, and specify a psychological 
mechanism through which safety practices influences safety behaviour (potentially 
informing the development of new interventions). 
Regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997) describes two orientations or mindsets that 
people adopt when striving towards goals; a promotion-focus and a prevention-focus. With 
a promotion-focus, individuals are oriented toward gains such as achievement and 
success. With a prevention-focus, individuals are oriented toward minimizing losses such 
errors and accidents. We also describe new theoretical constructs of self-regulation and 
how they relate to safety, which we label ‘uncertainty management’. The current research 
generally builds on the premise that uncertainty is an important component of health and 
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safety management, for instance, increasing uncertainty by promoting safety voice or 
speaking up (which may promote exploratory actions to rectify issues), and providing 
flexible and principle-based rules to promote adaptive performance (Grote, 2015). We 
propose two uncertainty management mental states; a flexibility-focus and a stability-
focus. With a flexibility-focus, individuals are primed to approach uncertainty and explore it 
to develop new capabilities. With a stability-focus, individuals are conversely primed to 
reduce uncertainty through exploiting existing capabilities. Integrating these theories with 
the ability to induce different self-regulatory states through environmental factors such as 
safety climate (Wallace & Chen, 2006) and practices such as safety leadership (Kark et 
al., 2015) may provide a powerful way for organizations to exert nuanced and strategic 
effects over the performance of operators within a work system. 
Based on the framework of Casey et al., (2017), we propose that different team-
level control strategies form distinct bundles or dimensions of practices. Each dimension is 
linked to different self-regulation states, which in turn, influence behavioural outcomes of 
safety compliance and safety proactivity. In the following sections, we first identify the 
tensions or dilemmas that teams resolve through the implementation of teams’ control 
strategies, and how these control strategies influence self-regulation and behaviour for 
individuals. In total, we outline four separate studies in this paper: a qualitative 
investigation to identify specific bundles of practices that could be used to develop a 
measurement scale, two scale development studies using diverse samples, and a final 
study to provide a preliminary test of the relationships with self-regulation and performance 
variables. 
 
Control strategies and self-regulation 
The socio-technical systems approach treats safety as a control problem (Leveson, 
2002; Rasmussen, 1997). Organizations need to ensure that operations remain within safe 
boundaries, which is difficult when the environment is dynamic, uncertainty is high, and 
there are complex interdependencies among the elements of the system. Casey et al. 
(2017) argued that perceptions of safety climate are influenced by the control strategies 
through which organizations maintain system safety. To be successful at maintaining 
system safety, these control strategies require the management of two fundamental 
tensions or dilemmas by system controllers: promotion versus prevention; and stability 
versus flexibility. The most proximal system controller to individuals performing work 
activities is the supervisor. Supervisors have considerable discretion in how and when they 
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implement safety control strategies, such as organizationally-endorsed policies, 
procedures, and practices (Zohar, 2000). Co-workers also shape individuals’ safety 
behaviours through exerting their own influences such as discouraging unsafe behaviour, 
communicating about safety matters, and supporting co-workers to complete work 
successfully (Fugas et al., 2012; Hofmann et al., 2003). Below we outline the background 
to these tensions and their relevance to operational (group level) safety behaviour 
management. We then develop hypotheses that will be tested in the final study to provide 
evidence of the proposed relationships between aggregated scale scores, self-regulation 
variables, and safety behaviours.  
 
Promotion and prevention tension 
The first dilemma that organizations need to control involves the need to minimize 
or eliminate negative events (i.e., prevent unsuccessful and unsafe outcomes) while 
maximizing and achieving positive events (i.e., promote successful and safe outcomes). 
This tension between promotion and prevention control strategies is evident in the 
changing emphasis of safety management over recent decades. Traditional approaches to 
safety management tend to focus on the prevention of accidents and injuries. Under this 
approach, which has been termed “Safety I” (Hollnagel et al., 2015), safety is framed as a 
prevention goal where the aim is to minimize harm or loss events. An alternative approach, 
which has been termed “Safety II”, is to frame safety as a positive outcome where effort is 
directed toward success and achievement (Hollnagel et al., 2015). Although the concepts 
of Safety I and Safety II have not yet been subject to rigorous empirical testing, they are 
consistent with a long history of research in psychology demonstrating that the distinction 
between positive and negative outcomes plays a fundamental role in human motivation 
(Carver, 2006; Elliot & Thrash, 2002; Higgins, 1997).  
These different control strategies align with the motivational orientations of self-
regulation theory. Regulatory focus theory predicts that when a goal is framed in terms of 
the potential benefits to be gained, people are likely to adopt a promotion-focus, in which 
goals are viewed as ideals to which the person strives (Higgins, 1997). A promotion-focus 
motivates strategies that emphasize hopes, accomplishments and advancement, and 
increases the likelihood of risk-taking (e.g., innovation) in the pursuit of gains. Casey et al. 
(2017) argued that when workers have a stronger promotion-focus, they are more likely to 
work proactively to enhance the safety of their work environment. This is because a 
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promotion-focus motivates behaviours that involve exploration, creativity, and innovation, 
and require personal initiative.  
On the other hand, when a goal is framed as a negative outcome to be prevented or 
minimized, regulatory focus theory predicts that people are likely to adopt a prevention-
focus. When a prevention-focus is induced, people are more likely to emphasize safety, 
responsibility, and security; goals are viewed as obligations and oughts; people tend to be 
vigilant; and take extra care to avoid mistakes and errors. Casey et al. (2017) argued that 
when workers have a stronger prevention-focus, they are more likely to comply with safety 
rules and procedures. This is because a prevention-focus motivates behaviours that 
minimize risk and enable the person to meet their duties and obligations. A prevention-
focus is characterized by practices including risk aversion, cautiousness, and vigilance. 
There is evidence to support the argument that prevention- and promotion-focus 
play an important role in explaining safety behaviour (e.g., Aryee & Hsiung, 2016; Kark et 
al., 2015; Wallace & Chen, 2006). Wallace and Chen (2006) found that safety climate was 
positively associated with prevention-focus. Of relevance to this research, Kark et al 
(2015) showed that supervisor transformational leadership was positively associated with 
promotion-focus, which was positively related to safety initiative. More recently, Ayree and 
Hsiung (2016) found that promotion-focus was related to safety-related events and injuries 
via safety initiative, whereas prevention-focus was related to safety-related events via 
unsafe behaviour such that a higher prevention-focus predicted fewer unsafe behaviours 
and safety-related events. However, these research studies also highlight some 
inconsistencies that may be explained through adopting a more nuanced framework that 
considers other self-regulation pathways. Ayree and Hsiung (2016) did not find an 
association between prevention-focus and injuries via unsafe behaviour, and Kark et al 
(2015) did not find a consistent relationship between prevention-focus and compliance 
behaviour.  
 
Stability and flexibility 
The second dilemma for system controllers involves resolving the tension between 
stability and flexibility. Organizations need to be able to operate reliably and safely under 
routine conditions (Leveson, 2011). To do this, they need to be able to identify and control 
known risks and hazards. This control is typically achieved using top-down and 
hierarchical managerial strategies characterized by specifying what people have to do 
ahead of time (e.g., pre-job planning and risk assessment; Zanko & Dawson, 2012), how 
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they do it (e.g., standardized work procedures; Adler & Borys, 1996), and monitoring 
compliance (e.g., transactional leadership; McCoy et al., 2001). In other situations, such as 
when hazards are unexpected, failure is experienced, or novel threats and opportunities 
arise, organizations need flexibility to achieve successful outcomes. This is typically 
achieved by giving people job autonomy (Dekker & Leveson, 2014), deferring to operators’ 
expertise for decision-making (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2011), and engaging in active 
consultation to inform changes (Dollard & Bakker, 2011). Again, a team’s direct leader and 
co-workers are often responsible for the implementation of such practices, meaning that 
they serve as a critical lynchpin to manage the daily variability of work and adopt specific 
strategies to achieve success.  
Most theories of human motivation propose that individuals seek to reduce 
uncertainty, particularly when uncertainty is perceived as aversive (Berker et al., 2016). 
When teams pursue their safety goals using strategies that emphasize stability and 
minimize uncertainty, we expect individuals will adopt a mindset that reflects this 
approach. With this focus, individuals are more likely to pursue goals in ways that exploit 
current capabilities, such as drawing on existing knowledge, planning, and predicting how 
a situation may turn out in the future. We describe this state as ‘stability-focus’ which is 
more likely when control strategies implemented by supervisors and team members 
emphasize clear goals, rules, procedures (e.g., supervisors emphasizing the importance of 
particular work objectives/targets during a pre-start meeting), and feelings of inherent 
danger or risk in the work environment (e.g., a co-worker’s emphasis on job hazard 
assessment and risk monitoring). Under conditions that induce a stability-focus, we expect 
individuals will be more likely to engage in compliance-related safety behaviours that 
concentrate on exploiting existing capabilities such as complying with rules and 
procedures, and using established risk management practices. 
When teams pursue their safety goals using strategies that emphasize flexibility and 
take a more proactive approach to uncertainty, we expect that individuals will adopt a more 
flexible mindset. We describe this mindset as a ‘flexibility-focus’. Control strategies that 
might induce a flexibility-focus involve an emphasis on support, development and growth, 
and learning. These strategies (practices/procedures) signal that individual needs and 
concerns will be addressed, and that there is a supportive and ‘psychologically-safe’ social 
environment in which exploration of uncertainty can take place. Under conditions that 
induce a flexibility-focus, individuals may be more likely to engage in more proactive safety 
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behaviours that involve exploring new capabilities and opportunities, such as safety voice 
(Tucker et al., 2008) and initiating safety-related change (Hofmann et al., 2003).  
Safety performance 
 Traditionally, safety performance has been defined as a combination of safety 
compliance and safety participation (Neal & Griffin, 2002). Safety compliance behaviour is 
widely defined as rule-following and procedural adherence. Safety participation is defined 
as actively engaging in discretionary safety activities such as promotion initiatives and 
voluntary meetings. Subsequent studies have broadened the conceptualization of safety 
performance, pointing to a more nuanced set of behaviours. For instance, Burke and 
colleagues (2002) found that ‘general’ safety performance consists of four dimensions: 
using personal protective equipment, engaging in work practices to reduce risk, 
communicating health and safety information, and exercising rights/responsibilities. 
Hofmann and colleagues (2003) applied the concept of organizational citizenship to health 
and safety, resulting in an adapted scale replete with six different performance 
dimensions. More recently, further nuanced conceptualizations of safety performance have 
been developed. For example, Hu and colleagues (2018) proposed a new model whereby 
safety compliance is divided into three elements: deep (engaging fully in safety activities 
and compliance tasks), surface – show (going through the motions or making a ‘show’ of 
complying), and surface – effort (doing the least possible to comply).  
 Taken together, these studies strongly support the notion that safety performance is 
more complicated than simply following rules and procedures. A combination of both 
compliant and proactive/innovative work behaviours are required for organizations to meet 
legislated and voluntary standards such as those specified by ISO:45001 (ISO, 2018). For 
example, the ISO standards prescribe the features of an effective safety management 
system, which include both prevention- and promotion-focused behaviours: encouraging 
compliance with health and safety procedures, contributing to improvement processes, 
participating in consultation, and controlling risks. Accordingly, it is behest of organizations 
to encourage flexible and dynamic behavioural responses from workers to achieve 
exemplary safety performance.  
 
The LEAD Model 
In this section we outline specific bundles of safety practices that are associated 
with the different safety control strategies. The dimensions are based on Casey et al. 
(2017), who identified four different control strategies (leverage, energize, adapt, and 
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defend, which together form the second-order factor LEAD) that organizations can use to 
achieve superior health and safety performance. In the current research, this theory is 
applied to teams rather than organizations. These strategies represent different ways that 
teams can solve the safety control problem, and require the deployment or use of different 
types of practices in anticipation of or in response to different work situations. We propose 
that supervisory and co-worker practices should influence self-regulation and behaviour 
via distinct dimensions. These dimensions are summarized in Table 3.1, and explained 
briefly below. 
 
Table 3.1. The four LEAD control strategies and underpinning self-regulatory mechanisms 
through which system control is established. 
Promotion and flexibility 
 
Energize 
 
Used in situations where conditions are 
changing, such as introducing new 
procedures or technologies 
 
Practices include consultation, 
involvement, and training/development 
centered on employee growth 
Prevention and flexibility 
 
Adapt 
 
Used in situations where an incident is 
occurring or has occurred, and the 
focus is on learning/improvement. 
 
Practices include reflection on work, 
effectiveness of emergency routines, 
and learning from failure 
Promotion and stability 
 
Leverage 
 
Used in situations where conditions are 
routine and low-risk, and the focus is on 
optimizing multiple work goals at once 
 
Perceptions of practices including goal 
specification, recognition of 
achievement, and planning/coordination 
of work 
Prevention and stability 
 
Defend 
 
Used in situations where high-risk work 
is being undertaken  
 
Perceptions of practices including risk 
management, driving accountability, 
and monitoring performance 
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 The leverage strategy encourages a promotion-focus and emphasizes stability. 
Implementation of the leverage control strategy requires the use of team-level practices 
such as reward and recognition for successful safety performance; high-quality 
coordination and communication within- and between-teams as work is carried out; and 
effective forward-planning practices that include the identification of safety goals and 
establishment of strong behaviour-outcome expectancies. 
The energize strategy encourages a promotion orientation and emphasizes 
flexibility. This strategy is proactive in nature, giving teams the capability to maintain safety 
in a dynamic and changing work environment. The energize control strategy exerts an 
influence on safety through practices such as communicating a specific vision or direction 
for safety-related change, encouraging collective purpose and commitment to goals, and 
enabling autonomy and growth opportunities for staff. Energize also requires the use of 
consultative and participative approaches to safety management. 
The adapt strategy encourages a flexibility- and prevention-focus. The adapt control 
strategy consists of implementing practices such as emergency readiness routines, 
reflection on past performance, and error management techniques. In particular, 
emergency readiness routines remind operators of the dangers and risks they can face in 
the workplace, continuous improvement practices such as after action reviews encourage 
critical reflection-on-practice and learning (Baird, Holland & Deacon, 1999), and error 
management techniques such as talking openly about mistakes and fixing problems before 
they become major issues fosters a preventative and flexible approach (Cigularov, Chen & 
Rosecrance, 2010). 
The defend strategy encourages a stability- and prevention-focus. Defend is best 
described as an uncertainty reduction control strategy that concentrates on stability and 
prevention, whereby drawing attention to rules and standardized procedures centralizes 
control over work systems and achieves reliable and stable operations (Grote, 2015). The 
defend control strategy centres on team members and supervisors emphasizing 
standardized rules and procedures around high-risk work (e.g., ‘Golden Rules’, Safe Work 
Methods Statements - SWMS), highlighting legislated duties and obligations (e.g., safety 
acts and regulations), carefully monitoring compliance and initiating corrective actions 
when expectations aren’t met, and making sources of danger and risk salient in the work 
environment. 
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Overview of Research Program 
 This paper consists of four separate studies conducted across a period of 12 
months. Overall, the studies chart the creation, fine-tuning, and validation of a new scale of 
team safety practices that are theorized to predict different configurations of self-
regulation, and in turn, safety behaviour. Study 1 adopts a qualitative methodology, using 
interview data from 25 subject matter experts to develop a pool of survey items. The 
objective of Study 1 was to lay a firm foundation for the measurement instrument through 
extensive consultation with experts. Subsequent studies adopt a quantitative methodology 
as we switched from scale creation to psychometric evaluation and fine-tuning. Study 2 
sought to establish the scale’s construct validity and develop a shorter, 12-tem version of 
the survey in line with the research project’s practical requirements (i.e., to develop a 
short, evidence-based safety leadership scale). We draw on a large sample from 30 
different organizations for this purpose. Study 3 builds upon Study 2 by providing validity 
evidence in a new sample, using the shorter 12-item scale. Again, a diverse and large 
sample drawn from 22 companies was used for this purpose. Study 4 provides a final test 
of the construct validity of the survey instrument, and an opportunity to replicate the 
findings from Study 2 using a new sample. Throughout the studies, different dependent 
variables were used in light of the project’s practical requirements (i.e., provide 
participating organizations with measures that could be used to inform safety improvement 
initiatives) and to demonstrate a wider range of relationships to shore up the survey’s 
construct and criterion validities.  
 
Study 1 
 The objective of Study 1 was to explore the practices that underpin each of the 
LEAD control strategies at the operational level (i.e., supervisors and team members) 
through semi-structured interviews with subject matter experts. This information was then 
converted into a pool of LEAD survey items for psychometric evaluation. 
 
Method 
Participants 
 Through consulting the safety science literature, we recruited subject matter experts 
in the areas of safety culture, safety climate, safety leadership, resilience-engineering, and 
systems thinking. An initial scan of the literature identified 28 academics with aligned 
research interests and outputs. In addition, the views of practitioners were sought. The first 
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author broadcast an invitation to participate across the Queensland health and safety 
regulator (Workplace Health & Safety Queensland). As inspectors and advisors interact 
with a number of different workplaces through their regulatory activities, they were deemed 
appropriate sources of information about safety control strategies. Each of these personnel 
had over 12 months regulatory experience (and some with over 20 years). Of the 13 
personnel from this subgroup, 11 elected to participate. Overall, 25 (61%) total number 
subject matter experts voluntarily participated in this research. 
 
Procedure 
 A semi-structured interview protocol was developed for this study. Following an 
initial description of each control strategy and the underpinning theory surrounding self-
regulation, participants were asked to describe specific safety-related practices that they 
believed would characterize each of the four control strategies. 
The first author acted as interviewer for all participants. Basic interviewing techniques such 
as use of minimal encouragers and paraphrasing were used to clarify and probe 
participants’ answers. Interviews were scheduled for one hour, and ranged between 20 
minutes and two hours, with most lasting between 30-45 minutes. With the consent of 
each participant, the interviews were recorded. Thereafter, the interviews were transcribed 
by an independent third party and the written transcripts submitted for analysis.  
Regarding the procedures for our analysis of the qualitative data, the methods 
outlined by Braun and Clarke (2006) regarding thematic analysis were consulted. 
Thematic analysis was deemed appropriate for this research because it is unbounded by 
epistemological and theoretical approaches (it sits across a range of different approaches 
and is essentially constructionist in its philosophy), it offers considerable flexibility in the 
identification of themes, and the fact that our intention was to adopt a more descriptive 
approach rather than engage in theory building (where an approach like grounded theory 
may have been more appropriate; Braun & Clarke, 2006). In this research we adopted a 
‘theoretical’ or deductive approach rather than inductive, whereby the existing LEAD 
theoretical propositions described by Casey et al. (2017) were used as scaffolding to sort, 
analyse, and interpret the data corpus. We also adopted a ‘semantic’ approach to 
identifying themes, which is more descriptive in nature than an approach that seeks to 
identify latent constructs. Our procedure for conducting the thematic analysis closely 
followed the approach outlined by Braun and Clarke (2006): 
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1. Data immersion and familiarization, 
2. Generation of initial codes (done independently by the lead author, which were later 
discussed and verified by the whole research team), 
3. Identification of themes (done independently by the lead author), 
4. Review of themes (done with the entire research team), and, 
5. Defining and naming the themes. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Following descriptive first-cycle coding, codes were then grouped together into 
common categories. Within these categories, the data were also separated into each of 
the four LEAD control strategies, based on the answers provided by participants. In total, 
155 codes were extracted for safety practices. Table 3.2 shows the breakdown of 
practices codes per LEAD strategy and participant group (practitioners and academics).  
 
Table 3.2. Tally of practices codes extracted from the data and allocated to the LEAD 
framework. 
LEAD Dimension No. Codes No. Academics No. Practitioners 
Leverage 37 26 11 
Energise 32 16 16 
Adapt 31 17 14 
Defend 55 36 19 
Total 155 95 60 
 
These categories were then grouped into themes, and the most prevalent themes 
were selected for inclusion in the conceptual model— five practices themes were selected 
for each strategy. This approach ensured that only the themes that most closely 
represented each control strategy were used to develop scale items. Specific themes 
falling under each control strategy are summarized by Table 3.3. Notably, many practices 
that emerged are typical of safety climate surveys, such as ensuring adequate training and 
enforcement of safety standards. However, other practices not typically included in either 
safety leadership or safety climate measures also emerged, such as integration of safety 
with production activities, standardization of work processes, conducting after action 
reviews, and collaborative team planning. These results suggest that the operationalization 
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of existing safety leadership and safety climate measures could be broadened to capture a 
wider repertoire of safety-related practices. 
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Table 3.3. Summary of organizational practices across the four LEAD factors. 
Factor Dimension Description 
Leverage 
Collaboration 
Shared planning processes. Leaders seek information about work from operators. Support is given to 
ensure task objectives are met. 
Performance recognition Reward and recognition programs that acknowledge workers who show high safety performance. 
Integration Safety is integrated with and made a part of production processes. 
Multiskilling Investment in workers to develop safety skills across multiple domains. 
Preparation Multidisciplinary planning, scheduling, workload modelling, and buffering. 
Energize 
Consultation Interaction with workers at all levels to solicit input and inform safety-related changes. 
Local autonomy Workers are permitted to make decisions in the absence of a supervisor’s explicit direction. 
Involvement Workers actively participate in safety decision making. 
Informed Communication is two-way and regular between workers and leaders. 
Safety vision and priority 
Leaders articulate a clear safety vision that are translated into team-level objectives, and safety is 
seen as an important work priority. 
Adapt 
After action review 
Following unsuccessful work operations, workers meet to discuss what went wrong and how to 
prevent reoccurrence. 
Temporary structures During emergency situations, operations and centrally organized, but locally executed. 
Emergency routines Well-rehearsed emergency routines and preparatory activities (e.g., drills and practice runs). 
Incident investigation Thorough investigations uncover all causes of incidents. 
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Leverage practices. These practices consisted of shared planning processes to 
decrease team uncertainty and achieve stability in work activities. Recognition and reward 
were also identified as a core practice, acknowledging workers who meet or exceed safety 
expectations. Integration of safety with production activities was also identified as a core 
practices, such as integrating safety activities with standard operating activities. Providing 
workers with skill development across multiple domains was identified, as was engaging in 
thorough processes to understand upcoming workloads and apply mitigating strategies 
such as buffering. 
Energize practices. Consultation with staff emerged as an important practice for this 
control strategy, as did providing workers with autonomy to make decisions about health 
and safety independent of supervisor oversight or approval. Another related practice was 
involving workers using a participative decision-making style. High quality two-way 
communication, which is similar to the consultation practice (although the latter focused 
more on communication prior to major safety changes being implemented) was also 
identified. Finally, developing and communicating a specific team safety vision was a 
theme. 
Adapt practices. Reflecting on past performance and identifying lessons learned to 
improve future performance (e.g., after action review) was a core practice identified for the 
adapt control strategy. A ‘deference to expertise’ theme was identified, meaning that 
temporary decision-making structures are employed (i.e., a flattened hierarchy) during 
emergency situations. Practicing emergency drills and routines was also a theme for the 
adapt control strategy. Finally, high quality incident investigations and ensuring lessons 
learned are shared broadly with all team members were two additional practices identified.  
Defend practices. Regarding defend, enforcement of safety standards and 
monitoring of safety performance (i.e., checking for compliance) were identified as themes. 
Effective risk management techniques such as identification and control of hazards was 
another theme. A theme relating to standardization of work processes when in the context 
of high risk hazards was also identified. Finally, ensuring staff have adequate competence 
and capability to understand safety procedures and requirements was identified as a team 
practice. 
These themes and the examples provided by the subject matter experts were then 
used to generate a list of 60 items. These items were provided back to the interview 
participants for review, and their feedback used to make further refinements and we 
shortened the scale to 24 items. 
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 Consultation with subject matter experts in safety leadership, safety climate, and 
safety culture enabled us to identify a list of practices relevant to each LEAD control 
strategy and develop an item pool for statistical evaluation. We supplemented the ideas 
put forward by Casey and colleagues (2017) with the experience of the recruited experts, 
combined with the results of a brief literature scan, to build and refine the draft item pool 
down to 24 items. We then undertook a series of quantitative studies to identify the factor 
structure of the LEAD scale and collect evidence of reliability and criterion validity.  
 
Study 2 
The objective of Study 2 was to evaluate the construct validity of the draft LEAD 
measure, and draw on structured techniques to revise the item pool down further to a short 
12-item measure in line with the practical requirements of this research program. 
Measures of regulatory focus at work and uncertainty management were included in this 
study to a) demonstrate evidence of discriminant validity, and b) explore associations 
between the LEAD scale and outcome variables, in line with methods to establish criterion 
or predictive validity.  
  
Method 
Participants 
Study participants were 2,131 workers drawn from across 30 different organizations 
who participated in a larger project to develop a LEAD toolkit (Queensland industry). 
These organizations were spread across construction, education, health care, 
transportation, public administration, manufacturing, and professional services. 51% 
(1,071) of the sample reported being employed in their current position for 10 years or 
longer. A similar number (51%, 1,075) were workers without supervisory responsibilities.  
 
Procedure 
Workplace Health and Safety Queensland maintains a database of over 2,000 
individuals who have voluntarily signed up to the Safety Leadership at Work program 
(SLAW). The SLAW program provides advice, guidance, resources, and events to 
members through a free or low-cost fee structure. The database includes a range of 
workers and leaders from multiple industries, with greatest representation from 
construction, healthcare and social assistance, manufacturing and transport, and 
government-owned organizations.  
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Following ethical clearance and permission from the regulator, one of the authors 
broadcast an invitation out to all 2,000 SLAW members. The invitation described the 
research project and outlined how in return for participating, each organization would 
receive a customized results report and debriefing session. A total of 85 organizations 
responded to the initial call for participants. Of these, 30 progressed through to data-
collection. Two companies did not complete their data collection due to competing 
priorities. Response rates at the company level ranged from 5% to 100%, and the average 
response rate was 38%. 
After agreeing to participate, each organization was given a ‘toolkit’ that included 
example communications templates, survey administration training materials, and a 
preparation document. Some minor customizations of item language and demographics 
was permitted; however, the extent of these customizations was carefully constrained to 
enable measurement and structural equivalence across the combined dataset. 
Employees completed the survey during work hours and with the support of the 
host organizations. Data were collected online in most cases, with anonymity managed 
through provision of a generic and non-identifiable link. A minority of companies required 
hardcopy surveys to reach parts of their workforce. These were sealed in envelopes and 
data-entered by the research team to ensure anonymity of the participants. 
 
Analytical approach 
Stata version 12 (StataCorp, 2011) was used for all descriptive statistics, and SPSS 
version 23 (IBM, 2015) was used for exploratory factor analysis. Mplus v5.2 (Muthen & 
Muthen, 1998-2008) was used to conduct confirmatory factor analyses. The full maximum 
likelihood estimator with robust standard errors was used for the analyses. Model 
goodness of fit was evaluated with a number of established indices including the Tucker 
Lewis Index (TLI >0.95; Tucker & Lewis, 1973), the comparative fit index (CFI >0.95; 
Bentler, 1990), the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA = <.05; Hu & 
Bentler, 1999), and the standardized root mean square residual (SRMR = <.05). 
Measures 
 LEAD. The 24-item version of the LEAD scale was used. Respondents indicated 
their agreement to each statement using a 5-point Likert scale (1=Strongly disagree to 
5=Strongly agree). Overall, internal consistency estimates were acceptable; combined 
scale α=0.96, leverage α=0.91, energize α=0.91, adapt α=0.87, and defend α=0.89. Items 
are shown in Table 5. 
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 Regulatory focus at work. The full 12-item scale validated by Wallace, Johnson and 
Frazier (2009) and originally developed by Wallace and Chen (2006) was used for this 
study. Internal consistency alphas for both prevention-focus (α=0.90) and promotion-focus 
(α=0.86) were acceptable. An example promotion-focus item is “Getting my work done no 
matter what”. An example prevention-focus item is “Doing my duty at work”.  
Uncertainty management. Two three-item subscales were adapted based on the trait 
measure originally developed and validated by Greco and Roger (2001). Internal 
consistency alphas for flexibility-focus (α=0.83) and stability-focus (α=0.81) were 
acceptable. Further, a CFA modelling both scales as separate latent factors provided an 
acceptable fit to the data. An example flexibility-focus item is “I easily adapt to change”. An 
example stability-focus item is “I take steps to clarify uncertain situations”. 
Safety compliance. A short three-item measure of safety compliance was used (Casey & 
Krauss, 2013). Internal consistency alpha was acceptable (α=0.82). An example item 
reads “Appropriately report all safety incidents”.  
Safety proactivity. A four-item measure of safety proactivity was used based on the 
scale of ‘initiating safety-related change’ developed by Hofmann et al (2003). Proactivity 
was measured on a six-point frequency scale (1=Never to 6=Always). Internal consistency 
alpha was acceptable (α=0.91). An example item reads “Try to improve safety 
procedures”.  
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Results and Discussion 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3.4 shows the means and standard deviations for all variables used in Study 2. 
 
Table 3.4. Means and standard deviations for all variables used in Study 2. 
Variable Mean SD 
Leverage 3.51 0.87 
Energize 3.67 0.83 
Adapt 3.80 0.76 
Defend 3.76 0.81 
LEAD 3.73 0.70 
Prevention-focus 4.41 0.52 
Promotion-focus 3.75 0.68 
Flexibility-focus 4.06 0.57 
Stability-focus 4.15 0.52 
Safety proactivity 3.71 0.95 
Safety compliance 4.44 0.69 
 
Measurement Model 
CFAs were conducted to evaluate the measurement model. First, a one-factor 
model was run, which was a poor fit to the data; χ2(252)=1970.63, p<.01; RMSEA=0.08, 
p<.01; CFI=0.85; TLI=0.84; SRMR=0.05. A two-level factor structure with LEAD sub-
dimensions and one overall LEAD superordinate factor provided the best fit to the data; 
χ2(247)=987.35, p<.01; RMSEA=0.05, p=0.07; CFI=0.94; TLI=0.93; SRMR=0.04. Table 
3.5 shows the standardized factor loadings from the CFA. 
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Table 3.5. Results of Study 2 confirmatory factor analysis (standardized factor loadings are shown). 
Survey Item Leverage Energize Adapt Defend 
After problematic work, our team discusses what happened to 
prevent similar situations from happening again 
  0.69  
People on this team try to prepare for situations that are out of the 
ordinary 
  0.61  
When a health or safety incident happens, our direct leader 
thoroughly investigates the situation 
  0.73  
This team makes sure that information about health and safety 
incidents is communicated to everyone 
  0.75  
People on this team shares what it learns from health and safety 
incidents widely 
  0.81  
Within this team, people are encouraged to talk openly about their 
mistakes and errors 
  0.74  
Compliance with health and safety rules is enforced by our direct 
leader 
   0.77 
Assessing and managing health and safety risks is an important 
work priority for this team 
   0.79 
In this team, workers' safety performance is closely monitored and 
supervised 
   0.82 
This team has a lot of specific steps that should be followed to 
make sure work is healthy and safe 
   0.72 
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This team is thoroughly trained in the specific health and safety 
rules and standards that apply to our work 
   0.71 
In this team, safety violations are handled fairly    0.71 
Our direct leader visits workers on this team to talk directly with 
them about health and safety 
 0.77   
Experienced workers on this team are encouraged to take control 
over health and safety in their job 
 0.72   
Workers on this team help each other to understand health and 
safety hazards and requirements 
 0.74   
Within this team there is a lot of two-way communication about 
health and safety between leaders and workers 
 0.84   
Our direct leader encourages the team to ask questions and clarify 
health and safety messages 
 0.84   
Our direct leader appreciates when workers take personal initiative 
when it comes to health and safety 
 0.74   
Our direct leader gives positive recognition when the team 
performs tasks safely 
0.76    
Workers on this team are given opportunities to work in different 
areas to build health and safety skills 
0.65    
This team is given experience in different types of work so we can 
do many tasks safely 
0.64    
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Within this team, people think ahead and plan how we will do our 
work safely and productively 
0.69    
Our direct leader sets clear and specific health and safety goals 0.87    
Our direct leader focuses on the positive behaviors we need to 
show to achieve health and safety goals 
0.88    
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Correlation analysis 
Pairwise correlations showed that the LEAD sub-dimensions and overall LEAD 
factor were significantly correlated with prevention/promotion focus, uncertainty 
management, safety compliance, and safety proactivity (see Table 3.6). Of note, the LEAD 
scales were positively related to self-regulation variables (as suggested by the theory 
proposed by Casey et al., 2017) as well as safety behaviours (proactivity and compliance). 
These results provide support for the LEAD scale’s criterion validity.  
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Table 3.6. Correlation analyses for all variables used in Study 2. 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
(1) Leverage 1.00           
(2) Energize 0.78 1.00          
(3) Adapt 0.66 0.71 1.00         
(4) Defend 0.72 0.77 0.70 1.00        
(5) LEAD 0.89 0.92 0.85 0.90 1.00       
(6) Prevention-focus 0.18 0.17 0.19 0.24 0.22 1.00      
(7) Promotion-focus 0.21 0.16 0.16 0.21 0.21 0.43 1.00     
(8) Flexibility-focus 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.23 0.33 0.29 1.00    
(9) Stability-focus 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.19 0.18 0.45 0.36 0.37 1.00   
(10) Safety proactivity 0.31 0.31 0.27 0.31 0.34 0.26 0.23 0.23 0.22 1.00  
(11) Safety compliance 0.27 0.30 0.27 0.35 0.33 0.35 0.15 0.20 0.24 0.51 1.00 
Note: All correlations are statistically-significant at the p<.01 level. 
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 Study 1 established preliminary evidence of the LEAD scale’s psychometric 
properties and criterion validity using cross-sectional data. Confirmatory analyses showed 
that a two-level hierarchical structure best fit the data, with all LEAD sub-dimensions 
loading onto a combined overall LEAD factor. LEAD scales and the overall second-order 
factor correlated significantly with all hypothesized outcome variables, supporting the utility 
of the scale in terms of its potential to predict safety behaviour. 
 
Study 3 
The objective of this study was to evaluate the psychometric properties of a new 
shorter version of the LEAD scale incorporating the findings from Study 2. A new shorter 
version of the LEAD scale was an important objective outlined by the Government sponsor 
of the research program at the outset of this research. Also, a shorter survey tool may 
increase its practical utility and reduce sources of response error induced by survey 
fatigue. A new sample was used for Study 3 to provide a more robust replication of our 
findings from Study 2. 
 
Method 
Participants 
Participants 2,216 workers who again participated in a larger project to develop and 
trial a LEAD toolkit, representing 22 different companies. Close to half of the sample 
reported working in the same industry for 10 years or more (48%, 560). 41% (473) were 
workers without supervisory responsibilities.  
 
Procedure 
A similar procedure to Study 1 was undertaken for this study. We broadcast a 
message to the SLAW database requesting participation the scale development in 
exchange for an organizational report and debriefing session. 58 companies initially 
expressed interest in participating, which converted into 20 that followed through to data-
collection. The average response rate across all companies was 43%, ranging from 11% 
to 83%. 
To reduce the LEAD scale further, the Stanton et al. (2002) procedure was used, 
drawing on standardized loadings from the Study 2 CFA, corrected-item total correlations, 
research team ratings, and correlations with proximal outcome variables of interest 
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(regulatory focus and uncertainty management). A total of 12 items were retained through 
this scale reduction process. 
 
Measures 
 LEAD. A shortened 12-item version of the LEAD scale was used in this study, with 
three items per LEAD sub-dimension retained. Respondents indicated their agreement to 
each statement using a 5-point Likert scale (1=Strongly disagree to 5=Strongly agree). 
Overall, internal consistency estimates were acceptable; combined scale α=0.95, leverage 
α=0.83, energize α=0.92, adapt α=0.84, and defend α=0.83. Items are shown in Table 7. 
 Safety compliance. A 15-item scale developed by Hu and colleagues (2018) was 
used to measure safety compliance. Hu’s et al. (2018) scale measures ‘deep’ compliance 
(paying close attention to risk and how to apply procedures effectively. Respondents 
indicated how true each statement was in relation to their safety compliance behaviours 
using a 5-point Likert scale (1=Not at all true to 5=Very true). The scale internal 
consistency alpha was acceptable: deep α=0.92. 
Safety proactivity.  The same safety proactivity measure used in Study 2 was used 
again for this study. Internal consistency alpha was acceptable (α=0.89). An example item 
reads “Try to improve safety procedures”. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 3.7 shows the descriptive statistics for variables used in this study. 
 
Table 3.7. Means and standard deviations for all variables in Study 3. 
Variable Mean SD 
Leverage 3.74 0.86 
Energize 3.72 0.94 
Adapt 3.97 0.82 
Defend 3.92 0.83 
LEAD 3.83 0.78 
Safety proactivity 4.50 0.98 
Deep compliance 4.33 0.67 
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Measurement Model 
A CFA revealed that a two-level factor solution was the best fit to the data, with one 
overall superordinate LEAD factor and four LEAD sub-dimensions; χ2(50)=230.65, p<.01; 
RMSEA=0.06; CFI=0.97; TLI=0.96; SRMR=0.03. Alternative models were also run, 
including a one-factor model (χ2 (54)=513.87, p<.01; RMSEA=0.09, p<.01; CFI=0.93; 
TLI=0.91; SRMR=0.04) and a two-factor model (χ2(53)=398.74, p<.01; RMSEA=0.08, 
p<.01; CFI=0.94; TLI=0.93; SRMR=0.04); however, both exhibited inferior fit statistics. 
This replication of the factor structure from Study 2 supports the LEAD scale’s construct 
validity. 
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Table 3.8. Results of Study 3 exploratory factor analysis (standardized factor loadings are shown). 
Survey Item Leverage Energize Adapt  Defend 
After a problem at work, this team discusses what happened to 
prevent similar situations from happening again 
  0.80  
This team shares information about health and safety incidents and 
how to prevent them 
  0.82  
Within this team, people are encouraged to talk openly about their 
mistakes and errors 
  0.77  
Managing health and safety risks is an important priority for this 
team 
   0.77 
Our manager closely monitors high risk work and enforces safe 
work methods 
   0.84 
This team is thoroughly trained in our health and safety duties and 
obligations 
   0.74 
Our manager talks to people in this team about their health and 
safety concerns 
 0.88   
Our manager helps workers to develop new health and safety skills  0.89   
Within this team, our manager regularly consults with workers 
about health and safety matters 
 0.90   
Our manager gives positive recognition when this team achieves 
high safety performance 
0.83    
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Workers in this team help each other to complete routine work 
quickly and safely 
0.66    
Our manager sets clear and specific health and safety goals for 
this team 
0.86    
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Correlation analysis 
Correlations between LEAD dimensions and overall scale revealed significant and 
meaningful relationships with deep and surface compliance, and safety proactivity 
behaviour. These correlations added further evidence of support to our research 
hypotheses. Table 3.9 shows the pairwise correlations between all variables included in 
Study 3. Specifically, the LEAD scales and the overall measure were significantly related 
to both safety proactivity (replicating the results from Study 2) and deep compliance. The 
latter result extends the utility of the LEAD scale to include more nuanced and 
contemporary constructs related to safety performance, such as thorough and meaningful 
consideration of safety procedures and activities. 
 
Table 3.9. Correlations between all variables used in Study 3. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(1) Leverage 1.00       
(2) Energize 0.81 1.00      
(3) Adapt 0.71 0.71 1.00     
(4) Defend 0.78 0.81 0.73 1.00    
(5) LEAD 0.91 0.92 0.87 0.92 1.00   
(6) Safety proactivity 0.28 0.32 0.22 0.27 0.30 1.00  
(7) Deep compliance 0.34 0.33 0.29 0.33 0.36 0.39 1.00 
Note: All correlations are statistically-significant at the p<.01 level. 
 
Study 4 
The objective of this study was to replicate the factors structure identified in Study 
3, and as a cross-validation of the results obtained in Study 2 using a distinct sample of 
respondents. 
 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 497 workers drawn from survey panel data (employed persons) 
across a representative sample of Australian industries. Over half of the sample were 
employed full-time (59%, 295) and just under one-third were employed part-time (29%, 
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146). The remainder were employed on a casual basis. Respondents worked an average 
of 32.14 hours per week (SD=12.79). Close to half (47%, 236) reported being employed as 
a worker without supervisory responsibilities. All Australian industries were represented, 
with the highest being: Education and Training (52, 10%), Health Care and Social 
Assistance (51, 10%), Retail Trade (50, 10%), and Other Services (50, 10%). The lowest 
industries were: Electricity, Gas, Water, and Waste Services (4, 1%) and Rental, Hiring, 
and Real Estate Services (9, 2%).   
 
Procedure 
 Participants were recruited using a professional survey panel company located in 
Australia. The sample was reimbursed a small monetary reward ($5.00AUD) for 
participating fully in the survey. The sample was recruited to inform industry benchmarking 
data that was being used in a larger safety culture diagnostic and improvement project 
initiated by Workplace Health & Safety Queensland. Participants completed the survey 
online using the Qualtrics system. Participant anonymity was maintained by assigning 
them a deidentified code.  
 
Analytical strategy 
 Given the sample size, one complete sample was used for all analyses. We 
proceeded straight to CFA to verify the two-level factor structure, then undertook structural 
modelling. Mplus v5.2 (Muthen & Muthen, 1998-2008) was used to conduct all analyses. 
The full maximum likelihood estimator with robust standard errors was used. 
Measures 
 LEAD. The same 12-item scale used in Study 3 was again used in Study 4, with 
some minor adjustments to the wording of some items. These small item changes were 
used based on feedback from survey respondents and the organizations that participated 
in Study 3, and were designed to improve the overall performance of the LEAD scale. The 
Appendix shows the final LEAD scale items. 
 Regulatory focus. A shortened version of the regulatory focus at work scale 
(Wallace et al., 2009) was used in this study. We used three items each for prevention and 
promotion focus, using the standardized factor loadings reported by Wallace and 
colleagues (2009) to select items with the highest loadings. The Appendix shows the final 
regulatory focus scales. 
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 Uncertainty management. A revised version of the uncertainty management scale 
was used in this study. We changed the response scale from an agreement format to the 
same frequency format used by the regulatory focus scales. The Appendix shows the final 
uncertainty management scales. 
 Safety compliance. A shortened version of Hu’s et al. (2018) deep compliance scale 
was used in this study. The items were provided by Hu (personal communication, 2018) 
based on confirmatory factor analysis results. The Appendix shows the final deep 
compliance scale. 
 Safety proactivity. The same scales for safety proactivity (initiating safety-related 
change and safety voice) that were used in Study 3 were used in Study 4. The Appendix 
shows the final safety proactivity scales. 
 Safety incidents. Retrospective involvement in safety incidents and incident 
reporting was assessed using three open-text items. Participants were asked to specify 
how many incidents they had experienced at work over the past three months. The three 
questions covered near-misses (incidents that could have caused harm or loss), minor 
injuries that did not require medical attention, and the number of reportable incidents that 
weren’t formally reported to the organization.  
 
Results and Discussion 
Descriptive analyses 
 Table 3.10 shows the means and standard deviations for all variables included in 
the analyses. Table 3.11 shows the pairwise correlations between all study variables. Of 
note, LEAD combined scale scores were significantly and negatively associated with 
employees’ experiences of near-miss safety events. LEAD dimensions and the overall 
combined scores were also associated with the different types of safety behaviour. 
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Table 3.10. Means and standard deviations for all variables in Study 4. 
Variable Mean SD 
Leverage 3.74 0.86 
Energize 3.72 0.94 
Adapt 3.97 0.82 
Defend 3.92 0.83 
LEAD 3.83 0.78 
Safety proactivity 4.50 0.98 
Deep compliance 4.33 0.67 
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Table 3.11. Correlations between variables used in Study 4. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
(1) Leverage 1.00              
(2) Energise 0.82 1.00             
(3) Adapt 0.69 0.69 1.00            
(4) Defend 0.70 0.71 0.74 1.00           
(5) LEAD 0.90 0.91 0.87 0.88 1.00          
(6) Prevention-focus 0.15 0.12 0.30 0.17 0.21 1.00         
(7) Promotion-focus 0.16 0.15 0.18 0.16 0.18 0.53 1.00        
(8) Flexibility-focus 0.19 0.21 0.17 0.17 0.21 0.33 0.47 1.00       
(9) Stability-focus 0.23 0.20 0.30 0.26 0.27 0.58 0.58 0.63 1.00      
(10) Initiating safety change 0.40 0.45 0.35 0.39 0.45 0.12 0.26 0.48 0.36 1.00     
(11) Safety voice 0.41 0.45 0.36 0.40 0.46 0.03 0.22 0.43 0.31 0.85 1.00    
(12) Deep compliance 0.24 0.26 0.28 0.27 0.29 0.40 0.34 0.40 0.52 0.43 0.34 1.00   
(13) Near misses  -0.08 -0.10 -0.08 -0.06 -0.09 -0.14 -0.04 -0.05 -0.12 0.00 0.02 -0.07 1.00  
(14) Medical treatment 
cases  
-0.10 -0.08 -0.07 -0.02 -0.08 -0.14 -0.02 -0.02 -0.05 0.09 0.10 -0.02 0.26 1.00 
(15) Minor injuries -0.04 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.08 0.03 0.01 -0.04 0.07 0.07 -0.03 0.20 0.59 
Note: Italicized correlations were not statistically-significant at a p<.05 level. 
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A CFA was conducted to replicate the factor structure (LEAD sub-dimensions with 
overall LEAD superordinate factor); an excellent solution was obtained; χ2(48)=150.64, 
p<.01; RMSEA=0.05, p=0.02; CFI=0.96; TLI=0.95; SRMR=0.03. Alternative models were 
also run but these exhibited less favourable fit statistics: one-factor model – 
χ2(54)=277.40, p<.01; RMSEA=0.08, p<.01; CFI=0.94; TLI=0.92; SRMR=0.04; four-factor 
model – χ2 (50)=196.46, p<.01; RMSEA=0.07, p<.05; CFI=0.94; TLI=0.93; SRMR=0.04. 
The repeated verification of the LEAD factor structure provides compelling evidence of 
construct validity. 
 
Overall Discussion 
We developed and contributed evidence towards the validation of a new measure of 
safety practices to assess four team-centric dimensions, derived from the theoretical 
propositions put forward by Casey and colleagues (2017). The study is the first empirical 
investigation of a framework to articulate specific pathways between safety practices 
demonstrated by supervisors and co-workers, self-regulatory states, and safety behaviour. 
Based on theoretical development by Casey et al. (2017), the framework we tested here 
indicates that teams can use a range of different control strategies to achieve safety 
objectives. The safety practices were expected to be related to each self-regulatory 
orientation, which in turn, were expected to be associated with safety compliance and 
safety proactivity. We found support for all our hypotheses. 
Study 1 showed that the theoretical propositions advanced by Casey and 
colleagues (2017) could be operationalized and summarized into an assortment of safety 
leadership practices. These ‘themes’ were then used to inform the development of a pool 
of survey items. Study 2 used a large and diverse sample to then test these preliminary 
items, and provided some emerging evidence for the scale’s internal consistency reliability 
and construct validity. Study 3 built on this work by using a new sample and providing a 
replication of the scale’s construct validity. A shorter, 12-item LEAD scale was successfully 
evaluated in this study. Finally, Study 4 concentrated on evaluating discriminant and 
criterion validity by including a range of outcome variables including regulatory focus, 
safety compliance, and proactive safety behaviours. The program of studies provides a 
robust and comprehensive set of studies that together, chart the journey from scale 
concept through to evaluation and validation using multiple distinct samples drawn from a 
diverse range of companies and industry contexts. 
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To our knowledge, this study is the first systematic and empirical attempt to 
integrate self-regulation theories and safety leadership practices. We outline the 
theoretical implications of our results below. We then explore some practical implications 
of the results and identify limitations of study that should be addressed in future research 
investigating more dynamic approaches to managing safety in workplaces.  
The results of our CFAs showed that the four dimensions of the safety leadership 
are distinct and load onto an overarching LEAD factor, with the same factor structure 
replicated across studies and multiple companies from a variety of industries. Our studies 
provide initial evidence that the LEAD dimensions do form separate factors, although are 
best operationalized by one overall LEAD factor. These factors are highly correlated 
because people’s perceptions of safety leadership practices are affected by their 
perception of the overall value that the organization places on safety. It may also be the 
case that teams with high scores on one dimension are also more likely to demonstrate 
other dimensions’ practices – an ‘all or nothing’ approach. Our research identified high-
intercorrelations between the safety leadership dimensions, which we believe represents 
the need for an overall LEAD factor. In practical terms, it may be difficult to explore the 
differentiated prediction of safety outcomes at the LEAD sub-dimension level using the 
current survey tool and cross-sectional methodology. A more appropriate design would be 
to conduct a series of experiments that expose participants to each control strategy, and 
measure the differential impact on self-regulation and safety performance. Such 
experiments might be conducted by assigning participants randomly to one of four 
experimental conditions that represent the four dimensions of the LEAD model. The 
participants could then be exposed to one of the control strategies (i.e., Leverage, 
Energize, Adapt, and Defend) and the effects on self-regulation measured pre-post to 
evaluate the causal effects of the control strategies on self-regulatory state. A neutral 
‘control’ condition could be added as a comparison point. This is a recommended avenue 
for future research to more thoroughly test the theoretical framework outlined by Casey 
and colleagues (2017).  
 
Theoretical implications 
An advantage of our framework is the focus on ‘bundles’ of safety leadership 
practices rather than homogenous dimensions. In strategic human resources 
management, it has been shown that it is useful to conceptualize groups of aligned 
practices that exert synergistic and augmenting effects on organizational performance 
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(Gooderham, Parry & Ringdal, 2008; Subramony, 2009). Similarly, we propose that the 
LEAD model represents bundles of safety leadership practices that together, may exert 
synergistic effects on safety behaviour over and above what each practice might contribute 
individually. Theoretically, this is a testable proposition as one could design an experiment 
whereby singular practices within each LEAD dimension are compared against bundles 
shown in combination or simultaneously. Also in-line with strategic human resources 
management, the LEAD model represents an opportunity to create a ‘strong situation’ in 
which contextual factors such as safety leadership overpower (and compensate for 
shortfalls) in person-level phenomenon such as personality and natural levels of 
motivation. The consistent establishment and ‘pairing’ of safety leadership practices with 
different work situations (e.g., use of Energize in conditions of change and uncertainty) 
may help to establish such strong situations that guide workers in the most appropriate 
behaviours to use. 
Regulatory focus provides a theoretical scaffold that should assist other scholars 
operating in the safety science domain to utilize psychological linkages between 
perceptions of safety management practices and individual worker performance. From a 
theoretical perspective, we add complementary evidence to the growing base of 
theoretical development work being undertaken in safety-related disciplines around 
proactivity (e.g., Curcuruto, Mearns & Mariani, 016) and promotion/prevention foci (e.g., 
Beus & Taylor, 2017; Wallace & Chen, 2006). Regarding the proactivity literature, 
researchers have long touted the benefits of safety-critical organizations fostering safety 
initiative, citizenship, and other proactive behaviours. Such behaviours build organizational 
capability to monitor, anticipate, respond, and learn from unexpected threats and 
opportunities (e.g., Hollnagel, 2013). These capabilities enable organizations to create 
safer work processes, revise safety management approaches and strategies, and use 
resources to counter or benefit from disruptions (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2011). From a 
motivational perspective, proactive role orientations and behaviours may be elicited 
through ‘reason to’ motivations (Parker et al., 2010); in other words, subjective value 
states directed towards an organization. Safety leadership may contribute to such ‘reason 
to’ motivation through theoretical mechanisms like social exchange and internalized 
motivation. Promotion/flexibility-inducing safety practices are likely to enhance these 
effects through providing opportunities for workforce autonomy and involvement (Griffin & 
Curcuruto, 2016). Thus, further theoretical integrations that consider multiple psychological 
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mechanisms through which different types of safety practices influence behaviour, in a 
holistic fashion, are warranted. 
We believe that regulatory focus adds another layer to the safety management field, 
specifically by providing workers with more detailed and nuanced information over what 
types of behaviour are rewarded and valued by the organization (i.e., behaviours that 
promote the presence of safety in addition to behaviours that prevent the absence of 
safety). In addition to direct effects on behaviours, implicit identification and clarification of 
such behaviours through social learning and interaction is likely to induce a particular 
regulatory focus that will enable operators to achieve the desired safety goal/outcome in 
the most effective way. Consequently, our work has theoretical implications for the field of 
safety climate. Traditionally, safety climate has been cast or operationalized primarily in 
ways that encourage a prevention focus (Wallace & Chen, 2006). Indeed, if one inspects 
the wording of various safety climate scales, there is a predominance of ‘Safety-I’ thinking 
such as ‘following rules’, ‘monitoring compliance’, and ‘disciplining violations’. Such an 
approach would likely foster prevention-focus given the emphasis on security and 
obligation. In contrast, operationalizing at least some dimensions of safety climate in a 
promotion-focused manner (e.g., ‘rewarding high safety performance’, ‘communicating a 
safety vision’, ‘growing safety skills’) would add an interesting theoretical perspective on 
the safety climate construct, and potentially extend its practical utility by empowering 
organizations to identify deficient aspects of their climates and working to improve these 
elements.  
The ideas advanced by our manuscript may also take safety climate theory into a 
more dynamic realm, whereby the dynamic nature of safety climate (Griffin & Curcuruto, 
2016) is explored in greater depth. Theoretically, this dynamic nature of safety climate is 
underspecified and has tended to focus on safety climate coherency of ‘strength’ rather 
than the content domain or dimensions of safety climate (the level of safety climate 
dimensions fluctuating over time). Current theory suggests that greater consistency in 
espousals versus enactments of safety leadership practices should result in higher levels 
and greater strength of safety climate (Zohar, 2010). With the LEAD model, it becomes 
relevant to explore how various demonstrations of safety leadership may contribute to 
different configurations of safety climate over time, and whether these configurations are 
mutually exclusive or compatible. Further theoretical and empirical work is recommended 
to explore these ideas in greater detail. 
 
95 
 
Practical implications 
The study provides some practical insights for teams seeking to understand safety 
practices and their links to safety outcomes via self-regulatory states. The framework 
studied here (the ‘LEAD’ model) provide a useful heuristic for team leaders and 
supervisors to identify the most appropriate safety practices given the work situation or 
desired goals, and use specific safety management and general leadership practices to 
induce a corresponding psychological state in workers that should optimize safety and 
other important outcomes such as efficiency and team morale (as a result of greater 
‘regulatory fit’; Higgins, 1997). Workers at the front line might benefit from awareness of 
practices to emphasize in different work situations. It may also provide a more credible and 
engaging approach to communicating safety concepts to workers given the notion of 
‘safety dilemmas’ or trade-offs and corresponding strategies that seek to maintain health 
and safety through complementary, rather than antagonistic, management practices.  
We think a more dynamic framework such as the LEAD model can help supervisors 
and co-workers to consider the breadth of their safety practices, particularly those that 
focus on encouraging a promotion-focus/flexibility-focus combination and proactivity. The 
framework encourages a more holistic approach to health and safety management that 
draws together many separate lines of theory and practice into one integrated framework. 
The framework encourages investment in traditional safety management practices 
associated with prevention of the absence of safety (e.g., monitoring and enforcing 
compliance standards, prioritizing risk management tools and processes), and also 
seeking ways to operationalize additional practices such as those associated with 
promotion of the presence of safety. It is possible that such practices may result in 
additional workforce outcomes outside the health and safety domain, such as affective 
commitment and proactive, self-starting behaviours like organizational citizenship through 
the effect of such practices on workers. 
Post-hoc exploratory analyses at the industry level identified that participating 
organizations tended to exhibit stronger and more positive results for the prevention-
related dimensions, and less positive and less positive results for the promotion-related 
dimensions. These results suggest that compliance-driven and top-down control based 
methods are apparent in measures of safety leadership. Less prevalent were perceptions 
that are likely to induce a promotion-focused way of framing health and safety, potentially 
leading to less frequent demonstrations of safety proactivity among workforces particularly 
in situations where changes and routine low-risk work are being undertaken. 
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Our LEAD model and survey tool could be particularly effective at enhancing these 
deficiencies if used as a team-leader/supervisor level data gathering and feedback tool in 
a manner similar to the intervention described and evaluated by Zohar and colleagues 
(2003; 2014). Specifically, this survey could be used as a ‘pulse’ measure that diagnoses 
deficiencies in safety practices proactively and provide useful monitoring feedback for 
frontline leaders and co-workers together. 
In addition, the Casey et al (2017) framework and concepts could be embedded into 
team huddles and ‘pre-starts’ to a) identify the nature of upcoming work tasks, b) 
proactively identify and encourage specific practices to manage safety, and c) surface 
typically intangible pressures that could induce competing self-regulatory states and 
identify misalignment between production and safety systems (e.g., where high risk work is 
being undertaken but production-related pressures and practices are inducing a conflicting 
promotion-focused self-regulatory state). Our future program of work will include 
developing and trialling these types of interventions. 
 
Strengths, limitations, and future research directions 
A strength of this study is the size and diversity of the organizations participating in 
this research. Studies 2 and 3 had over 50 companies participating across a range of 
industrial settings. However, as with all cross-sectional research this study is limited in the 
causal inferences that can be drawn from the reported findings. Also, we made exclusive 
use of self-reported measures, which may introduce additional bias such as positively-
inflated ratings. Nevertheless, we employed a stringent data processing/cleansing 
procedure and also argue that self-report is the most appropriate method for the majority 
of perceptual and attitudinal variables included in this study (Conway & Lance, 2010). An 
extension includes testing Casey’s et al (2017) theoretical propositions in longitudinal and 
experimental designs. Specifically, there is opportunity to evaluate whether (a) specific 
safety practices can be used in a dynamic fashion, and (b) alignment of specific safety 
practices dimensions with specific work contexts results in optimal team performance. 
Such research would best be conducted using an experiential sampling technique or 
similar repeated measures approach. 
One significant limitation concepts the operationalization of the uncertainty 
management construct in Study 2. Specifically, the measurement scale and item wording 
used may have tapped into a trait-like construct rather than an induced state-like construct. 
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However, we corrected this deficiency in Study 4 so that the measure more accurately 
reflects a state-based construct.  
A final limitation is that participation in the study was voluntary and done in 
exchange for a free safety diagnostic report. This approach may have biased the sample 
of companies towards those more positive on their scores, reducing the total variation in 
predictors and outcomes at the between-group level. However, this was addressed in 
Study 4 with the use of an online survey panel where no report or feedback was given. 
One way to improve and clarify the relationships between the safety practices 
dimensions and safety performance outcomes is by using a more comprehensive 
taxonomy of safety behaviours. It is possible that the LEAD safety practices scales will be 
related to specific safety behaviours via the different combinations of self-regulation foci. 
For example, leverage may predict team communication safety behaviours such as 
passing on safety messages and coordinating work operations with colleagues via the 
inducement of promotion-focus and stability-focus.  
Also important is future research that establishes the potential for the Casey et al 
(2017) safety practices dimensions to be improved through team-level interventions, and 
the concomitant impact on performance and team culture. An intervention targeting team 
leader/supervisor safety leadership and focusses on specific practices that can be 
implemented in response to specific operating conditions would be appropriate (e.g., 
Toolbox Talks, pre-start meetings, safety leadership training). Given the dearth of 
evidence-based safety culture, climate, and leadership interventions in published literature 
(Lee et al., 2018), such research would advance the field significantly. 
 
Conclusions 
Overall, the Casey et al (2017) framework takes safety management in new 
theoretical and practical directions. The safety practices dimensions were positively 
associated with safety compliance and proactivity, as well as to all of the hypothesized 
intermediatory variables (regulatory-focus and uncertainty management). Our findings that 
promotion, prevention, flexibility, and stability foci were consistently related to safety 
behaviour confirms our central proposition. Namely, that self-regulation presents an 
opportunity to exert nuanced and strategic influence over safety-critical systems, provided 
the specific combinations of self-regulation states can be directly induced by system 
operators and leaders in response to or anticipation of different environmental conditions. 
This integration of safety practices with systems thinking demonstrates the potential of 
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cross-disciplinary frameworks to advance safety management and performance in the 
future. Further, through providing a validated and evidence-based ‘LEAD toolkit’ freely to 
industry, it is possible that further gains in safety performance will be made through 
equipping organizations with an innovative, practical, and evidence-based safety 
management framework that concentrates on practices that can be implemented by 
supervisors and co-workers. 
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Chapter 4: Improving safety culture through leadership practices: A case study 
describing the implementation and evaluation of an evidence-based practitioner 
toolkit based on the LEAD model 
Abstract 
Safety culture has been described as one of the most thoroughly researched yet 
poorly understood concepts in safety science (Reason, 2000). Indeed, a plethora of 
models and frameworks exist, which makes it difficult for practitioners to know where to 
begin (Vu & Di Cieri, 2015). Rather than tackle the safety culture debate directly, the LEAD 
framework sidesteps these conceptual issues and focusses instead on the tangible 
practices that should ultimately contribute to a shared pattern of beliefs and assumptions 
around safety culture. A feature of the LEAD model is its dynamic and situational 
approach: specific LEAD practices and strategies are emphasized in different operating 
conditions when working toward achieving optimum health and safety performance. This 
approach is in line with contemporary scholars who have suggested that rather than 
attempt to ‘manage culture’, organizations should instead ‘manage culturally’ through a 
focus on systems, leadership, and team work (Borys, 2014). This paper describes the 
theoretical and practical underpinnings of the LEAD safety culture model, and describes 
the results of an applied study conducted with six organizational units at a major university 
campus in Queensland where the LEAD toolkit was implemented. We found evidence that 
the implementation was successful, with some measured changes in leadership 
perceptions and safety behavior. Implications for future leadership interventions are 
described, with a focus on practical considerations. 
 
Keywords 
Safety leadership, safety culture, training, intervention 
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Much has been said and done in the name of safety culture. It has been hailed by 
some as an evolutionary step forward in understanding and explaining the causes of 
accidents in organizations (Hudson, 2007). Others treat safety culture with skepticism and 
have labelled it a ‘container’ concept that essentially displaces blame from operators to 
groups of people in organizations (Guldenmund, 2010). Regardless, safety culture has 
been firmly established as a core concept in safety science (Dekker, 2019) and represents 
the culmination of ground-breaking sociological ideas and thinking that originated in the 
1970s (Turner, 1979).  
Since the 2000s, safety culture research and practice has been divided into two 
camps: the interpretivist, which treats culture as something the organization is or does; 
and the functionalist, which treats culture as something the organization has (Reiman & 
Rollenhagen, 2014). The interpretivist view offers rich descriptions of culture, but few 
answers about what to practically do about it. The functionalist view offers plenty of 
suggestions for action, but forces cultural homogeneity, which in itself may actually 
increase risk through stifling discrepant and diverse points of view.  
A critique of the functionalist paradigm suggested that instead of ‘managing culture’, 
practitioners should instead ‘manage culturally’ through the design and implementation of 
systems, structures, and practices (Borys, 2014; Hopkins, 2019). Similarly, Edwards and 
colleagues (2015) showed how insights into cultural beliefs regarding safety can be used 
to design more effective organizational structures and systems. Essentially, the broader 
organizational social context is taken into account so that implementations of safety 
initiatives support rather than conflict with existing beliefs. This represents an interesting 
new direction for safety culture research, and essentially sidesteps many of the problems 
that both the functionalist and interpretivist perspectives suffer from. On the one hand, 
functionalist methods argue that there is a desirable end state for a safety culture, which 
can be established ‘if only everyone thought and acted in the same way’. On the other 
hand, the interpretivist perspective is descriptive and proposes that culture shouldn’t be 
evaluated or judged; it simply ‘is’. One view is overly prescriptive and constraining, and the 
other view is overly emergent and impractical. A middle ground could be to focus instead 
on encouraging underlying practices that over time, gradually shape and contribute to the 
safety culture (Casey et al., 2019; Hopkins, 2019). In other words, managing safety with 
culture in mind rather than attempting to change the culture itself. 
Leaders are widely described as exerting a strong influence over the types of 
attitudes, beliefs, norms, and ultimately, behaviors that get adopted by people within 
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organizations and become ingrained into ‘the way things are done around here’. Schein 
(2010) proposes that leaders shape and mold culture through practices such as directing 
attention, measuring and monitoring work, rewarding good performance, role modelling, 
and imposing their own views and beliefs onto followers. Others have found that safety 
leadership training can improve perceptions of safety climate and outcomes such as safety 
behaviors and injury rates (Mullen & Kelloway, 2009). Thus, leaders are a natural focal 
point for safety culture improvement initiatives.  
The LEAD model, first outlined by Casey and colleagues (2017), positions safety as 
a ‘control problem’, whereby superior safety performance can be achieved through 
aligning bundles of safety practices with specific work situations. A measurement tool was 
then developed and validated by Casey et al. (2019), and this current study takes the 
research program an additional step by evaluating an intervention ‘toolkit’ that was 
implemented across a cohort of six organizational units within a tertiary education 
institution setting. The toolkit was developed through a tripartite relationship between 
academia, government, and industry, and is freely available for use on the Safety 
Leadership at Work website. The main objective of this paper is to provide evidence that 
the toolkit is an effective means to improve safety performance through developing safety 
leadership capabilities at worker, supervisor, and management levels. This toolkit presents 
a practical way of improving safety culture by focusing on bundles of leadership practices 
and the corresponding self-regulatory states that they activate. 
 
Introduction 
Despite the hundreds of safety culture studies published in peer-reviewed journals 
(Vu & Di Cieri, 2015), very few have captured evidence of intervention impact. Definitional 
problems plague safety culture research, with anything from attitudes and beliefs 
(Choudhry et al., 2007) to perceptions (Zohar, 1980; Zohar, 2010) to safety management 
systems and structures (Guldenmund, 2010) to behaviors (Cooper, 2000) targeted for 
improvement. An evaluation of a government-funded incentive scheme designed to 
improve safety culture revealed mixed evidence of success: out of 17 companies, eight 
showed positive improvements in injury rates following implementation (Hale et al., 2010). 
Factors that predicted intervention success included: the number of initiatives conducted, 
level of support from senior management, workforce motivation and engagement, and 
quality of communication between stakeholders. These findings suggest that safety culture 
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change might best be achieved if a combination of top-down and bottom-up strategies are 
used (DeJoy, 2005).  
Safety climate is commonly positioned as the measurable aspect of safety culture – 
a momentary snapshot of the culture at a point in time (Griffin & Curcuruto, 2016). 
Theoretically, improvements in safety climate should flow through into underlying changes 
to the safety culture as perceptions of safety value and priority start to influence core 
assumptions and beliefs through cognitive dissonance (Das et al., 2008), intrinsic 
motivation (Zohar et al., 2015), and self-regulation (Casey et al., 2017). 
A recent systematic review of safety climate interventions found that 47% of studies 
within scope involved safety leadership improvement activities (Lee et al., 2019). These 
studies were able to achieve measurable improvements in safety climate through 
leadership-centric activities. Leadership impacts safety climate, and eventually, culture, 
because implemented practices serve as situational cues regarding the importance and 
priority attached to safety (Griffin & Curcuruto, 2016). Leaders also contribute directly to 
the formation of safety climate by drawing attention to specific practices and policies, 
facilitating sense-making about safety (Zohar & Luria, 2003), and creating strong behavior-
outcome expectancies regarding safety performance (Zohar, 2010).  
Taken together, the reviewed literature suggests that it is possible to change safety 
culture through safety climate, and that the dominant approach taken to date concerns the 
targeted improvement of leadership practices. 
 
The LEAD model 
The LEAD model is based on the premise that safety is a control problem. This 
means that safety capacity is increased when work processes operate as predicted, and 
variability is either exploited or suppressed to achieve successful work. Incidents occur 
when work processes are ‘out of control’, or where variability is outside tolerable limits and 
the system is unable to cope. In practical terms, this logic follows the thinking of 
Rasmussen (1997) who described safety at the ‘sharp end’ as being influenced by 
successive layers of top-down and hierarchical control mechanisms. Legislators implement 
laws and regulations to control organizations; organizations implement policies and 
procedures to control supervisors; supervisors exert monitoring and compliance-based 
activities to control workers; and ultimately, workers directly control the hazardous 
energies that are required to do work.  
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Top-down control is effortful and fraught with difficulty. As evidenced by the 
diminishing returns achieved by top-down techniques such as bureaucracy (Dekker, 
2014), alternative means of control must be established if safety performance is to 
improve. A top-down approach results in a control system that is ultimately just as complex 
as the work processes it has to monitor and constrain, requires costly resources and effort 
to maintain, and is only as successful as the foresight of the organization is to anticipate 
every eventuality – threat, disturbances, and opportunities alike. Alternative means to exert 
control are therefore required. 
Control over safety critical systems, according to Rasmussen (1997) and other 
scholars (Mitropoulos & Cupido, 2009) is not synonymous with implementation of 
constraints and compliance against prescribed standards. Granted, safety control can be 
established using such methods, but it is a strategy with diminishing returns. Paradoxically, 
control over safety can be achieved by empowering workers in ways that increase 
flexibility and uncertainty (rather than reduce it). This line of thinking follows from 
fundamental theories in human psychology, such as self-determination theory, whereby 
satisfaction of the fundamental human needs of autonomy, belonging, and competence 
increases internalized or intrinsic motivation (Ryan & Deci, 2000). Put simply, ‘screwing 
things down’ when it comes to safety may be appropriate in some situations (e.g., high risk 
work), and less appropriate in other situations (e.g., implementation of new initiatives or 
where creativity and innovation are required). Human psychology suggests that where 
lasting and fundamental buy-in and engagement are required, empowering approaches 
are preferable, and in situations where workers just ‘need to get on with it’, an approach 
based on externalized motivators is probably the best strategy.  
Scholars have long been working to establish psychological links between practices 
and safety performance. Up to now, the dominant model has been Griffin and Neal’s 
(2000) framework that links safety leadership through to safety climate and behavior via 
knowledge and motivation; when people know more about safety, and care more about 
safety, they are more likely to show safety compliance and participation. However, this 
model is not nuanced enough to inform specific management strategy and practices when 
safety is treated as a control problem. Recent work by scholars such as Wallace and Chen 
(2006) and Beus and Taylor (2018) have explored the role of regulatory focus, a type of 
motivational state that influences goal striving behaviors, in predicting more nuanced 
demonstrations of safety performance. 
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Regulatory focus at work is an established construct (Wallace and Johnson, 2009) 
derived from regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997) that posits people are differentially 
motivated by the way goals are framed. If a goal is framed in terms of security and danger, 
corresponding behaviors will emphasize duties, obligations, and avoidance of losses (e.g., 
compliance with safety procedures). If a goal is framed in terms of growth and 
achievement, corresponding behaviors will emphasize proactivity and energetic striving to 
achieve successful ‘hits’ (e.g., raising ideas to improve safety). 
In addition, Casey et al (2017) proposed an additional self-regulation construct 
called ‘uncertainty management’. This variable is best represented by two constructs; 
flexibility-focus and stability-focus. When the work situation emphasizes psychologically-
safe opportunities to become involved in decision-making and a sense of control and 
autonomy, people are more likely to embrace change and take measured risks. When the 
work situation emphasizes dangerous conditions or high risk, people are more likely to 
embrace stability and stick to ‘tried and true’ methods like work methods statements. Such 
self-regulation constructs mirror similar management concepts like 
‘exploitation/exploration’, which typically apply at the organizational level.  
The LEAD model suggests that there are four different operating conditions that 
workers are confronted with: high risk work, routine work, changing conditions, and 
mistakes/incidents (Casey et al., 2017; Casey et al., 2019). To maintain control and hence 
achieve safe work outcomes, a corresponding control strategy (in the form of bundles of 
practices implemented by workers and leaders) is required. For instance, in high risk 
situations (e.g., working at heights) where hazards are dangerous but well-known, a valid 
control strategy is to standardize work processes (e.g., using safe work methods 
statements or procedures) and emphasize prevention (e.g., draw attention to hazards and 
foster a sense of unease and vigilance). By contrast, in situations where there are 
opportunities to innovate and develop, a corresponding control strategy could be to 
encourage flexibility (e.g., consultation and participative decision-making) and promotion of 
success (e.g., in-depth training and coaching, establishment of a compelling vision). Each 
of the LEAD control strategies are described briefly below. 
Leverage is the strategy for routine, everyday work where risk is low. Leverage 
induces a promotion- and stability-focus through practices that create a sense of 
achievement and certainty about the work environment. Leverage is comprised of three 
bundles of practices: recognition of good safety performance, clarity of tasks and safety 
goals, and coordination.  
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Energize is the strategy for changing conditions, where new initiatives are being 
implemented. Energize induces a promotion- and flexibility-focus through practices that 
create a sense of involvement, autonomy, and competence. Energize is comprised of 
three types of practices: inspiration to achieve, empowerment, and growth (i.e., employee 
training and coaching).  
Adapt is the strategy for when mistakes or errors are being made, and the 
emphasis is on recovery and learning. Adapt induces a prevention- and flexibility-focus 
through practices that highlight the risk involved in the situation but encourage open 
discussion and learning. Adapt has three bundles of practices: reflection on practice, 
resilience to unexpected emergencies, and voice (speaking up about safety concerns).  
And finally, defend is the strategy for high risk work, where tasks are dangerous and 
compliance with thorough work processes and standards is advantageous to control risk. 
Defend induces a prevention- and stability-focus through practices that emphasize the 
danger of tasks and the importance of complying with pre-specified safe work methods. 
Defend has three bundles of practices: enhancing unease and vigilance within a team, 
driving accountability in a fair and just way, and monitoring or taking an active interest in 
workers’ safety performance and work practices.  
Defend is a strategy that many organizations have invested in heavily and is best 
described as a ‘Safety-I’ approach (Hollnagel et al., 2015). Safety-I consists of practices 
and techniques that aim to reduce the number of negative outcomes to as low a level as 
possible, and does so through strategies that emphasize compliance and adherence to 
strict standards of work. Although Safety-I has been criticized heavily (Dekker, 2017), it is 
responsible for dramatic improvements in safety over the past 100 years (Dekker, 2019) 
and so should form the backbone of an organization’s safety management strategy.  
Adapt is a strategy that is founded in high reliability organizing (HRO) theory. HRO 
theory advocates for the establishment of cultural principles that drive organizational 
‘mindfulness’ or keen sensitivity to risk, chronic unease, and effective error avoidance and 
management (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2006). HROs include organizations such as nuclear 
power plants, aircraft carriers, and potentially some hospital environments (Cook & 
Rasmussen, 2005). In these settings, the potential for catastrophe is huge, yet the 
organizations persist and indeed thrive in high tempo environments. In these conditions, 
leaders in HROs listen and encourage speaking up regardless of rank or status, foster 
reflection and learning, and a commitment to resilience (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001).  
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Energize and leverage would best be described as strategies that incorporate 
principles from ‘Safety-II’. Safety-II is a complementary perspective to Safety-I, and states 
that safety capacity is an emergent property defined as the capacity to succeed under 
varying conditions (Hollnagel et al., 2015). According to Safety-II, organizations should 
instead aim to increase the number of things that ‘go right’ through developing positive 
capacities. Consequently, there is an emphasis placed on understanding variability rather 
than quashing it, workforce involvement, and development of expertise. In sum, Safety-II 
advocates for strategies that encourage workers to strive toward safety; achieving 
something rather than avoiding something. 
In this study, we outline the development and evaluation of a LEAD toolkit designed 
to be independently administered by organizations. The toolkit was developed by the 
Office of Industrial Relations, a government regulator of health and safety in Queensland, 
Australia, a cohort of eight organizations from a wide range of industries, and a consortium 
of universities. Thus, in this paper we focus on both the process and the outcomes of the 
toolkit development for two reasons: 1) to establish the LEAD toolkit as an evidence-based 
intervention package, and 2) to foster scholarly learning and encourage further tripartite 
collaborations between academia, industry, and government. In the sections that follow we 
initially outline the development and content underpinning the toolkit, followed by a 
presentation of evaluation data. Then we move into a discussion of our reflections and 
learnings throughout the process, as well as implications for LEAD toolkit implementation 
by industry. 
The LEAD toolkit is a measurement and training resource designed for industry, 
consisting of a validated survey for efficient data gathering, and an intervention package. 
The latter includes three LEAD safety leadership workshops targeted to managers, direct 
supervisors, and workers. 
 
Method 
Participants 
The toolkit development and evaluation were possible due to the joint efforts of 
government, academia, and industry. This study includes data from the evaluation of the 
toolkit in six organizational units from an Australian tertiary education institution. The 
diversity of functions and hazard profiles represented by these units was valuable for the 
study, given that the toolkit was designed for general application across multiple industries. 
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A total of 714 survey responses were received before and after the training. At Time 1 
(Baseline), 385 worker and supervisor responses were received. At Time 2 (Follow-up), 
329 responses were received. The survey response rates for each time point by 
organizational unit are summarized in Table 4.1. The strategies to promote survey 
participation included: a) initial presentations to all staff to raise awareness about the 
project and highlighting the importance of response rates, b) the distribution of survey links 
and reminders by the area’s leadership team, and c) regular progress monitoring 
information supplied to each organizational unit by the research team. 
 
Table 4.1. Survey response rates by time point and organizational unit. 
Unit Baseline Participation 
Rate 
Follow-up Participation 
Rate 
Org Unit 1 22% 26% 
Org Unit 2 33% 33% 
Org Unit 3 46% 25% 
Org Unit 4 39% 13% 
Org Unit 5 86% 67% 
Org Unit 6 44% 49% 
 
The workshops included 220 people across all the organizational units; which represented 
between 10% and 43% of the total population within each organizational unit (see Table 
4.2). 
 
Table 4.2. Workshop participation per organizational unit. 
Organizational Unit Participation 
Org Unit 1 20% 
Org Unit 2 15% 
Org Unit 3 30% 
Org Unit 4 10% 
Org Unit 5 27% 
Org Unit 6 43% 
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Measures 
The LEAD measures developed and tested by Casey and colleagues (2019) were 
used in this study. For brevity, only basic details are summarized here, and readers are 
referred to the Casey et al. (2019) paper for the full instruments.  
Safety control strategies (LEAD). A total of 12 items were used to measure safety 
practices, with three items per LEAD safety control strategy. Internal consistency alphas 
for each subscale were acceptable: Leverage α=0.86, Energize α=0.88, Adapt α=0.85, 
and Defend α=0.87. All items were answered according to a 5-point Likert scale, ranging 
from 1=Strongly disagree to 5=Strongly agree. See Table 4.3 for an overview of the 
measures. 
Safety improvement behavior. A total of three items were used to measure the 
frequency of safety improvement behavior. Participants were asked to self-report their 
behavior with respect to offering safety improvement suggestions. Internal consistency 
reliability was acceptable; α=0.90. A sample item reads: “Make suggestions to improve the 
health and safety of work”. All items were answered according to a 5-point Likert scale, 
ranging from 1=Never to 5=Always. 
Safety voice behavior. A total of three items were used to measure the frequency of 
safety voice behavior. Participants were asked to self-report their behavior with respect to 
speaking up about safety issues. Internal consistency reliability was acceptable; α=0.92. A 
sample item reads: “Express my opinions on health and safety matters even if others 
disagree”. All items were answered according to a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from 
1=Never to 5=Always. 
The workshops were evaluated using an organizationally-endorsed form; which 
consisted of nine questions: five ‘reaction’-style statements that were rated on a 5-point 
Likert agreement scale (ranging from 1=Strongly disagree to 5=Strongly agree) and three 
open-ended questions (i.e., what will be applied on return to the workplace, workshop 
strengths, and workshop improvements).  
To enable pairing of individuals measured before and after comparisons, survey 
participants were presented with the option to answer four additional questions that 
combined to create a unique deidentified code. Another important question that allowed 
analysis, yet preserved the anonymity of participants, was the inclusion of a binary variable 
in the follow-up survey that classified respondents into those who attended a LEAD 
workshop versus those who didn’t.  
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Table 4.3. LEAD safety control strategies survey items (Casey et al. 2019). 
Variable Items 
Leverage 
Our supervisor works with people on this team to set clear health and 
safety performance goals 
People in this team are recognized when they achieve what is expected 
around health and safety 
In this team, our priority during work is to keep each other informed about 
what is happening 
Energize 
Our supervisor inspires us to think about how health and safety changes 
could benefit us 
This team looks favorably on people who use their personal initiative 
around health and safety 
This team is supported to grow new health and safety skills so we can 
make our work environment safer 
Adapt 
Our team reflects on problems with work to prevent the same things from 
happening again 
As a team, we expect each other to speak up when we notice something is 
unsafe 
Our supervisor expects this team to confront unexpected problems and 
minimize their impact 
Defend 
People in this team expect each other to clearly identify all the risks to 
health and safety 
Our supervisor reacts strongly when people fail to uphold an important 
health and safety responsibility 
When work is critical, this team's compliance with rules and standards is 
closely monitored 
 
Intervention development 
As described by Casey et al (2019), the core component of the LEAD toolkit is an 
organizational diagnostic survey that includes 12 questions measuring the four LEAD 
quadrants. Workers report their perceptions of safety leadership practices of their team 
and direct supervisor, and the data are summarized by a report ‘dashboard’ (developed 
manually by the research team). Figure 4.1 below shows a page from the reporting 
dashboard. Overall, the LEAD toolkit includes four components. The four components 
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include: a diagnostic survey, a management action planning workshop, a supervisors’ 
workshop, and a workers’ workshop. The next section outlines our process to develop the 
toolkit. 
First, a design ‘sprint’ (Knapp, 2016) was held that involved the core research team 
and government stakeholders. The session was facilitated by the first author. During this 
session, participants defined and reached consensus on the core objectives and goals of 
the LEAD toolkit. An open brainstorming session was also held where participants 
described components and features of the toolkit independently. Common ideas were 
identified and prioritized using a sticker-based voting system. Specifically, participants 
indicated features they particularly liked with a sticker, and the features with the highest 
count were prioritized for consideration. Specific training content was also brainstormed 
and drafted as part of the design sprint. 
 
Figure 4.1. LEAD dashboard report example, showing the evolution of designs over time. 
 
 
Following the sprint, draft training content was identified from existing safety 
leadership, general leadership, and organizational behavior literatures. A steering 
committee was established at each organization and a series of brainstorming sessions 
held to identify ‘must haves’ for the toolkit. Early versions of the toolkit materials were 
piloted with the steering committees and feedback incorporated. The workshops started 
with a brief description of the concept of safety culture and its link with safety performance, 
followed by a description LEAD Safety Culture Model and a description of the workshop 
dynamic. After this, participants are invited to do a “walk-around the model”, which 
consists of: a) a brief conceptual description of each subcomponent of each quadrant; b) 
an introduction to a well-known organizational behavior tool associated to the item; c) an 
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activity where participants reflect on application the described tool to a health, safety or 
wellness example relevant to each participant’s organizational unit; and d) one-on-one 
sharing of reflections from the exercise. 
Concurrently, the diagnostic survey was designed in close consultation with the 
steering committees. Draft versions of the results report and questionnaire were shared 
with the group, and feedback incorporated. A final report and survey instrument were 
developed that adequately balanced the need for comprehensiveness with practicality and 
simplicity of communication. Data were presented as a series of stacked bar charts and 
overlaid line graphs, which communicated three pieces of information: the spread or 
distribution of responses to each question, the average result for each question, and the 
statistical-significance of any differences between the organization’s average and the 
results obtained from a sample of 600 respondents drawn from Australian industry (see 
Casey et al., 2019 for details). The overall response rate and qualitative comments to the 
question ‘Please describe any concerns or ideas to improve health and safety in your 
workplace’ were also added to the results report to assist in action planning.  
The management action planning workshops consisted of a two-hour session 
facilitated by the research team. The session began with a 15- to 20-minute overview of 
the LEAD model, followed by a description of the action planning process and overall 
toolkit implementation model. Management was given the survey results and asked to 
identify parts that resonated in terms of strengths or opportunity areas. These areas were 
then written down into a template planning document, and specific goals and actions 
assigned through group discussion. The facilitators erred on the side of caution, stepping 
back from the role of subject matter expert and instead providing general advice and 
process observations to prompt discussion. This approach was used to maximize the 
managers’ ownership over the action planning outputs.  
After the action planning workshops, the training modules were implemented. 
Sessions were held for each organizational unit, with blanket invitations issued to 
employees and postgraduate students. Attendance to these workshops was voluntary, and 
consequently the participation rates varied widely across the sessions. The sessions were 
designed to maximize learning through allocating most of the time to activities and 
discussion. Sessions were fast-paced and dynamic, resulting in continuous participant 
engagement. Time management played a fundamental role towards ensuring that all the 
content, activities and discussion were completed satisfactorily. Facilitators were therefore 
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required to keep very close monitoring of the time, and clearly communicate to participants 
the time allocated for each activity 
After each workshop, feedback was obtained from participants and key themes 
incorporated into revisions to content and delivery. Iteratively, the program quality 
improved over time as feedback was actioned and content tweaked to address identified 
weaknesses and build on elements identified as strengths. 
 
Intervention evaluation strategy 
Our evaluation results are divided into two sections: feedback from post-session 
forms completed by participants at the conclusion of the two-hour training event, and 
statistical analyses involving matched pairs (pre-post analysis) and comparisons at ‘post’ 
follow-up between training participants and non-participants. Our goal with these analyses 
is to provide a triangulated story of training impact drawing on multiple sources of 
information, considered suitable for the in-situ experimental design.  
 
Results 
Workshops feedback analysis 
The Likert-scale data collected after each session was processed and presented as 
average (see Table 4.4). Apparent is the incremental improvement in session quality as 
feedback was integrated into each workshop. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
113 
 
Table 4.4. Workshop feedback results. 
  
I am 
likely to 
apply this 
learning 
in my 
work 
This 
workshop 
met the 
set 
objective
s 
The 
learning 
activities 
were 
effective 
The 
learning 
materials 
were 
useful 
The time 
allocated 
to each 
activity 
was 
adequate  
I would 
recomme
nd this 
training to 
others 
Session 1 4.3 3.8 3.8 4.2 3.4 4.0 
Session 2 4.0 3.7 3.6 3.7 3.3 3.1 
Session 3 4.2 3.9 3.9 4.0 2.5 3.7 
Session 4 4.0 4.0 3.7 4.0 3.3 3.7 
Session 5 4.2 3.9 4.1 3.9 4.0 3.9 
Session 6 4.3 3.9 4.1 3.9 4.3 4.0 
Session 7 4.5 4.3 4.5 4.2 4.0 4.3 
Session 8 4.1 4.1 3.9 3.9 3.7 4.2 
Session 9 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.0 4.5 
Session 10 4.6 4.4 4.0 4.1 4.4 4.1 
Session 11 4.2 4.4 3.7 3.6 3.9 3.5 
Session 12 4.1 3.7 3.8 4.0 3.9 3.8 
Session 13 4.1 3.9 3.9 4.3 3.8 3.6 
Session 14 4.1 4.1 4.2 4.1 4.1 4.1 
Session 15 4.1 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.1 4.1 
Session 16 5.0 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7 5.0 
Session 17 4.5 4.5 4.4 4.4 4.3 4.5 
Overall 4.3 4.1 4.1 4.1 3.9 4.0 
 
The feedback was generally positive, with participants agreeing that they are likely 
to apply the learning at their work (4.3 in a 5 point agreement scale), that the learning 
activities were effective (4.1 in a 5 point agreement scale), that the learning materials were 
useful (4.1 in a 5 point agreement scale),  that the time allocated to each activity was 
adequate (3.9 in a 5 point agreement scale) and that they would recommend this training 
to others (4.0 in a 5 point agreement scale). 
In the free-text fields, participants indicated that the strengths of the workshops 
were the discussions, having knowledgeable and engaging facilitators, useful activities, 
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quality of materials, content quality, the delivery structure, that the instructions were clear 
and easy to follow, that the sessions were thought provoking, well-organized and provided 
participants with applicable skills. 
 
Pre-post analyses 
Means and standard deviations for each study variable are summarized in Table 
4.5 below. Across the safety behavior variables (safety voice and safety improvements) 
before and after the training (using unmatched data and aggregating across all 
organizational units), there were statistically significant differences for the safety behavior 
variables only. 
 
Table 4.5. Means and standard deviations for each variable, by time point, and t-test 
results. 
 Time 1 Time 2 t-
value 
p-value 
 
 n Mean Var n Mean Var   
Leverage 297 3.76 0.81 247 3.88 0.68 -1.60 0.11 
Energize 297 3.75 0.83 247 3.82 0.72 -1.01 0.31 
Adapt 297 4.04 0.69 247 4.12 0.50 -1.13 0.26 
Defend 297 3.81 0.73 247 3.92 0.56 -1.60 0.11 
Improv. 297 3.50 1.09 247 3.64 0.80 -2.12 0.03 
Voice 297 3.34 3.31 247 3.58 0.90 -2.65 0.01 
 
Approximately 10% of the participants answered all the four optional survey 
questions that allowed the creation of a four-letter code for paired analysis. A series of 
matched pairs t-tests were undertaken to evaluate whether there were any significant 
changes in the focal variables, drawing on the 27 matched cases. These tests revealed 
statistically-significant differences for individuals on some of the study variables. 
Specifically, the test of change in Leverage was non-significant; t(26)=1.11, p=0.28. The 
test for Energize was also non-significant; t(26)=-1.13, p=0.27. However, the tests for 
Adapt and Defend were statistically-significant; t(26)=-2.82, p<.01 (Adapt), and t(26)=-
2.10, p<.05 (Defend). Neither safety behavior variables changed at a statistically-
significant level; t(26)=-0.10, p=0.94 (improvements) and t(26)=-0.51, p=0.61 (voice). 
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Workshop participant vs. non-participant analyses 
Within the follow-up survey, we included a binary variable that classified 
respondents into those who had attended any of the LEAD workshop versus those who 
hadn’t. This categorization allowed the comparison of intervention recipients against those 
who may only have received indirect effects of the workshop. A series of independent t-
tests were conducted to evaluate whether these two groups differed (training participants 
versus non-participants). 
Meaningful and statistically-significant effects were found for all study variables: 
workers who participated in the training had higher and significantly more positive scores 
on the survey measures than those who did not participate. Table 4.6 below summarizes 
the results of our statistical testing. 
 
Table 4.6. Results of comparisons between training participants and non-participants. 
 
Yes (Participated) No (Did not participate) 
t-
value 
p-value 
 n Mean Var n Mean Var   
Leverage 127 4.10 0.46 193 3.83 0.78 2.86 <.01 
Energize 127 4.07 0.58 193 3.76 0.71 3.34 <.01 
Adapt 127 4.32 0.30 193 4.05 0.55 3.48 <.01 
Defend 127 4.08 0.48 193 3.88 0.63 2.39 <.05 
Improv. 127 3.97 0.53 193 3.49 0.84 5.03 <.01 
Voice 127 3.97 0.63 193 3.41 0.96 5.41 <.01 
 
Organizational unit analysis 
Where sample size permitted, we conducted intra-organizational unit analyses to 
identify patterns of change within the participating units. Three organizational units could 
be analyzed in this manner.  
For Organisational Unit One, there were statistically-significant improvements for 
the Energize safety control strategy (t[106]=-2.11, p<.05) and one of the safety behaviour 
variables, making safety-related improvement suggestions (t[105]=-2.00, p<.05) see Table 
4.7). Our comparisons also revealed that these improvements (within the unit) were 
apparent across all participants (on average), independently of their attendance at the 
workshop.  
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Table 4.7. The intervention’s effect on the mean indexes for Organizational Unit One. 
 Time 1 Time 2 t-
value 
p-value 
 
 n Mean SD n Mean SD   
Leverage 47 3.90 0.80 61 4.15 0.90 -1.48 0.14 
Energize 47 3.78 0.90 61 4.14 0.88 -2.11 <.05 
Adapt 47 4.21 0.62 61 4.32 0.76 -0.81 0.42 
Defend 47 3.91 0.77 61 4.17 0.81 -1.72 0.09 
Improv. 46 3.65 0.13 61 3.97 0.71 -2.00 <.05 
Voice 46 3.63 0.95 61 3.86 0.79 -1.38 0.17 
 
For the Organisational Unit Two, no statistically-significantly differences were noted 
for the before and after t-test comparisons (using unmatched data; see Table 4.8). 
However, when we analysed the differences between trained and untrained (measured 
post-implementation), we found that both safety improvement behaviours (t[78]=2.89, 
p<.01) and safety voice behaviours (t[78]=2.52, p<.05) were higher in the trained than the 
untrained group.  
 
Table 4.8. Workshop participation effect on the mean indexes for Organizational Unit Two. 
 Time 1 Time 2 t-
value 
p-value 
 
 n Mean SD n Mean SD   
Leverage 108 3.93 0.86 83 3.98 0.62 -0.43 0.67 
Energize 108 3.99 0.81 83 3.99 0.66 -0.03 0.98 
Adapt 108 4.22 0.78 82 4.21 0.56 0.17 0.87 
Defend 108 3.96 0.79 82 4.01 0.60 -0.44 0.66 
Improv. 108 3.55 0.92 81 3.55 0.89 0.02 0.99 
Voice 108 3.39 0.98 81 3.63 0.95 -1.74 0.08 
 
The before vs after comparisons (unmatched) for Organisational Unit Three 
revealed there were no statistically-significant differences (see Table 4.9) between the 
October 2018 and the June 2019 results, except for a decrease in the Energize index 
(t[139]=1.99, p<.05) and self-reported safety voice behaviours (t[137]=2.36, p<.05). 
Additional analyses revealed that there were statistically-significant differences between 
117 
 
the before and after data for people that did not attend the workshops for the Leverage (p-
value=0.03), Energize (p-value=0.00), Adapt (p-value=0.02), Defend (p-value=0.01) and 
Proactive (p-value=0.01) indexes; specifically, all these indexes worsened from Time 1 to 
Time 2. Interestingly, there were mainly no statistically-significant differences between the 
before and after data for people who did attend the workshops (i.e., participants’ ratings of 
the LEAD safety control strategies and their self-reported safety behaviour remained 
stable over time). Overall, the trained group’s perceptions and ratings were consistently 
higher and more positive than the untrained group’s ratings. However, the trained group’s 
self-ratings of safety improvement behaviours were significantly higher than the ratings of 
the untrained group at Time 2; t(72)=2.08, p<.05. 
 
Table 4.9. Workshop participation effect on the mean indexes for Organizational Unit 
Three. 
 Time 1 Time 2 t-
value 
p-value 
 
 n Mean SD n Mean SD   
Leverage 67 3.84 0.87 75 3.61 0.83 1.56 0.12 
Energize 67 3.81 0.92 75 3.50 0.90 1.99 <.05 
Adapt 67 4.10 0.78 75 3.92 0.71 1.37 0.17 
Defend 67 4.00 0.85 75 3.73 0.77 1.92 0.06 
Improv. 65 3.90 0.83 75 3.69 0.85 1.50 0.14 
Voice 64 3.88 1.01 75 3.46 1.06 2.36 <.05 
 
Discussion 
The objective of this study was to describe the evaluation of a practitioner-focused 
toolkit designed to improve safety culture through specific bundles of safety practices. 
These practices are positioned as control strategies that represent optimal ways of 
resolving the safety control problem depending on the specific operating conditions 
experienced. Following development and validation of the diagnostic survey component by 
Casey and colleagues (2019), this intervention study is the next logical step in a program 
of research that commenced with the theoretical underpinnings explicated by Casey et al. 
(2017).  
Participant feedback from all workshops and training sessions was generally 
positive. The upwards trend in average feedback received over time represents the 
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iterative and flexible nature of our development strategy. Specifically, we incorporated 
feedback between each implementation. This approach paid off in terms of developing a 
superior toolkit product that received consistently high feedback from participants.  
Our triangulated analysis of the pre-post survey data suggested that the training 
influenced participants’ perceptions of safety as well as their self-reported safety behavior. 
Specifically, we found significant changes in perceptions of targeted safety practices for 
the small matched sample of training participants. We also found that there were 
meaningful differences between the trained and untrained groups at the follow-up survey, 
with perceptions of safety and frequency of self-reported safety behavior being higher and 
more frequent in the trained group versus the untrained group. 
Our additional analyses of intra-organizational unit results found some interesting 
results worthy of further exploration and commentary. In particular, the results obtained for 
Organizational Unit Three suggest that the LEAD training intervention may have a 
‘protective’ effect in terms of workers’ perceptions of safety practices. At the time of the 
LEAD implementation, Unit Three was undergoing a large-scale organizational change. 
Change, particularly when implemented sub-optimally, can be a source of anxiety and 
dissatisfaction from affected employees (Vakola & Nikolaou, 2005). Participation in the 
LEAD training sessions, which include some topics related to change management and 
self-regulation, may not only improve safety practices generally, but also help to inoculate 
employees to other stressful organizational events like restructures and downsizing.  
Overall, the results of this study demonstrate the use of different evaluation 
techniques when confronted with practical restrictions and difficulties with employing more 
rigorous experimental designs. 
 
Practical implications 
This study reinforces the central role played by leadership in influencing safety 
climate perceptions, and flowing through to safety behavior. Ever since the original 
conceptualization of safety climate (Zohar, 1980) and subsequent refinement through the 
addition of group level safety climate (Zohar & Luria, 2005), leadership practices have 
been a major contributor to safety climate perceptions. Just as Zohar and Polachek (2014) 
found that a simple intervention involving providing feedback to supervisors on the safety 
content of their communications was enough to improve safety climate, we have found 
evidence that a series of short two-hour workshops was enough to bolster safety 
perceptions and improve (albeit, self-reported) safety behavior.  
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This intervention paves the way for shorter and more focused safety interventions, 
which are likely to be more important in the modern workplace where costs of training are 
high, and workers’ available time is short. In our workshop, we stepped leaders through 
such activities as forming a safety vision, identifying two-three short-term goals associated 
with it, and identifying ways to improve communication and coordination with their teams. 
This approach shifted the focus away from didactic classroom-based learning and towards 
bursts of ‘microlearning’; short three- to five-minute mini-lectures that are supplemented by 
eight-10 minutes of application and workbook activity. Discussion was used extensively 
throughout the workshop, which may have contributed to sense-making and reformulation 
of safety climate perceptions. 
This study also supports the use of a multi-level approach when tackling safety 
climate improvement. We used a combination of an organization-wide survey, leadership 
training, and general workforce training to achieve the outcomes described here. As safety 
climate perceptions are informed by structural components like safety policies and 
procedures, improving one aspect like leadership while leaving the systems-components 
untouched is likely to attenuate improvements. Interestingly, one of the organizational units 
that participated in the project went through a restructure at the time of the training 
program. Our analysis showed that participation in the training may have ‘inoculated’ 
training participants from this stressful and potentially negative experience; in particular, 
those that were trained had stable safety climate and behavior results whereas the non-
trained experienced significant decline in perceptions and behavior. Thus, safety training 
may have the additional benefit of boosting morale and ability to cope with change, 
particularly where it includes self-regulation skills and leadership skills. 
 
Reflections 
This toolkit development process was a rich source of professional learning. 
Following the project, we collated our experiences and reflections thereof, and provide 
these as a source of learning for other scholars and practitioners who seek to use the 
LEAD toolkit or develop their own safety culture improvement interventions in the future.  
Within the management workshops, participants varied greatly in their ability to generate 
meaningful actions. Participants often referred back to the facilitators for specific ideas and 
suggestions, which were gently reflected onto the group for discussion and debate. 
Managers ‘don’t know what they don’t know’; hence, an accompanying training session or 
resource describing example actions and practices to improve safety culture may have 
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been advantageous. In organizations with less corporate knowledge and experience, the 
action planning component may be particularly difficult without such resources.  
Partnerships between academia, industry, and government are powerful 
mechanisms to advance knowledge and practice. Each party brings with it a unique array 
of strengths that overcome and counter each other’s weaknesses. Government has a long 
arm to reach and influence industry that academia typically lacks. Academia can invest the 
time and resources required to develop innovations that are firmly evidence-based that 
industry cannot afford to do. And industry can act as a robust test bed for interventions to 
be implemented under ‘rough and ready’ field conditions that take research out of the 
laboratory and into the field, something that government and academia can often fail to do 
effectively.  
Finally, our findings highlight the difficulty of achieving meaningful and sustainable 
change in large organizations where multiple initiatives and changes may be underway. At 
the Organizational Unit level, we found quite different patterns of results that would have 
otherwise been masked if we had concentrated our analyses on the overall aggregated 
sample. One of the Units showed signs of dramatic safety culture change, however, 
unfortunately a different version of the survey was used at baseline so pre-post 
comparisons were impossible. This Unit empowered their Safety Committee to take 
charge of the LEAD implementation, and numerous gains like additional training, 
investment in safety infrastructure, and improved safety behavior were observed. On the 
other hand, Organizational Unit Three showed signs of decline over time, at least when 
analyzed at the aggregate Unit level. It wasn’t until we examined differences between 
trained and untrained that it became apparent there were differences between the groups. 
These results suggest that implementing change in large and complex organizations 
should adopt a tailored approach, which considers factors like timing, concurrent 
initiatives, and overall change readiness. On the other hand, the results indicate that safety 
training (in the form presented by the LEAD toolkit) may protect employees from negative 
reactions and responses to organizational changes like downsizing/restructuring. On 
reflection, more nuanced qualitative research with each participating Unit would have been 
useful to explore these hypotheses in more detail. 
 
Limitations 
There are numerous variables and processes that may be affecting the results, 
which are difficult to measure and evaluate in practice. Some reassurance should be 
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gleaned from the fact that other organizations that participated in the project reported 
perceived benefits from using the toolkit. Similar evaluation approaches to the one used in 
this study could shed some light about the effect of the toolkit in other organizations as it 
becomes more widely disseminated. 
We also note the positive intervention feedback data as a sign that the ‘dose’ 
administered to the participants was strong and consistent, suggesting a more powerful 
effect on the focal variables than extraneous initiatives and factors underway.  
One criticism that could be levelled at this study involved our comparisons between trained 
and untrained participants, along with the voluntary nature of the study. It may be such that 
differences between trained and untrained reflect preexisting differences in safety 
perceptions and behaviors instead of evidence that the toolkit has had an effect. However, 
the fact that we observed some degree of change in the matched pairs over time suggests 
that the training at least had some measure of impact, particularly on perceptions of 
Defend and Adapt perceptions. 
Given perceptions of safety practices are likely to converge or approach 
homogeneity at the team level (LeBreton & Senter, 2008), it is desirable to examine the 
data using a group-level/nested modelling technique such as multi-level modelling. 
However, collecting team data may jeopardize the anonymity of survey participants, 
especially in small teams, and we encountered some resistance from Unit leaders when 
we initially presented a proposal to explore team-level patterns using a suitable identifier. 
Nevertheless, future research should explore and if necessary, control for the multilevel 
nature of data such as these.  
 
Conclusions and Future Research 
This study demonstrated the practical utility of the LEAD toolkit. The findings 
suggest that it is possible to improve both perceptions of safety practices and the 
frequency of safety behavior with a readily-implemented practical toolkit based on the 
LEAD model. These evaluation data bolster the evidence supporting the LEAD toolkit and 
should provide organizations with some level of confidence that the intervention materials 
are evidence-based and effective if the recommended process is followed. Further, we 
outlined a number of reflections on our experiences and learnings that should inform 
further intervention work in this area. In one sense, the program of research commenced 
by the first author has reached a logical conclusion, given the progression from theory, to 
measurement, to intervention. In another sense, there is still much work to be done to 
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explore nuances of the LEAD model, such as evaluating propositions like 1) are the 
proposed control strategies the optimal way to manage safety in each hypothesized work 
condition, 2) is it possible to dynamically influence workers’ self-regulation through 
purposeful manipulation of leadership practices on short time-scales (i.e., intra-day), and 
3) are there alternative ways to measure the LEAD control strategies that overcome the 
limitations of survey-based methods (e.g., non-response bias, halo bias, social desirability 
bias).  
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Chapter 5: General Discussion 
This programme of research traced an arc from theory through to practice. I 
conducted a comprehensive series of investigations that established the LEAD model and 
associated measures and resources as an evidence-based toolkit that can benefit 
industry. Findings from this program of research demonstrated that the LEAD survey tool 
is a valid and reliable measure, with replicated results across multiple organizational and 
industry settings. The intervention study highlighted the potential for short and innovative 
workshops to produce some degree of change in safety practices over time. In this section 
I present an integrated discussion concerning the findings and implications of each 
contribution, as well as an in-depth consideration of programme limitations and future 
research directions. A reflection section concludes this thesis. 
 
Theoretical implications 
 From a theoretical perspective, the first contribution contained in Chapter 2 (Casey 
et al., 2017) advanced the safety climate and culture literatures considerably. Up until now, 
the conceptualization of safety climate has largely ignored the motivational pathways 
through which climate exerts effects over behaviour. Beginning with Craig Wallace’s work 
(Wallace & Chen, 2006), which was the first to demonstrate the effects of safety climate on 
regulatory focus, and safety performance, scholars have thereafter expanded 
understanding of the ways in which social forces shape behaviour via self-regulatory 
states. For example, Beus and colleagues (2019) recently explored the effects of 
paradoxical organizational climates on commitment and productivity. Similarly to the ideas 
advanced by Casey and colleagues (2017), Beus et al. operationalized climate measures 
in terms of their effects on self-regulation (i.e., a prevention climate and a promotion 
climate). Regarding the LEAD model, and the underpinning theoretical ideas, different 
constellations of LEAD control strategies should convey unique and measurable self-
regulatory states, which then lead to purposeful elicitation of specific safety behaviours. 
This is an important theoretical contribution that remains to be tested in future research. 
 I also contributed a new construct which I termed ‘uncertainty management’. This 
construct leverages the work of Grote (2015), who argued that uncertainty has a complex 
relationship with workplace safety. Uncertainty management is another self-regulatory 
construct that influences the tactics and strategies people use to cope with uncertainty in 
their environment. There are a number of testable hypotheses regarding the effects of 
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social and physical context on self-regulation. For instance, exposure to a high-risk 
environment in concert with practices that emphasize Defend should elicit a ‘stability-
focussed’ state, leading to strategies that seek to maintain predictability and control over 
the workplace (e.g., using safety procedures and established tools like risk assessment to 
create uncertainty). 
 In the series of studies summarised by Chapter 3 (Casey et al., 2019), we found 
that the relationships between LEAD dimensions and self-regulatory states were not as 
‘clean’ as the theory would have predicted. For instance, the theory would suggest that 
Leverage would be more strongly related to promotion-focus and stability-focus than other 
regulatory constructs. However, the pattern of correlations across the LEAD measures and 
self-regulatory constructs were homogenous and undifferentiated. However, it is possible 
that this finding is due to measurement issues rather than incorrect theory. Response bias, 
and more specifically, common method bias, could be an explanation for these results. In 
addition, forcing a global rating of the LEAD practices (i.e., a rating that is averaged across 
a number of different work situations) would likely artificially inflate the intercorrelations as 
respondents would be making an overall assessment of each practice rather than a 
momentary report of current practices. Use of a diary-based or other longitudinal study 
would help to clarify these relationships. 
 Regarding the Chapter 4 intervention study, the finding that one of the 
Organizational Units appeared to be inoculated against negative effects of 
restructuring/downsizing due to the safety training raises some theoretical implications. 
Safety initiatives may contribute positively to personal factors like organisational 
commitment and job satisfaction through a process of social exchange. Employees 
participating in safety training may feel that the organisation cares about them and has 
facilitated their involvement in valuable training, cuing the need to reciprocate. Further, the 
job demands/resources model may also be applicable here. Being provided with safety 
training that includes general leadership and self-management skills may increase job 
resources and decrease the experience of job demands, or assist people to reframe 
hindrance stressors into more functional challenge stressors. An interesting line of future 
research would be to examine the differential effects of safety training on non-safety 
phenomena like job satisfaction and organisational commitment.   
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Practical implications 
 Practically, this study contributes to the improvement of safety performance across 
industry through supporting the dissemination and uptake of the LEAD toolkit. Safety is 
often criticised as a discipline with little theory or empirical evidence behind it (Dekker, 
2019). This research programme provides an integrative and innovative assemblage of 
theories and ideas from leading safety scientists, and resolved them to a practical toolkit 
that industry can readily implement. Our user-centred and iterative design process 
ensured that the tools and resources are fit-for-purpose. The partnership between industry, 
academia, and government was powerful because it enabled the rapid and wide-reaching 
recruitment of organisations to participate in the programme, as well as a powerful reach 
to assist dissemination. The toolkit has been made available on the Workplace Health & 
Safety Qld website and to date, approximately 100 organisations have used the materials 
at various stages of development. One organisation from the meat processing industry, 
Teys Australia, was successful at winning the National Safety Council of Australia 2019 
Pinnacle Safety Award for their LEAD implementation. This recognition strengthens the 
practical utility of the toolkit by generating media coverage and bolstering the reputation of 
the resources. 
 Another practical implication of this study is that worker safety behaviour can be 
improved through relatively short and ‘punchy’ safety interventions. In all, the training 
sessions and workshops only required about one day of combined investment (each 
roughly two hours long). Tailored and targeted activities and content were delivered to 
senior managers, supervisors, and workers through this implementation. Rather than force 
employees to participate in every tool and training, we instead developed an approach that 
was tailored to each level of the organisational hierarchy. Focussed and brief safety 
training interventions are likely to be required in the future, as resources become tighter 
and production requirements more intense. The evidence here suggests that even a short 
two-hour training session can be enough to improve safety behaviour and perceptions of 
safety practices in an organisation.  
 Given the toolkit implementation was unable to achieve consistent and holistic 
improvement in safety leadership perceptions among subordinates, the context of the 
project might be relevant when it comes to practical implications. First, the toolkit 
concentrated just on leadership perceptions. As safety is created and produced through 
the interaction of multiple subsystems (i.e., personnel, procedural, structural; Carayon et 
al., 2015), changing just one of these may be inadequate to achieve wholesale change 
126 
 
across an organisation. For instance, training people in safety leadership without reviewing 
existing safety management processes and policies may encourage entrenched practices. 
Second, some of the organisations going through the intervention process were also 
simultaneously experiencing large-scale organisational change (centralisation of corporate 
services and downsizing). Thus, any gains in safety leadership perceptions may have 
been tainted through negative morale and other affective reactions. Third, the 
organisations involved in this research were diverse in terms of their risk profiles and work 
types. Organisations ranged from largely office-bound personnel through to staff that 
routinely visit active mine sites. Developing a training program that is generic enough to 
function across these contexts, yet still have a consistent and measurable impact on 
subordinates’ perceptions of safety leadership is a significant challenge, which this study 
suggests shouldn’t be underestimated. Finally, the time lag between before and after 
measurement was only a few months, which may have been an inadequate timeframe to 
assess for flow-on effects to subordinates’ perceptions of safety leadership.  
 
Limitations 
 Across this programme of research, I was unfortunately not able to source a sample 
that would have permitted the multiple repeated measures and intensive diary-based data 
collection that would have enabled me to test the underlying theory of the LEAD model in 
more detail. This is a significant limitation because the intervention was designed from the 
premise that the theoretically-specified relationships between control strategies, 
motivational states, and safety behaviour are valid.  
Most of the data reported here was collected using a cross-sectional survey design. 
Even for the longitudinal intervention study, I was only able to collect data from two time 
points, and at each point both the predictor and criterion variables were collected using the 
same survey instrument. Consequently, it is inappropriate to make causal inferences about 
the nature of any relationships discussed here. For instance, the scale validation would 
have been considerably enhanced (in particular, predictive validity) by using a longitudinal 
design that sourced data from different instruments/methods.  
 Regarding the intervention study, the deidentified code performed less effectively 
than was hoped, resulting in a small sample of matched pairs pre-post intervention. The 
fact that so few participants could be matched before and after the intervention means that 
the sample could be biased, or otherwise provide a conservative test of the intervention 
effects. A larger sample would not only have increased statistical power, but also 
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potentially shown markedly different results. In addition, practical limitations with data 
collection prevented me from sampling at multiple time points. Consequently, the timing of 
the follow-up data collection may have been too early to detect evidence of other 
significant changes. We were also not able to source a suitable control group, so again, 
causality inferences are not appropriate (i.e., the observed changes may be due to 
contextual effects rather than the intervention exposure).  
 Despite these limitations it is noteworthy that I was able to recruit a diverse and 
large sample to conduct the scale development process. Further, the use of a multi-
organisation and diverse intervention sample likely provided a realistic and conservative 
evaluation environment for the toolkit. Taken together, the series of studies here chart the 
progression of a theoretically derived idea, through to a psychometrically-sound 
measurement tool, and finally, a field test of an intervention toolkit that is focussed on 
practical usability by industry. Scholars have long lamented the absence of intervention 
research in safety science (e.g., Hale et al., 2010; Lee et al., 2019), so this study makes a 
useful contribution to the existing literature.  
 
Future Research Directions 
The LEAD model, explicated by Casey and colleagues (2017, 2019), supports the 
proposition that optimal safety performance results from the implementation of specific 
bundles of practices (‘control strategies’) in response to the demands conveyed by 
different work situations. At its core, the LEAD model attempts to explain the linkages 
between behaviour and more distal influences like leadership and safety climate through 
combinations of self-regulatory foci.  
 
LEAD profiles 
Although the model is typically represented as a quadrant, with orthogonal axes, the 
reality is likely much more complex. For instance, research has shown that promotion and 
prevention are actually non-mutually exclusive; rather than being opposing ends on a 
continuum, it may be possible for an individual to be simultaneously high on promotion and 
prevention (Wallace & Chen, 2006). Previous research on the LEAD model has also 
identified moderate positive correlations between the underpinning self-regulatory foci 
(Casey et al., 2019). Further research is required to identify the effect of a ‘balanced’ 
LEAD profile, and the consequent combinations of self-regulatory foci, on safety 
behaviour. Also, other LEAD profiles that are less balanced, and potentially misaligned 
128 
 
with situational demands may produce unintended effects on safety behaviour and 
performance. Existing research from both the safety and management sciences support 
these research directions. In the general management literature, the seminal work of 
Delery & Doty (1996) includes a discussion on configural approaches to strategic human 
resource management. Their results showed that configural approaches to human 
resources practices explains deviations in financial performance, with some profiles of 
practices being more effective than others, depending on the market context. In safety 
science, Colley et al. (2013) investigated the competing values framework and workplace 
safety performance. They found that profiles with stronger ‘human relations’ emphasis 
tended to result in better safety performance. These results highlight that profile or 
configural research can provide more nuanced prediction of organisational performance. 
 
Targeted elicitation of safety behaviours 
Each LEAD strategy is proposed to solve the safety ‘control problem’ by inducing a 
specific self-regulation state and thereafter, encouraging targeted behaviours at the 
individual and team levels. As shown by Figure 5.1, the integration of various safety 
behaviour frameworks with the LEAD model shows the expected relationships between 
combinations of self-regulation and certain behaviours. This is a fertile area for future 
investigation because it would enable organisations to encourage particular behaviours 
among workers in response to safety strategy, opportunities, or anticipated threats. 
I illustrate the relationships between self-regulation and safety behaviour through 
the following examples. When prevention-focus and flexibility is high, employees may be 
more likely to engage in activities such as whistleblowing – targeted action designed to 
initiate transformational change within a team or organisation (hence the high flexibility-
focus) and highlight duties, obligations, and ethical resolution of perceived miscarriages of 
responsibility (as induced through the high prevention-focus). ‘Deep’ compliance, 
described as investing full cognitive resources in the task of using standardised 
procedures, rules, and protocols, is most likely when both prevention-focus and stability-
focus are high. This outcome is driven by the sense of duty and obligation (creating 
conditions that are ripe for compliance, and also a deference to standardisation and well-
established rules and procedures (the combination of prevention- and stability-focus). 
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Figure 5.1. Integration of safety behaviours within the LEAD model.  
  
Relative frequency of LEAD control strategies 
The deployment of each LEAD control strategy (i.e., Leverage, Energise, Adapt, or 
Defend) is driven by two fundamental variables: uncertainty and risk. In situations where 
risk is high, the choice of regulatory focus defaults to prevention, and either stability or 
flexibility. In situations where uncertainty is high, the choice of focus is flexibility. 
Environmental cues are likely different for each individual worker. One doesn’t have to go 
too far to identify that risk doesn’t exist ‘out there’ (environment), but rather ‘in here’ (the 
mind). The seminal works of Slovic (1987, 1992) identify that risk is socially-derived and 
other more recent work shows the emotionality of risk-related perceptions (Xia et al., 
2017), which collectively erode the intuitive and often-practiced assumption that humans 
are calculative and rational risk assessors.  
Accounting for these considerations, the LEAD model ‘landscape’ is likely 
configured differently for certain individuals, teams, and organisations based on shared 
and agreed understandings of what constitutes low and high risk, and the type of work 
undertaken, among other factors. Consequently, the performance space defined or 
bounded by each control strategy could be markedly different. Figure 5.2 shows an 
example mapping of the work performance space in light of the LEAD control strategies. 
The Leverage control strategy space is likely to be the dominant or most frequently-
experienced one, both in terms of the type of work undertaken and the organisation’s (or 
team/individual) tolerance thresholds for uncertainty and risk. Adapt is likely to be a rarely 
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encountered control strategy given the high safety levels of most industries and relatively 
low failure rates (e.g., aviation, manufacturing).   
Given the LEAD model requires individuals and teams to make decisions about 
level of risk and uncertainty, as well as select the most appropriate control strategy to suit 
the current environmental conditions, further research would be valuable. Specifically, 
investigating the thresholds and signal processing limits that trigger a switch between 
LEAD control strategies based on environmental cues would develop new insights into the 
practical implementation of the LEAD model. 
 
Figure 5.2. Mapping of LEAD control strategy spaces by uncertainty and risk levels. 
 
LEAD and the resolution of paradox 
Each LEAD control strategy is proposed to optimise performance through inducing 
a specific self-regulatory state. This state is comprised of different combinations of 
promotion- and prevention-focus, and flexibility- and stability-focus. In some work 
situations, this combination is complementary or synergistic. For instance, when 
opportunities are being pursued and the Energise control strategy is used, the optimal 
configuration is flexibility and promotion (and high levels of both these foci are desired).  
Promotion and flexibility are aligned because promotion-focus results in exploratory 
and growth-oriented behaviours, and flexibility-focus results in approach towards 
uncertainty. This is a high-tension situation because the exploratory and uncertainty 
approach effects of high promotion-flexibility foci is in direct competition with the 
compliance and certainty effects of high prevention-stability foci. For Energise to be fully 
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effective as a control strategy, flexibility-promotion foci should be maximised, whereas 
stability-prevention focus should be minimised. 
Conversely, in routine work environments, a paradoxical situation results because 
the optimal configuration is stability-promotion foci, along with moderate levels of flexibility-
prevention foci. Successful control over performance requires foci typically in competition 
to instead be mutually-reinforcing and existing simultaneously. In the case of routine work, 
the combination of promotion and stability foci ensures that behaviours are concentrated 
on achievement striving and effective work practices that maximise success. The 
moderate levels of prevention and flexibility foci act as attenuators – tempering the 
achievement striving in the face of emerging risks and permitting some acceptance of 
variability (e.g., work arounds, adaptive work patterns) to maintain overall stability and 
optimal efficient performance. Figure 5.3 provides a visual summary of these propositions. 
 
Figure 5.3. Combinations of self-regulatory foci and corresponding tension or paradox 
situation. 
 
These tensions and paradoxes between self-regulatory foci can be visually 
represented as vectors. As Figure 5.4 shows, each of the work situations (routine 
operations, opportunity pursuit, recovery and learning, and critical risks) are characterised 
by different levels of risk and uncertainty. These environmental cues determine the 
position and intensity of the regulatory foci vectors, as well as the direction of movement 
as levels of these cues fluctuate. By measuring levels of risk and uncertainty (albeit at 
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different levels), individuals, teams, and organisations should have real-time data 
regarding the most appropriate control strategy to deploy.  
My general line of thinking here is that the dynamics of the LEAD model can be 
represented by vectors. These vectors can change their orientation around axes that 
represent increasing, decreasing, or maintenance of environmental conditions (i.e., 
uncertainty and risk). Each vector represents one of the self-regulatory states that a LEAD 
control strategy purports to induce (e.g., prevention, promotion). Because self-regulatory 
states are separate constructs rather than opposing poles on a continuum, they can co-
exist, albeit in a state of paradoxical tension, such as creating stability through flexibility 
(Farjoun, 2010).  
In Figure 5.4, cell a., the Leverage strategy is most appropriate due to decreasing 
risk and decreasing uncertainty – the work activities being undertaken are likely to be well-
known and routine, where little can go wrong. Consequently, the optimal configuration of 
self-regulatory foci is promotion-stability, with moderate levels of prevention-flexibility. This 
is a paradoxical situation. Providing workers with clarity of goals and roles, and coupling 
this with recognition of effective work practices is likely to achieve the paradoxical self-
regulation state. Clarity encourages a promotion-focus by highlighting goals and 
achievements that workers can strive towards. It also induces a stability-focus by helping 
to identify well-established processes and procedures that can be drawn on to increase 
efficiency. Recognition and reinforcement of effective work practices builds promotion-
focus be satisfying needs of achievement, and encourages stability by cementing and 
grounding work practices.  
Cell b. is a high-tension situation as induced by the Energise strategy. 
Complementary combinations of flexibility-promotion (increasing) and prevention-stability 
(decreasing) establish control by promotion individual behaviours that generate and 
sustain exploratory change. Practices such as inspiration and empowerment induce the 
promotion-flexibility combination and decrease the prevention-stability combination. 
Cell c. is another paradoxical situation, with the combinations of flexibility-
prevention (increasing) and promotion-stability (maintaining). A flexibility-prevention focus, 
as induced by the Adapt control strategy, prime people to accept change but focus their 
efforts on incremental and prevention-oriented improvement (i.e., preventing the 
reoccurrence of failure). Practices such as reflection on past performance (e.g., after 
action reviews) and voicing concerns enable the coexistence of paradoxical foci 
(prevention-flexibility).  
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Finally, cell d. is a high-tension situation with the focus on prevention-stability in 
response to increasing risk and decreasing uncertainty in the environment. In other words, 
workers are confronted with high-risk hazards that they know well, and have effective 
means of identifying, assessing, and controlling such hazards. Promotion-flexibility focus is 
discouraged through practices such as detailed risk assessment and adherence to 
standardised safety procedures. Correspondingly, workers are more likely to engage in 
‘deep compliance’ and achieve high safety performance. 
 From a future research perspective, exploration of how these paradoxical situations 
are experienced psychologically, and the effectiveness of various LEAD strategies are 
resolving such paradoxes, is warranted. Paradox will be an important concept into the 
future of health and safety, because employees in high-risk situations are likely to be 
presented with more frequent opportunities to either accept or resolve paradox (Hu et al., 
in press).  
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Figure 5.4. Combinations of environmental risk and uncertainty, and corresponding 
dynamics of self-regulatory foci.
 
Levels of LEAD implementation: Operational, tactical, and strategic 
Mostly, the LEAD model is positioned as a tactical (supervisory) and operational 
(worker-centric) phenomenon. At these levels of the organisation, the level of influence is 
local, and the environmental pace is fast. Correspondingly, the dynamism of the LEAD 
control strategy deployment and changes in environmental conditions is high. Teams may 
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cycle through many different iterations of LEAD control strategies throughout a working 
day as the nature of the work situation fluctuates. At the strategic level, senior managers 
experience a slower rate of environmental change and more global impact of decision-
making. These patterns are summarised by Figure 5.5. 
 
Figure 5.5. Different organisational levels and the relationships with influence and 
environmental pace. 
 
Therefore, there exists the possibility of interactive effects between different layers if 
the LEAD model is implemented on a wholesale level across an organisation. Operational 
teams may deploy control strategies that are either aligned with or compete with tactical 
and organisational levels. Ensuring alignment of control strategies, and even misalignment 
in the case of strategic decision making that aims to change the status quo (to exert a 
macro or global influence over lower levels of the organisation) is important if the full 
effects of the LEAD model implementation are to be realised.  
As shown by Figure 5.6, the layers of an organisation may exert markedly different 
effects on each subsequent layer through the self-regulatory context that each respective 
control strategy implementation generates. Adding to this complexity are the ‘self-imposed’ 
control strategies that operate within each level – all levels are comprised of teams, and 
certain leadership and co-worker practices will likely influence local conditions. The ‘net 
sum’ effect of all these interacting control strategies produce the ultimate effect on 
individuals’ self-regulatory foci and corresponding behavioural practices. 
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Figure 5.6. Implementation of LEAD control strategies at different organisational levels in 
response to environmental conditions. 
 
 Future research could possibly explore the different operationalisations of the LEAD 
model at different levels of an organisation. LEAD may apply quite differently to 
organisational strategists like senior managers, where the timescale and lag times 
associated with control strategy implementation (and their effects) will be much longer than 
in-the-moment control strategies implemented by teams at the operational level. Further, 
exploring the net sum of LEAD model effects across an entire organisation, where multiple 
and possibly competing control strategies could be deployed simultaneously, would add to 
the practical knowledge base around this framework.  
 
Personal Reflection 
 Much has been said about the role of organisational culture in either contributing to 
(Tuner, 1978) or preventing (Weick, 1995) workplace accidents. From the first perspective, 
culture acts as a ‘blinker’, obfuscating or distorting important information about risk and 
creating organisational vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities, known as ‘latent conditions’ or 
‘resident pathogens’ (Reason, 1997) incubate and are triggered at the sharp end by 
unexpected interactions of variability or acts that cut through organisational defences. 
Consequently, culture is a process of ‘not seeing’. From the second perspective, culture 
acts as a positive capacity that an organisation should foster. The theory of high reliability 
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organising exemplifies this approach, with the five tenets of mindfulness; socio-cognitive 
processes that ensure risks are noticed and allocated the attention that is warranted by 
their significance. Thus, culture is also a process of ‘seeing more’ and ‘seeing differently’ 
(Barry & Meisiek, 2010). When an organisation knows more, through searching for what is 
not seen, directing attention in areas to see more, and critically questioning what is seen, 
safety is improved. 
Critical to both perspectives on culture is the activity of sense-making. Sense-
making is literally ‘making sense’ of ambiguity in organisations, through processes of 
interaction and interpretation. For example, following a situation or event within an 
organisation, people will cognitively ‘talk situations into being’, either through self-talk and 
interpretation, or through social interaction with others. The latter is particularly likely in 
organisations because humans are social beings, and we draw on relationships and 
interactions with others to help understand and control our environment. 
Nevertheless, a lot of organisational sense-making is implicit and subconscious. 
People make decisions, send messages, and act (or not) on safety issues in ways that are 
often ignorant of the effect such activities have on employees’ sense-making, and their 
consequent behaviours. People can also contribute to a culture of ‘not seeing’ by 
poisoning the well of sense-making. For example, consider the accidental shooting down 
of an unarmed civilian airliner. An investigation of such a disaster may begin with a 
fundamental question ‘why did he/she shoot’ However, such a question drives sense-
making in ways that lead straight back to the individual decision maker rather than casting 
light on hidden dangers lurking in other areas of the organisation. This is because ‘why did 
they shoot’ quickly leads to ‘why did they make the wrong decision’. Judgment is 
premature, sanctions are imposed, and learning is impaired. The organisational culture of 
‘not seeing’ has been reinforced through the ‘success’ of the investigation conclusion – 
human error. 
Consider another example closer to the reality of organisational life. A pocket risk 
assessment (JSA, Take 5 etcetera) is a staple tool in many high risk environments. Such 
risk assessments are conducted prior to a job commencing, and are a way of forcing 
workers to consider risk and implement controls. Yet, we know that these assessments are 
rarely completed as intended (Havinga et al., 2018). Stories abound of workers completing 
Take 5s en-masse at the end of the month to meet their quotas or developing rubrics to 
inform which boxes to tick so no further action is required. Non-compliance with risk 
assessments is usually met with disciplinary actions. This is dictated by a culture of not 
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seeing. In a culture of ‘seeing differently’, and ‘seeing more’, sense-making occurs 
differently. We ask questions like: Is a Take 5 the best method of focussing attention on 
risk? What else could we do instead? Is there a system change we can make to eliminate 
the hazard and negate the need for a Take 5 altogether? 
Leaders (both formal and informal positions of authority) are well-placed to manage 
sense-making processes, and in so doing, contribute to more functional treatments of risk. 
Leaders can provide explicit cues or inputs into what constitutes a risk and how it should 
be dealt with. Leaders can contribute to a rich informational environment by encouraging 
‘psychological safety’ or a willingness to speak up and voice concerns or ideas. And finally, 
leaders can draw attention to risks that may otherwise have gone unnoticed or 
underappreciated. Consequently, leaders are facilitators of sense-making, and by training 
their competencies to take conscious control of this process, contribute greatly to an 
organisation’s safety culture. 
Altogether, a number of premises can be derived from the ideas described above: 
 
• Risk is a social construction (it is subjective and what is deemed to be a risk is 
shaped through culture). 
• Culture is a dynamic phenomenon that is constructed and modified over time, 
through processes of sense-making; hence, what is constituted as risk will also 
change over time. 
• Culture is as a frame of reference or a ‘shared mental template’ that provides 
guidance to employees about how they should interpret and respond to risk (e.g., 
what constitutes a hazard, how should hazards be controlled, should incidents be 
reported). 
• By influencing culture at all levels of an organisation, managers can change the way 
risk is perceived, assessed, and actioned. 
 
Rather than attempting to change culture directly (largely a fruitless effort), it should 
be shaped or ‘nudged’ by increasing employees’ ‘cultural competence’ to engage in guided 
sense-making processes that enhance the informational environment. 
By enhancing the informational environment and fostering critical thinking around 
safety, the culture becomes self-sustaining, and moves away from a prescriptive global 
template (e.g., all cultures should be homogenous) and towards a locally-relevant set of 
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boundary conditions (e.g., the ‘right’ culture will emerge if the initial conditions and 
maintenance activities are appropriately set). 
 What do these insights mean for the current research programme? The LEAD 
model neatly sidesteps the existential crisis of safety culture (and to some extent, safety 
climate) by concentrating on the antecedent practices that should create the cultural 
conditions that lead to an informational environment. The LEAD research programme even 
makes some small steps to unpacking the ‘black box’ of how social context influences 
behaviour, namely, via self-regulation. Yet, the LEAD research conducted here is largely 
normative and functional in nature.  
Being steeped in a quantitative tradition, this research missed an opportunity to 
describe or interpret the cultural nuances that existed within the participating 
organisations. Throughout this research, and my exposure to alternative ideas and 
methodologies from sociology via the Safety Science Innovation Lab, I have discovered 
the futility of thinking that a safety culture can be engineered or created through purposeful 
interventions. I have even started to question the term ‘safety culture’ itself, preferring ‘a 
culture for safety’ instead to denote a dynamic, differentiated, and effect-based 
conceptualisation of organisational culture. I have found that it is less worthwhile to focus 
on what safety culture IS, but rather to focus on what safety culture DOES.  
In addition, the studies here highlight the temptation plaguing industry for a panacea 
or quick fix when it comes to safety. Managers, consultants, and even regulators want a 
toolkit that has a readily-implemented ‘cookbook’ or recipe for how to create a safety 
culture. This research has made me realise more intently the pressure and blinkering that 
such demands place on both academics and practitioners. Rather than giving them what 
they want, perhaps we should instead be giving them what they don’t (want) to see? A 
window into the complexities, nuances, conflicts, and discrepancies that make up an 
organisational culture (for safety).  
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Subject Matter Expert Semi-Structured Interview Guide 
 
• My background 
• Scope of thesis project 
• Confidentiality  
• Time required 
 
In developing a systems-model of safety in organisations, it has become apparent that 
social forces such as culture and climate could act as mechanisms for control over work 
operations. Culture and climate are arguably more effective ways of exerting control than 
top-down procedures and prescriptive rules because they are bottom-up and don’t require 
effortful monitoring and enforcement. To help explicate the specific configurations of 
culture and climate that would enable such control to be effected, we’ve developed a 
model of four separate control strategies. These strategies are appropriate for operating 
contexts defined by two continuum, namely: flexibility-stability, and promotion-prevention 
focussed goals. The matrix below summarises the operating conditions and corresponding 
control problems. 
 
 Promotion Prevention 
Flexibility 
System is operating in an 
environment where change is 
being implemented while 
seeking to achieve promotion-
focussed goals. Control 
achieved through motivating 
vision and purpose, and 
workforce empowerment. 
System is attempting to recover 
from an incident and implement 
improvements to prevent 
reoccurrence. Control achieved 
through well-rehearsed 
emergency routines and learning 
practices. 
Stability 
System operates in routine 
conditions with a focus on 
promotion goals. Control 
achieved by planning, 
coordination, and recognising 
goal attainment. 
System is operating in routine 
conditions with a focus on 
prevention goals. Control 
achieved by monitoring and 
correcting deviations, 
standardisation, and top-down 
supervision. 
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What I’d like us to do together is to review each of the four control strategies and hear your 
opinions on the specific organisational practices and cultural beliefs that you think apply to 
each one. There are no right or wrong answers, I am simply interested in your professional 
opinion. 
 
At times, organisations operate in stable and routine environments where risks and 
hazards are predictable, and the focus is on preventing losses and harm. In this operating 
context, the control strategy constrains the variability of operations and exerts a force to 
push the system operating point away from the boundary of safe performance. The 
strategy exerts control by setting and enforcing safety standards, monitoring compliance, 
and correcting deviations.  
 
1a) In your opinion, how prevalent is this control strategy across industry? 
1b) What industries would be most likely to use this type of control strategy? 
1c) What organisational practices do you think characterise this strategy? 
1d) What cultural beliefs do you think characterise this strategy? 
 
Alternatively, organisations can operate in a stable and routine environment where the 
focus is on promotion-focussed goals such as striving towards production goals. In this 
operating state, the control strategy aims to maintain a state of optimisation so the system 
is as close to the boundary of safe performance as possible, thus maximising production 
goals while maintaining safety. Control is maintained through coordination of operations, 
setting aspirational standards, monitoring performance, and recognising successful 
achievement of goals.  
 
2a) In your opinion, how prevalent is this control strategy across industry? 
2b) What industries would be most likely to use this type of control strategy? 
2c) What organisational practices do you think characterise this strategy? 
2d) What cultural beliefs do you think characterise this strategy? 
 
Another operating state that organisations can experience is high flexibility and prevention. 
Such a state occurs when a hazard has been released and the organisation is attempting 
to recover and learn to prevent reoccurrence. The control strategy returns the system 
operating point back behind the safe performance boundary and strengthens the boundary 
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through improvement and learning. The control strategy exerts control through 
implementing emergency routines and making changes to systems and processes to 
reduce future risk. 
3a) In your opinion, how prevalent is this control strategy across industry? 
3b) What industries would be most likely to use this type of control strategy? 
3c) What organisational practices do you think characterise this strategy? 
3d) What cultural beliefs do you think characterise this strategy? 
 
The final operating state is when flexibility is combined with promotion, such as when 
positive changes are being introduced like new technologies, changes in market forces, or 
people work in an environment in which the risks and hazards are dynamic or 
unpredictable. In this operating context, the control strategy highlights and clarifies 
performance boundaries, and coordinates system operating point movements. The 
strategy exerts control through developing a shared and motivating vision for safe 
production, inspiring collective purpose and ownership, encouraging operator autonomy, 
and involving operators in decision-making and initiatives. 
 
4a) In your opinion, how prevalent is this control strategy across industry? 
4b) What industries would be most likely to use this type of control strategy? 
4c) What organisational practices do you think characterise this strategy? 
4d) What cultural beliefs do you think characterise this strategy? 
 
Thank you for your time and effort. Do you have any further comments or advice to offer 
for this research project? 
 
Can you recommend a colleague in this field who may be a suitable candidate for 
participation in this research study? 
 
• Next steps 
• Providing participants with feedback/outcomes 
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Interview Summary of Themes 
Organisational Practices 
Leverage 
Collaboration and support. Leaders engage with workers to conduct shared 
planning processes. Leaders seek input and information from workers at the sharp end. 
Leaders work alongside their staff to ensure visibility on work variability is maintained. 
Feedback is given on performance to assess progress towards goals, and support is given 
to ensure goals are met (“But it's something that would normally be like cooperative 
planning and that sort of idea.”). 
Performance recognition. Organisations implement reward and recognition 
programs that acknowledge workers who show high safety performance. Regular 
discussion of positive performance indicators (progress towards goals) is conducted within 
workgroups (“They have award for the best hazard identification card or somebody who 
has come up with a smart idea for approving safety. They have these kinds of reward 
systems as well to focus the workforce minds on safety.”). 
Integration. Safety is integrated within production and quality processes in such a 
way that there is little distinction between them. Practices such as safe work methods 
statements combine task steps with safety requirements. Attempts are made to consider 
safety at the design phase of equipment manufacture and work design (“Yeah, I suppose 
to be safe in that sort of context, you're probably wanting to build safety into how you do 
your work processes. So rather than safety being a sort of separate add on process”). 
Qualification. Attempts are made to invest in people so that they develop skills 
across multiple domains. Training in conducted to qualify and requalify staff, ensuring that 
multiple skills are kept fresh and sharp. There is a general reliance on the competency of 
workers to achieve group goals (“Stronger reliance on individual and team competency.”). 
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Preparation. Multidisciplinary planning practices are the norm. Work planning is conducted 
well ahead of the job being started. Scheduling and workload modelling are specific 
practices used to anticipate variability and intensity of work. Buffering is undertaken to 
horde resources so as to cope with heavy workloads (“Scheduling stuff, being more aware 
that okay it's going to get busier at the end of the year so we need to have more staff.”). 
Energise 
Consultation. Efforts are made to interact with workers at all levels and ask for their ideas 
and concerns around upcoming changes before implementation. Consultation is 
considered an important practice and routinely carried out prior to large-scale workplace 
changes. There is an emphasis on listening to workers’ concerns (“Like consulting with 
staff about new premises, and showing them plans and things, and saying "This is what 
we're doing." If there's any feedback obviously we can take it to whoever's designing”). 
Local autonomy. Workers are permitted to make certain decisions themselves in the 
absence of a supervisor’s or manager’s direction. There is a tendency to defer to local 
expertise over rank or hierarchy. Workers are permitted to stop work if the situation is 
unsafe (“I think that there are organisations trying to promote autonomy, local autonomy, 
and they're starting to understand the importance of that.”).  
Involvement. Workers actively participate in safety decision-making throughout the 
business. There is an emphasis on workers adopting responsibility for managing risks in 
the workplace. Workgroups engage in collaborative activities to anticipate and understand 
risks (“really working with a very high level of participation, clearly a level of participatory 
ergonomics has become part of the company and it’s well-integrated into the company.”). 
Informed. Communication is two-way and regular between leaders and workers. Workers 
receive routine feedback on current changes and concerns they have raised. Regular 
meetings ensure that all workers are informed about business activities and safety 
initiatives (“Give them the opportunity to ask questions about stuff.”).  
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Safety vision and priority. Leaders articulate a company strategy and vision for safety, 
which are translated down into specific team goals and targets. Safety is given high priority 
and widely seen as an important work priority (“It's not seen as an onerous extra thing that 
businesses have to do. It's just part of good business and everyone believes in it and 
hasn't got a problem with it having the same priority as all the other things they've got to 
do.”). 
Adapt 
After action review. Following a safety incident or near-miss, work groups meet and 
discuss what went wrong and how to avoid the same mistake in the future. There is an 
emphasis on learning from negative events and making changes to the work system to 
prevent reoccurrence (“When there has something gone pear-shaped, they do a proper 
review on what it was and the focus is on preventing it from reoccurring.”).  
Temporary structures. During emergency situations, temporary organisational structures 
ensure that activities are centrally coordinated, but locally executed (“Centralise 
coordination, but decentralise operations.”). 
Emergency routines. Organisations possess well-rehearsed emergency routines that 
enable workers to respond quickly and effectively to emergencies. Resources are invested 
to conduct realistic simulations and regular emergency drills to keep workers alert and 
prepared (“They are focused on the emergency routines. They do have emergency 
provisions in place.”).  
Incident investigation. Following a safety incident, thorough investigation practices uncover 
causes of incidents and system conditions that may have combined and contributed to the 
outcome (“They would typically use relatively sophisticated incident investigation tools and 
then also try to come up with a solution to that practise.”). 
Sharing information. Attempts are made to share lessons learned with other parts of the 
business and with external parties. There is a focus on providing such information with the 
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expectation that it will be reciprocated, resulting in greater collective learning and 
improvement to safety (“They are trying to share lessons learned across installations, so 
that if the other installations have similar problems or challenges, they should implement 
the same measures, for instance.”). 
Defend 
Enforcement. Sanctions are used to hold people to account on agreed safety standards. 
Safety is included in performance reviews to formalise requirements. Non-compliance with 
safety standards is punished (“Very, very strong dos and don'ts and regulations and how 
you go about doing things in a safe manner.”). 
Risk management. Workers employ practices to identify hazards, assess risk, implement 
controls, and verify the effectiveness of controls (“Putting measures in place to mitigate 
those hazards.”). 
Monitoring performance. Workers’ performance is monitored closely through supervision 
and technological solutions such as GPS tracking. Performance is constantly checked 
against safety standards for compliance (“In environments where there is direct 
supervision of employees, then there is a fair amount of supervisory monitoring and control 
in that context.”). 
Standardisation. Prescriptive action rules are put in place to ensure that variability is 
constrained. Work procedures standardise the steps involved in completing tasks (“They 
need to have really strict guidance and rules to manage the production.”). 
Safety competence. Training and induction are used to raise the safety knowledge and 
overall competence of workers, in particular around safety standards and standardised 
ways of working. Such training is repeated to create automatic responses to safety-critical 
situations (“I think they train people to do this. I think they have also things that people can 
automatically do since they go through learning this many, many, many times, for 
example, in the military.”). 
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Cultural Beliefs 
Leverage 
Incremental improvement. Participants described cultural beliefs that centred 
around the importance on continuous improvement through taking small and measured 
risks (“Rather, you have to be more cautious and things need to be better. Possibly 
structured, monitored.”). Fitting with this theme, codes included a future-focussed element 
along with the belief that improvements in safety are likely to cross over into other areas of 
the business, such as quality and productivity.  
Consideration. To achieve the objective of remaining informed, participants 
described supporting beliefs such as being open to and seeking out the ideas of others, 
regardless of hierarchical level, as well as a willingness to engage in collaborative 
decision-making (“There are companies where leaders are more inclined to include 
workers in their decisions and consult with them before making a decision”). Overall, there 
is a desire to consider workers’ views and stay informed about performance at the sharp 
end of operations. 
Optimising feedback. Conjoint optimisation of safety was seen to rely on a feedback 
system that is open to the suggestions of workers at all levels of the organisation and 
consists of a closed loop that ensures improvements are actioned and the results fed back 
to the source(s) (“…would be a feedback system which we typically find in safety 
management system and that incorporates feedback from staff and collaborating with staff 
and taking staff feedback serious and then implementing consequences from the staff 
feedback”). 
Energise  
Workers-as-experts. According to the participants, control is achieved when 
workers at the sharp end are recognised as experts in their craft (“Particularly when they 
recognise that the experts are the ones that do the job every day”). Such expertise must 
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be tapped into through the belief that workers are valued sources of information (“People 
would think that the managers of the business actually think those people are important, 
want them to be more than just churning out stuff, and like it when they give their ideas 
and raise issues”).  
Distributed power. In safe organisations, participants described a cultural belief of ‘giving 
away’ of ‘giving up’ power to workers (“But we're talking here about power. Ultimately, 
we're talking about power. Managers are not keen to give away power”). Instead of being 
seen as a threat or problem to control, workers are instead given power through support to 
have their opinions heard and ideas implemented. 
Growth orientation. Supporting the change-focussed nature of the Energise control 
strategy, participants described cultural beliefs that concentrated on themes of flexibility, 
growth, and exploration. There was a common perception that safe organisations have a 
culture that supports invention and change (“understanding that what's been done until 
now might not be the thing to do in the future, that invention is good”).  
Adapt 
Chronic unease. Participants provided statements that were best summarised as 
‘chronic unease’. This theme was supported by codes including a perpetual anxiety about 
things going wrong or safety incidents occurring (“I don't feel safe 100% of the time.”) and 
a consequent focus on ensuring contingencies are in place to deal with these anticipated 
negative events (“Look. That could happen to us and have we got things in place.”). 
Learning. Under the Adapt control strategy, learning is proposed to underpin 
preventative changes to the work system to avoid future reoccurrence of incidents. This 
concept was apparent within the data, as participants described the importance of cultural 
beliefs that support reflection and learning (“Most important is to be open. To have an 
open attitude towards not being afraid of- not stigmatising when someone has done 
anything wrong, or some people or some crew.). The importance of respecting and 
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encouraging a diversity of views, maintaining an openness to others’ ideas and 
suggestions, and being tolerant of mistakes were core aspects of this theme.  
Self-critical. Accompanying the theme relating to learning was a theme around self-
criticality. Participants indicated that safe and successful organisations continually strive to 
better themselves and are ‘willing to admit that they don’t know everything’. Such 
organisations are willing to turn their attention towards their internal processes and 
practices with the goal of questioning their efficacy (“They question themselves as an 
organisation more frequently.”). 
Defend 
Accountability. There was some agreement among participants that the Defend 
control strategy is underpinned by a belief around accountability. Participants reported that 
this strategy is supported by aspects including not only setting agreed standards and 
expectations, but that all workers are aware of these and accept responsibility for their 
actions. There is a clear belief that people will be held accountable for their safety 
performance (“We pull people up at the line”). 
By the book. According to some participants, the Defend control strategy includes a 
cultural belief around there being a ‘right way’ to do things, and that there is a professional 
pride among workers in following this ‘one’ or ‘correct’ way. There was also an aspect in 
the data relating to the belief that following this right way of doing safety is likely to reduce 
risk (“I would expect to see a belief that actually obeying the rules and following policies 
and procedures would reduce that risk.”). 
Certainty. There was evidence of a cultural belief around a preference for certainty 
and reducing/removing ambiguity. Participants’ statements included elements such as 
behavioural homogeneity (“That it's good that everyone behave in the same manner.”), 
that certain types of work can be deconstructed into constituent components and 
understood (“I would say decomposed rather than deconstructed, but absolutely, and in 
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very literal ways.”), and that the future is predictable (“I think it's a belief that things are 
predictable.”). 
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LEAD Scale - Preliminary Item Pool 
 
Listed below are a number of survey statements. Please review each one and 
provide feedback on clarity and simplicity. Please evaluate each item for its 
suitability across a range of industries and both medium and large business sizes. 
Rewrite any statements that you feel are unclear or difficult to understand. If you 
feel a statement is clear and understandable, please leave the feedback section 
blank. 
 
After unsuccessful work, this organisation spends time reviewing what happened 
to improve how things are done. 
Feedback: 
When work doesn't go as planned this organisation takes the time to reflect to 
identify improvements. 
Feedback: 
After something goes wrong, this organisation brings people together to discuss 
what happened so similar situations can be prevented in the future. 
Feedback: 
During emergencies, this organisation creates a central point of communication 
and coordination to guide people's actions. 
Feedback: 
When emergencies happen, this organisation gives people direction but allows 
them to improvise as needed. 
Feedback: 
During emergencies, this organisation allows people to make necessary 
adjustments and changes within the boundaries of the response plan. 
Feedback: 
This organisation spends time practising a range of emergency situations so 
people are well-prepared. 
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Feedback: 
In this organisation, we regularly take the time to rehearse different emergency 
situations. 
Feedback: 
 
 
This organisation has clear and realistic plans in place to help workers deal with 
emergencies. 
Feedback: 
This organisation thoroughly investigates safety incidents and near misses so 
specific causes are identified. 
Feedback: 
After a safety incident or near miss, considerable time is invested to understand 
what happened. 
Feedback: 
When a safety incident or near miss happens, this organisation investigates what 
happened so it knows how and why the situation occurred. 
Feedback: 
Lessons and learnings from safety incidents are shared widely across this 
organisation. 
Feedback: 
This organisation makes sure that information about safety incidents and near 
misses is communicated to everyone. 
Feedback: 
This organisation shares what it learns from safety incidents and near misses with 
everyone. 
Feedback: 
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This organisation has safety rules that are enforced consistently. 
Feedback: 
Compliance with safety rules is enforced by leaders at this company. 
Feedback: 
Compliance with safety rules is part of how this organisation measures our work 
performance. 
Feedback: 
Prior to work starting, this organisation makes sure workers assess risks and put 
controls in place. 
Feedback: 
Risk management is an important work priority for everyone at this organisation. 
Feedback: 
After risks have been identified, people here verify that controls are in place and 
appropriate. 
Feedback: 
At this organisation, workers' safety performance is closely monitored and 
supervised. 
Feedback: 
Leaders at this organisation spend a lot of time closely watching how work is done 
to make sure it is safe. 
Feedback: 
Workers' performance is closely monitored to check it is in line with how work 
should be done. 
Feedback: 
This organisation has detailed standards and procedures that tell us how to do 
work safely. 
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Feedback: 
Around here, there are thorough procedures for how things should be done safely. 
Feedback: 
This organisation spends time describing how work should be done so safety is 
maintained. 
Feedback: 
Training and onboarding for safety is an extensive process at this organisation. 
Feedback: 
This organisation invests a lot of resources teaching people about safety risks and 
how to manage them. 
Feedback: 
People here are trained so well in safety that the necessary skills are often 
automatic and well-learned. 
Feedback: 
Leaders at this organisation consult closely with workers at all levels to hear their 
safety ideas and concerns 
Feedback: 
At this organisation, leaders often visit places where work is done to consult 
directly with people about safety. 
Feedback: 
Leaders at this organisation act in ways that make it clear they value consultation 
with workers about safety matters. 
Feedback: 
Leaders here respect the safety expertise of workers who have been doing the job 
for a long time. 
Feedback: 
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Experts in this organisation are given the freedom to make their own decisions 
about safety, regardless of their rank or seniority. 
Feedback: 
In this organisation, if you have expertise in a work area you are allowed to make 
your own decisions about how safety is done. 
Feedback: 
Workers at this organisation are involved in making decisions around how work is 
planned and done. 
Feedback: 
Leaders around here involve workers in major decisions and activities around 
safety. 
Feedback: 
Workers here are routinely encouraged to get involved in helping to understand 
safety requirements. 
Feedback: 
At this organisation there is a lot of two-way communication with leaders about 
safety. 
Feedback: 
Leaders here take the time to communicate safety messages and encourage 
people to ask questions or clarify. 
Feedback: 
Before the job starts, leaders at this organisation take time to have a conversation 
with workers about safety requirements and concerns. 
Feedback: 
Throughout work activities, there are times when teams come together to discuss 
safety problems or issues. 
Feedback: 
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Leaders at this organisation encourage workers to plan together and collaborate 
during work activities so safety can be maintained. 
Feedback: 
As work happens, people routinely work together and support each other to talk 
through safety issues and challenges. 
Feedback: 
Leaders regularly reward or recognise workers who perform safely on the job (e.g., 
rewarding hazard identifications and control actions). 
Feedback: 
Workers here are given recognition by leaders when work is done safely and 
efficiently. 
Feedback: 
Workers here know when they have shown good safety performance because it is 
recognised and rewarded. 
Feedback: 
At this organisation, safety and work activities are integrated and not seen as 
separate parts of the job. 
Feedback: 
Around here, safety is just the way that work is done because it is a core part of all 
work procedures and activities. 
Feedback: 
Safety is not seen as a separate or add-on part of work activities at this 
organisation. 
Feedback: 
This organisation invests resources to make sure people are competent at their 
work and multi-skilled. 
Feedback: 
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People's competence to perform work is checked at regular time periods (e.g., 
annually). 
Feedback: 
Workers are given training and experience to make sure they know how to perform 
many different tasks competently. 
Feedback: 
This organisation spends time planning how work will be done so hazards and 
inefficiencies are managed before the job starts. 
Feedback: 
At this organisation, we plan ahead and think about how our workload might create 
safety risks before we start a job. 
Feedback: 
This organisation tries to buffer against safety risks by putting extra resources in 
place in case they are needed. 
Feedback: 
You can never be too careful because a safety incident or accident could happen 
when you least expect it. 
Feedback: 
Incidents and accidents can happen to the safest workplaces, so it's best to be 
prepared for anything. 
Feedback: 
It is important to maintain a level of fear or anxiety that things could go wrong 
otherwise we might be unprepared for an incident. 
Feedback: 
People need to be open to different perspectives and ideas to learn effectively. 
Feedback: 
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When people make mistakes, the focus should be on how we can learn and 
improve rather than blaming or shaming. 
Feedback: 
Different or unorthodox ways of thinking is a useful way to identify improvements 
to how things are done. 
Feedback: 
It is better that people question themselves and admit they don't know everything 
than to think everything is predictable and under control. 
Feedback: 
We can never rest easy because there is always something to learn and improve. 
Feedback: 
Being critical and questioning how things are done is an important quality to 
encourage. 
Feedback: 
People need to be clear about their role and the company's expectations to 
perform well. 
Feedback: 
It's important that people are pulled up on their performance when they cross the 
line. 
Feedback: 
Accepting your personal responsibilities and accountabilities will get you far. 
Feedback: 
There is a 'right way' and a 'wrong way' to do things in an organisation. 
Feedback: 
Following rules and standards is a useful way of staying out of trouble and 
reducing risk. 
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Feedback: 
There is a sense of professional pride in doing things 'by the book'. 
Feedback: 
Work activities can be taken apart and broken into pieces so they can be fully 
understood. 
Feedback: 
Things are at their best when work is predictable, routine, and certain. 
Feedback: 
It's important that people think and behave in similar ways so that work is 
predictable. 
Feedback: 
People at the frontline are the reason why an organisation is successful. 
Feedback: 
People with influence in an organisation are the ones that do the work everyday. 
Feedback: 
It's important to respect and value the expertise of people who work in frontline 
operations. 
Feedback: 
Power and influence is something that should be shared and distributed across an 
organisation. 
Feedback: 
Organisations where leaders and workers have a similar level of influence are 
more effective than those with a strong hierarchy. 
Feedback: 
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People shouldn't be afraid of giving away their power or influence to others with 
more expertise. 
Feedback: 
Without change and flexibility an organisation is likely to fail. 
Feedback: 
Growth is important for an organisation to survive and flourish. 
Feedback: 
Being open to growth means that an organisation is better equipped to handle 
threats and opportunities. 
Feedback: 
Investment in well thought-out safety improvements is likely to also result in better 
efficiency and quality. 
Feedback: 
It is wise to take small and measured risks when improving safety so unintended 
problems are avoided. 
Feedback: 
Thinking about the future and how to make small improvements makes an 
organisation more effective. 
Feedback: 
Considering a range of perspectives and viewpoints is essential for work to be 
done safely and efficiently. 
Feedback: 
Getting multiple people involved in planning usually results in more effective work 
on the job. 
Feedback: 
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Considering people's viewpoints and involving them as much as possible leads to 
safer and more productive work. 
Feedback: 
It is critical that people are kept informed and in the loop when concerns or 
suggestions are raised. 
Feedback: 
Giving feedback on what people have raised as ideas or concerns is important to 
keep them engaged. 
Feedback: 
Listening to and valuing people makes sure the organisation's work is efficient and 
safe. 
Feedback: 
 
 
